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Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
 
Door de veroudering van de bevolking komt ons sociaal-zekerheidsstelsel en pensioensysteem onder 
druk te staan. De recente financiële en economische crisis hebben geleid tot lagere of stagnerende 
groei en tot het verlies van veel banen. De nood aan effectieve overheidsmaatregelen die 
werkgelegenheid en groei stimuleren is groot. Nochtans hoeft dit geen onmogelijke opdracht te zijn. 
We constateren dat er grote verschillen bestaan in werkgelegenheid en groei tussen Angelsaksische 
landen, West-Europese landen en Scandinavische landen, waaruit we kunnen leren. De verschillen 
zijn bijzonder groot voor de werkgelegenheid onder oudere werknemers. Er zijn recent heel wat 
studies gedaan naar de oorzaken van deze verschillen. Empirisch onderzoek bevestigt de rol van het 
begrotingsbeleid op werkgelegenheid en groei, m.a.w. de hoogte en structuur van belastingen en 
overheidsuitgaven spelen een grote rol. Andere studies beklemtonen de rol van onderwijs voor groei.  
 
Algemene situering en bijdragen 
 
In een eerste studie van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2) construeren we een theoretisch model 
waarmee we de effecten onderzoeken van overheidsbeleid – in de eerste plaats fiscaliteit en 
overheidsuitgaven – op de economische groei, de scholingsinspanning (tertiaire studie) van jongeren 
en de werkgelegenheid van drie leeftijdsgroepen (jongere werknemers, werknemers op middelbare 
leeftijd, en oudere werknemers). 
We dragen hiermee bij tot de literatuur op drie manieren. Vooreerst zien we dat in de meeste 
theoretische modellen slechts één aspect van macro-economische prestaties aan bod komt: ofwel 
ligt de focus op werkgelegenheid ofwel ligt hij op groei. Er zijn weinig modellen die beide variabelen 
in rekening brengen, zodat de verbanden en onderlinge interactie tussen deze variabelen bij het 
onderzoek van de effecten van overheidsmaatregelen verloren gaan. Een tweede opmerking is dat 
men in de literatuur weinig studies vindt die rekening houden met de verschillen in werkgelegenheid 
tussen leeftijdsgroepen. Over het algemeen gaat het over één werkgelegenheidscijfer voor de gehele 
bevolking op actieve leeftijd. In de realiteit is het duidelijk dat mensen van middelbare leeftijd meer 
werken dan jongeren, die nog een deel van hun tijd besteden aan studeren, en ouderen. Ten derde is 
de modellering van het begrotingsbeleid in de meeste studies beperkt. Een rijke specificatie waarbij 
diverse categorieën belastingen (op arbeid, consumptie en kapitaal) en diverse categorieën 
overheidsuitgaven (productieve uitgaven, transfers aan wie niet werkt, pensioenen, en dergelijke) 
worden onderscheiden, en in hun effecten worden vergeleken, ontbreekt doorgaans.  
 
Ons model in hoofdstuk 2 houdt rekening met deze tekortkortingen. In dit onderzoek wordt scholing, 
in het bijzonder hoger onderwijs, als een belangrijke determinant voor economische groei 
beschouwd. De assumptie is dat iedereen bekwaam en gemotiveerd is om met succes hogere studies 
te volgen. In de werkelijkheid is dit duidelijk niet zo. In het volgend hoofdstuk maken we het model 
nog meer waarheidsgetrouw door niet langer te veronderstellen dat alle individuen dezelfde 
studievaardigheden hebben. Mensen verschillen in hun bekwaamheid om bestaande kennis te 
 
 
absorberen en nieuwe kennis op te bouwen. In hoofdstuk 3 houden we rekening met deze 
verschillen in studievaardigheden tussen mensen. Hiermee leveren we een andere bijdrage tot de 
literatuur. Het meer realistisch en completer model van hoofdstuk 3 met verschillende 
‘bekwaamheidsgroepen’ van individuen gebruiken we in een volgende studie (hoofdstuk 4) om de 
effecten van verschillende mogelijke hervormingen van het pensioensysteem op groei, scholing, en 
werkgelegenheid (globaal en naar leeftijd) te onderzoeken.  
 
Onderzoeksaanpak en resultaten 
 
In de eerste studie (hoofdstuk 2 van het proefschrift) onderzoeken we dus de effecten van 
begrotingsbeleid op de economische groei, de scholing van de jongeren en de werkgelegenheid van 
drie leeftijdsgroepen. We construeren hiervoor een micro-economisch gefundeerd algemeen 
evenwichtsmodel (overlapping generations model) waarin de hoogte en de samenstelling van de 
ontvangsten en de uitgaven van de overheid een cruciale rol spelen. De overheid heft belasting op 
arbeid, kapitaal en consumptie. De uitgaven van de overheid omvatten overheidsconsumptie, 
productieve uitgaven en transfers naar structureel niet-werkenden. Productieve uitgaven zijn 
uitgaven hoofdzakelijk voor onderwijs en publieke infrastructuur. De tijd die jongeren besteden aan 
tertiaire studie is de hoofdcomponent van de endogene economische groei in het model. Naast de 
drie actieve generaties is er in het model ook één generatie van gepensioneerden. We tonen de 
empirische relevantie aan van het model voor een groep van 13 OESO landen (3 Angelsaksische 
landen, 6 West-Europese en de 4 Scandinavische landen) in de periode 1995-2007. We observeren 
opmerkelijke verschillen in werkgelegenheid per leeftijdsgroep, scholingsinspanning van de jongeren 
en groei tussen deze OESO landen. We illustreren dat de voorspellingen van het model voor deze 13 
landen de actuele data heel goed voorspellen. Vervolgens gebruiken we het aan de realiteit geteste 
model om de effecten van verschillende beleidsmaatregelen die de werkgelegenheid en groei 
bevorderen te simuleren.  
 
Resultaat van het onderzoek is dat verlaging van de belasting op arbeid en (vooral) verlaging van 
transfers aan structureel niet-werkenden het meest effectief zijn als we de werkgelegenheid willen 
bevorderen. Productieve uitgaven zijn het meest effectief voor de output en groei op lange termijn. 
Als één van de belangrijke onderzoeksresultaten vinden we dat belastingverlaging op arbeid 
effectiever is t.a.v. de groei en werkgelegenheid wanneer deze gericht is op oudere werknemers. 
Lastenverlaging op de arbeid van jongeren is veeleer negatief voor de lange termijn groei omdat deze 
de jongeren ontmoedigt om te blijven studeren. 
 
Gebaseerd op deze studie kunnen we voor veel Europese landen de volgende beleidsaanbeveling 
doen om groei en werkgelegenheid te bevorderen, vooral onder de oudere werknemers. Een 
effectieve beleidsmaatregel is het verlagen van de transfers aan structureel niet-werkenden en het 
hierdoor vrijgekomen budget te gebruiken om de belasting op arbeid van oudere werknemers te 
verlagen en de uitgaven voor onderwijs en publieke infrastructuur te verhogen. 
 
 
 
Ten opzichte van hoofdstuk 2 maken we in het derde hoofdstuk een meer realistische 
veronderstelling. Meer bepaald bouwen we in dat er in elke generatie verschillende 
bekwaamheidsgroepen zijn. We onderscheiden drie specifieke groepen met verschillende 
aangeboren studiebekwaamheid: laag, gemiddeld en hoog. De eerste groep neemt veeleer weinig 
van de bestaande kennis op wanneer ze jong zijn. Deze groep studeert ook niet verder. De tweede en 
de derde groep assimileren meer bestaande kennis, en zijn ook productiever in het opbouwen van 
nieuwe kennis door studie. De groep met de hoogste studiebekwaamheid studeert het langst en 
bouwt het meeste menselijk kapitaal op.  
 
In ons derde hoofdstuk gaan we de implicaties na voor de conclusies uit het vorige hoofdstuk 
wanneer we rekening houden met heterogeniteit in studievaardigheid. Minder lasten voor oudere 
werknemers, en dus een hoger nettoloon later, betekent dat de return op investering in scholing 
wanneer men jong is toeneemt, waardoor men eerder geneigd is om verder te gaan studeren. De 
vraag nu is of deze maatregel nog efficiënt is als men weet dat niet iedereen slaagt in hoger en zelfs 
niet in middelbaar onderwijs. In hoofdstuk 2 stelden we ook dat verlaging van belasting op arbeid 
van jongeren het studeren ontmoedigt, en dus slecht is voor de groei. Wat als men nu een 
belastingverlaging op arbeid enkel voor de lage inkomensgroepen doorvoert? Het model in 
hoofdstuk 3 laat toe dit te onderzoeken. De personen met laag inkomen zijn over het algemeen de 
laaggeschoolden, die niet verder gestudeerd hebben. In het model beschouwen we als lage 
inkomensgroepen diegenen die minder verdienen dan twee derde van het gemiddelde 
arbeidsinkomen. Verder vonden we in hoofdstuk 2 ook dat verhoging van productieve uitgaven, 
hoofdzakelijk voor onderwijs, het meest effectief is met betrekking tot groei. Maar zal dit geen 
ongelijkheidsverhogend effect hebben wanneer ongeveer een derde van de actieve bevolking geen 
baat heeft bij zulke maatregel omdat ze niet verder studeren? Of is deze groep op langere termijn 
toch beter af bij verhoogde productieve uitgaven, omdat ze ook genieten van de resulterende 
algemene productiviteitsverhoging? 
 
Zoals ook in hoofdstuk 2 werd de empirische relevantie van dit uitgebreid model getoetst en werden 
de beleidssimulaties pas uitgevoerd nadat het model voldoende empirisch gevalideerd was. Het 
nieuwe model is eveneens in staat de beduidend lagere werkzaamheidgraad onder laaggeschoolden 
te verklaren. En er wordt in het model ook rekening gehouden met het feit dat de verschillende types 
van arbeid (van laag, midden en hooggeschoolden) niet perfect substitueerbaar zijn.  
 
Onze conclusies zijn de volgende. Vooreerst bevestigen we de onderzoeksresultaten uit hoofdstuk 2. 
We vinden opnieuw dat verlaging van de belasting op arbeid en verlaging van de uitkeringen naar 
structureel niet-werkenden het meest effectief zijn om werkgelegenheid te bevorderen. Productieve 
uitgaven verhogen heeft opnieuw het positiefste effect op de lange termijn groei. Tevens blijkt ook 
nu dat een verlaging van de belasting op arbeid enkel gericht op oudere werknemers positief is voor 
de lange termijn groei. Opnieuw geldt het omgekeerde wanneer we een verlaging van de belasting 
 
 
op arbeid doorvoeren voor jongeren. Vooral nieuw en belangrijk in deze studie was het bekijken van 
de welvaartseffecten van fiscale beleidsmaatregelen voor de drie verschillende 
bekwaamheidsgroepen (laag, gemiddeld en hoog). We vonden duidelijk verschillende effecten op de 
werkgelegenheid en verschillende welvaartseffecten voor deze drie groepen. Onder andere vonden 
we dat een gecombineerde maatregel van verlaging van de belasting op arbeid voor oudere 
werknemers, samen met een verlaging van de belasting op arbeid voor lage inkomensgroepen, 
welvaartsbevorderend was voor zowel laag-, midden- en hooggeschoolden, en zowel bevorderend 
was voor de groei als voor de werkgelegenheid. Dit in tegenstelling tot een loutere belastingverlaging 
voor oudere werknemers, die de welvaart van de laaggeschoolden schaadde. De belangrijkste 
beleidsimplicatie van dit nieuwe hoofdstuk met heterogene individuen is:  beperk de uitkeringen 
voor structureel niet-werkenden en gebruik het vrijgekomen budget voor hogere productieve 
uitgaven en lagere belasting op arbeid voor zowel lage inkomensgroepen als voor oudere 
werknemers.  
 
In hoofdstuk 4 breiden we bovenstaand model uit met een publiek pensioensysteem en onderzoeken 
we, in een gezamenlijk werk met Tim Buyse, de effecten van pensioenhervormingen op 
werkgelegenheid, onderwijs, groei en welvaart. Deze studie is een uitbreiding van het model van 
Buyse, Heylen en Van de Kerckhove (Journal of Population Economics, 2013). In dit model 
ontwikkelen de auteurs een overlapping generations model met een repartitie pensioen systeem. De 
huidige actieve bevolking (3 generaties werkenden) betaalt de pensioenen van de oudere generatie. 
De wettelijke pensioenleeftijd is 65 jaar. Wettelijke pensioenen worden vanaf die leeftijd betaald. 
Maar oudere werknemers kunnen beslissen om vroeger te stoppen. Tot hun 65 jaar hebben ze recht 
op een vervroegd pensioen. De conclusie van Buyse et al. (2013) is dat een goed geconstrueerd 
repartitiesysteem beter kan presteren voor de macro-economische groei en werkgelegenheid dan 
een kapitalisatiestelsel. Wenselijk zijn een nauwe band tussen het pensioen en het eigen 
arbeidsinkomen, vooral het arbeidsinkomen dat verdiend is tussen 40 en 65 jaar.  
 
Een tekortkoming van dit model is, dat de auteurs geen onderscheid maken tussen individuen en hun 
studiebekwaamheid. Ze gaan voorbij aan het gegeven dat een nauwe band tussen het pensioen en 
het eigen arbeidsinkomen ook sterk ongelijkheidsverhogend kan werken. Laaggeschoolden die een 
lager loon verdienen zullen in dit model ook een laag pensioen ontvangen en kunnen op oudere 
leeftijd in armoede belanden. Om deze problematiek en optimaal beleid dienaangaande te 
onderzoeken, maken we in hoofdstuk 4 opnieuw het model meer realistisch door ook hier de 
individuen op te splitsen in de drie specifieke bekwaamheidsgroepen. Vervolgens kunnen we de 
effecten van verschillende pensioensystemen en pensioenhervormingen (repartitiesysteem, eigen 
kapitalisatie, basispensioen, …) op werkgelegenheid, scholing, economische groei en ongelijkheid in 
kaart brengen. Uit onze resultaten blijkt de voorkeur voor een ‘intelligent’ repartitiesysteem boven 
basispensioenen en pensioensystemen die vooral steunen op individueel pensioensparen. 
 
 
 
We vinden de sterkste positieve effecten op werkgelegenheid, groei en geaggregeerde welvaart in 
een repartitiestelsel wanneer het verband tussen pensioen en individueel verdiende 
arbeidsinkomens hoog is en wanneer bij de berekening van de pensioenbasis veel gewicht wordt 
toegekend aan de inkomsten uit arbeid als oudere werknemer. Onze resultaten bevestigen aldus die 
van Buyse et al. (2013). We vinden echter ook – zoals verwacht - dat dit repartitiesysteem, wanneer 
het niet verder gecorrigeerd wordt, een sterke toename van ongelijkheid impliceert. Het beste om 
deze ongelijkheid te verminderen, is de strakke koppeling tussen individueel arbeidsinkomen en de 
pensioenbasis te handhaven, ook voor lage inkomensgroepen, maar anderzijds hun vervangingsratio 
aanzienlijk te verhogen. Dit vereist wel solidariteit van de hogere inkomensgroepen.  
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Introduction 
 
1. General context and motivation 
 
Rising pressure on social security and pension systems due to ageing,  as well as the risk of persistent 
output and job losses because of the recent financial and economic crisis, have strengthened in all 
OECD countries the need to develop effective employment and growth policies. The need to raise 
employment is particularly pressing among older and lower skilled workers, in most countries of the 
euro area.  At the same time, the observation of (much) higher employment and higher growth in 
some other countries reveals that low employment and growth are not accidents from nature. 
The reasons for these cross-country differences have been the subject of intense discussion in the 
economic literature. In recent years the importance of finding convincing explanations for what 
drives employment and growth has only increased.  Many researchers have demonstrated the major 
influence on employment of the composition of fiscal policy, i.e. the level and structure of 
government expenditures and taxes.  More recently many fiscal policy models have introduced 
education expenditures/subsidies as a major component of productive government expenditures, 
enhancing effecting human capital accumulation and possibly growth. Empirical work confirms the 
importance of fiscal policy for growth in OECD countries.  Others find evidence for a significant role 
of education for growth. 
 
The literature is limited in some aspects. First, most of the studies focus on only one aspect of macro 
performance, either employment or growth. Second, most studies neglect life cycle patterns in labor 
supply and employment differences across age groups.  The data, however, show that in all countries 
the middle aged work more hours than the young and the older. Third, most existing studies 
disregard differences in abilities and motivation of people to learn.  An important observation here is 
that differences in school results feed through directly into labor market outcomes. 
 
In Chapter 2 of the dissertation we respond to the first and the second limitation that characterize 
most existing literature. We study the effects of fiscal policy in a general equilibrium OLG model on 
education, employment per age group, income, welfare and growth.  In Chapter 3 we extend our 
OLG model by allowing for heterogeneity in learning abilities.  In Chapter 4, we use the extended OLG 
model of Chapter 3 to investigate the effects of pension reform on the income and welfare levels of 
different ability groups. 
 
2. Research questions, results, and contributions 
 
In Chapter 2 “Employment by age, education, and economic growth : Effects of fiscal policy 
composition in general equilibrium”  we build and parameterize a general equilibrium OLG model 
(Overlapping Generation Model) for an open economy that explains hours of work of young, middle 
aged and older individuals, education of the young, and aggregate growth, within one coherent 
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framework. The composition of fiscal policy, i.e. the level and structure of taxes and government 
expenditures, play a crucial role. The government sets tax rates on labor, capital and consumption.  It 
allocates its revenue to productive expenditures (mainly for education and public infrastructure), 
consumption and non-employment benefits. Labor taxes and benefits may differ across age groups. 
In our four-period OLG model we consider three working generations and one retired generation and 
we evaluate the empirical relevance of our model on a group of 13 OECD countries in 1995-2007. We 
observe significant differences in employment by age, education of the young and per capita growth 
across these 13 OECD countries. We find that our model’s predictions match the facts remarkably 
well for all key variables in many OECD countries and then use the model to investigate the 
effectiveness of various fiscal policy measures in promoting employment and growth. We also 
evaluate welfare effects for current and future generations.  
 
Our key research question is what fiscal policy is most effective to promote employment, in 
particular among older workers, human capital formation, and per capita growth? What is the 
optimal composition of taxes, and of government expenditures? What are the employment and 
growth effects of changes in this composition? What is the realistic size of all these effects? What are 
the welfare effects on current and future generations?  
 
We contribute to the literature in two possible ways. First, we tell one story explaining employment, 
and human capital and growth. Our approach allows to fully take into account the mutual 
relationships between all variables, which will matter for the size and possibly the sign of fiscal policy 
effects. Our second potential contribution is the careful parameterization of our model and we 
establish its empirical reliability before using the model for policy simulations. 
 
The main results in this research are as follows. We identify cuts in labor taxes and non-employment 
benefits as the main policy variables promoting employment. Productive expenditures are the most 
effective with respect to long-run output and growth.  We observed that output and growth may 
benefit from labor tax cuts targeted at middle-aged and older workers since these policies raise the 
return to investment in education when young. By contrast, labor tax cuts targeted at younger 
workers discourage the young to study and imply lower future output and growth. In general, the 
size of the effects that we obtain is well within the range of existing studies, although often at the 
lower end. A key policy implication of our results for many European countries searching higher 
growth and employment, mainly among older workers, would be to cut non-employment benefits 
and to reallocate these resources to labor tax cuts on older workers and to higher productive 
expenditures. From a welfare perspective, these policies are beneficial to current young and future 
generations, but only some are likely to support from current older and retired individuals. 
 
In Chapter 2, we assume homogeneous individuals in each generation, and disregard obvious 
differences in abilities and motivation of people to learn. Everyone in the model is able to study and 
succeed at the tertiary level. Reality is different, however. Data reveal that in 2008 about 30% of the 
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25-64 year old population on average in the OECD has no upper secondary degree. About 44% has an 
upper secondary degree but no tertiary degree. About 40% obtains an upper secondary degree, but 
no tertiary degree. Cross-country variation in these data suggests that differences in the schooling 
system and government policies may have an important influence on these numbers. But the simple 
fact that innate ability as for example reflected by IQ varies across people implies that one can never 
expect everyone to exceed at the tertiary level. 
 
In Chapter 3 “Heterogeneous abilities, and the effects and fiscal policies on employment and growth” 
we extend our OLG model by allowing for heterogeneous abilities. We make the assumption that 
within each generation three ability groups exist. These groups differ both in the degree to which 
they (when young) assimilate existing knowledge, i.e. inherit human capital from the middle aged 
generation, and in their productivity of schooling when they spend time studying. One group has low 
ability and will never engage in tertiary education. A second group has medium ability, a third group 
high ability. Both these groups inherit higher fractions of existing human capital, and will allocate 
time to tertiary education, but given the variation between them in the productivity of knowledge 
assimilation and schooling, the amount of time will differ. A high quality schooling system may to 
some extent counteract the effects of differences in innate ability. Our extensions allow for a richer 
analysis of policy.  
 
Our main findings are the following. First, we confirm our earlier results in Chapter 2. We again 
identify labor taxes and (especially) ‘non-employment’ benefits as the main policy variables affecting 
employment. Productive government expenditures are the most effective with respect to long-run 
output and growth. Again we observe that output and growth may benefit also from labor tax cuts 
targeted at older workers. Second, however, a first new result in this study is that if these policies are 
imposed, they also imply clearly differential welfare effects between the ability groups. Current and 
near future low ability individuals may experience welfare losses. Third, better overall employment 
effects and better welfare effects for low ability groups, at a slight cost in terms of growth, are 
possible if one complements policies that cut labor taxes on older workers with labor tax cuts on the 
low wage earners. The best effects on employment follow if this combined tax cut is financed by 
overall benefit cuts.  A key policy implication of our results for many European countries would be to 
cut non-employment benefits, and to reallocate these resources to tax cuts on older workers, tax 
cuts on all the low wage earners, and higher productive expenditures. 
 
In Chapter 4 “Pension reform in an OLG model with heterogeneous abilities” which is joint work with 
Tim Buyse, we study the effects of pension reform on employment, education, growth and welfare. 
This study is an extension of the model of Buyse et al. (2013). These authors develop an overlapping 
generations model which includes a public PAYG old-age pension system which pays out pensions to 
a fourth generation of retired. The statutory retirement age in the model is 65 and exogenous. Old-
age pensions are paid from this age onwards. Individuals, however, may optimally choose a lower 
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effective (early) retirement age. They then receive early retirement benefits. The specification of 
pension benefits allows for both own-earnings related and flat-rate or basic components.  
 
A shortcoming of this model is, however, that the authors do not explicitly model heterogeneity in 
skills or abilities. In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, we therefore introduce heterogeneous 
abilities, in order to assess the effects of the proposed pension reforms on inequality and welfare. 
Within each generation we distinguish individuals with high, medium or low ability to build human 
capital, which allows investigating also the effects of pension reform on the income and welfare 
levels of different ability groups. The government sets tax rates on labor, capital and consumption. It 
allocates its revenue to productive expenditures, consumption, pensions and non-employment 
benefits which include early retirement benefits. Our aim is to investigate the effects of various 
parametric adjustments in the old-age PAYG pension system on the employment rate of young, 
middle aged and older workers, education, growth and welfare. These parametric adjustments 
include changes in benefit levels, changes in the link between benefits and individual contributions, 
and changes in the weights of the three active periods in the computation of the old-age pension 
assessment base, i.e. earned labor income used to calculate pension benefits. We also consider the 
effects of moving to full private capital funding.  
 
An advantage of realistically introducing heterogeneous abilities, and therefore an important 
contribution of this research, is that we will be able to study differential effects of pension reform on 
the income and welfare levels of individuals with different abilities and human capital. Particular 
attention goes to the income at old-age and the welfare level of the low-ability individuals. The link 
to major issue as old-age poverty is obvious. 
 
Our results prefer an ‘intelligent’ pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. We find the strongest positive effects 
on employment, growth and aggregate welfare in a PAYG system when it includes a tight link 
between individual labor income and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to labor 
income earned as an older worker to compute the pension assessment base. Our results confirm 
those of Buyse et al. (2013). However, we find that their preferred system, when uncorrected, 
implies a strong increase of welfare inequality. Best is to maintain the tight link between individual 
labor income and the pension also for low-ability individuals, but to significantly raise their 
replacement rate. This requires some solidarity from high-ability individuals.  
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Abstract 
We build and parameterize a general equilibrium OLG model that explains hours worked by three 
active generations, education by the young, the retirement decision of older workers, and aggregate 
per capita growth as functions of the level and structure of taxes and government expenditures. We 
find that our model’s predictions match the facts remarkably well for all key variables in many OECD 
countries. We then use the model to investigate the effects of various fiscal policy shocks. To 
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prefer labor tax cuts targeted at older workers and higher productive government expenditures 
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1. Introduction 
Rising pressure on the welfare state due to ageing, and growing concerns about the sustainability of 
public finances at times of high government debt, force all OECD countries to develop effective 
employment and growth policies. The need to raise employment is particularly pressing in the euro 
area, and most so among older workers. Concern for employment and growth is not new, however. 
They have been high on the agenda of both policy makers and researchers for at least two decades.  
 
Many researchers have demonstrated the major influence on employment of the composition of 
fiscal policy, i.e. the level and structure of taxes and government expenditures including social 
security programs. Most contributions focus on aggregate employment (e.g. Prescott, 2004; 
Rogerson, 2007; Dhont and Heylen, 2008; Ohanian, Raffo and Rogerson, 2008; Olovsson, 2009; Berger 
and Heylen, 2011). Recent work, however, has paid growing attention to life cycle patterns in labor 
supply and employment differences across age groups (e.g. Rogerson and Wallenius, 2009; 
Wallenius, 2009; Alonso-Ortiz, 2011; Erosa, Fuster and Kambourov, 2012). Fiscal policy composition is 
also a central element in the ‘capital accumulation’ endogenous growth framework as initiated by 
Barro (1990) and King and Rebelo (1990). More recently, many fiscal policy models have introduced 
education expenditures/subsidies as a major component of productive government expenditures, 
enhancing human capital accumulation and possibly growth (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; 
Buiter and Kletzer, 1993; Docquier and Michel, 1999; Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; Dhont and 
Heylen, 2009). Empirical work confirms the importance of fiscal policy for growth in OECD countries 
(e.g. Kneller, Bleany and Gemmell, 1999; Romero-Ávila and Strauch, 2008; Gemmell, Kneller and 
Sanz, 2011). Others find evidence for a significant role of education and/or public education 
expenditures (e.g. Barro, 2001; Nijkamp and Poot, 2004; de la Fuente and Doménech, 2006; 
Blankenau, Simpson and Tomljanovich, 2007)1. Hanushek and Woessmann (2009, 2011) emphasize 
the crucial role of education quality and the institutional features of the schooling system for growth. 
 
The above mentioned literature has strongly improved our understanding of the effects of fiscal 
policy on employment, human capital, and growth. Still, it is limited in two respects.  
First, most of the above mentioned studies focus on only one aspect of macro performance, 
either employment or growth. Most studies explaining employment disregard human capital and 
growth. At the same time, existing models explaining growth generally ignore the endogeneity of 
labor supply and the labor-leisure choice. Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009) are 
exceptions in this respect. They construct general equilibrium models with infinitely lived identical 
individuals and a rich specification of fiscal policy to study labor supply, employment and growth 
within one coherent framework. Some other researchers have built models with endogenous labor 
supply and endogenous human capital, but exogenous growth. Wallenius (2009) studies the 
influence of social security programs on life cycle labor supply in a general equilibrium context. She 
                                                          
1
 Not all studies investigating the relationship between education and growth come up with significant positive 
results, however (e.g. Pritchett, 2001). De la Fuente and Doménech (2006) point at the low quality of schooling 
and human capital data as an important factor that may explain the mitigated results in many studies. 
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models human capital formation endogenously via a learning-by-doing mechanism. Fougère et al. 
(2009), Ludwig, Schelkle and Vogel (2012) and Guvenen, Kuruscu and Ozkan (2009) have also 
constructed models with endogenous employment over the life cycle and human capital formation. 
Here human capital is accumulated via the allocation of time to education or training à la Ben-Porath 
(1967). Second, the few studies that model labor supply and employment over the life cycle, and that 
have endogenous human capital, are relatively limited in the specification of the fiscal block and the 
number of fiscal policy instruments that they consider. Wallenius (2009) investigates the effects of 
the scale and eligibility rules of social security programs. Guvenen et al. (2009) study the effects of 
progressive taxation on human capital and before-tax wage inequality. Fougère et al. (2009) and 
Ludwig et al. (2012) do not investigate the impact of fiscal policy. All in all, the expenditure side in 
particular is underdeveloped in existing models. In this paper we want to make progress on these 
aspects.   
 
Our main objectives in this paper are (i) to construct and parameterize a general equilibrium 
overlapping generations model for an open economy where hours worked by three active 
generations, education by the young, the retirement decision of older workers, and economic growth 
are all endogenous, and (ii) to use this model to study the effects of a rich set of fiscal policy shocks. 
The model is situated in the fiscal policy endogenous growth tradition, with growth being related to 
education and education quality. In line with most of this literature, we assume competitive markets. 
The government in our model sets tax rates on labor, capital and consumption. It allocates its 
revenue to productive expenditures (mainly for education), consumption, pensions, and non-
employment benefits, including early retirement benefits. Our key research question is what fiscal 
policy is most effective to promote employment, in particular among older workers, human capital 
formation, and per capita growth? What is the optimal composition of taxes, and of government 
expenditures? What are the employment and growth effects of changes in this composition? What is 
the realistic size of all these effects? What are the welfare effects on current and future generations? 
 
Although the questions that we ask are not new, we contribute to the literature in two possible 
ways. First, unlike existing studies, we tell one story explaining employment over the life cycle, and 
human capital and growth. Our approach allows to fully take into account the mutual relationships 
between all variables, which will matter for the size and possibly the sign of fiscal policy effects. 
Various channels exist in our model where changes in employment, capital formation and growth 
reinforce each other. For example, if employment rises, so will the marginal productivity of physical 
capital and the incentive to invest. Also, if people expect to retire later and work more hours as older 
worker, the return to investment in education when young will rise, and so may human capital and 
growth. Conversely, policies that promote education will encourage people to work longer since they 
will then get a higher return from their investment. Our model also contains channels where 
employment and growth move in opposite directions. One channel follows from the possible 
tradeoff between employment of the young and education. Policies that promote employment of 
the young may hinder growth when they discourage the young to study. From these examples it can 
easily be derived that a realistic modeling of all the linkages between labor supply in different 
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periods of life, human capital formation, and growth, is crucial for a correct analysis of the effects of 
fiscal policy changes. The long-run effects of labor tax cuts for example will be very different in a 
model where the endogeneity of human capital formation is taken into account rather than 
neglected. Also, the long-run effects of labor tax cuts may be very different when these tax cuts are 
targeted at older workers rather than young individuals.  
 Our second contribution is our focus on comparative fiscal policy analysis. Taking as our 
starting point the need to raise growth and employment, most so among older workers, in many 
OECD countries, we investigate the relative effectiveness of various changes in fiscal policy 
composition. The question is what policies work best? It makes our perspective different from recent 
contributions in the literature, like those of Alonso-Ortiz (2011) and Erosa et al. (2012). A central aim 
of their work is to investigate to what extent differences in various social security programs and taxes 
between European countries and the US can explain differences in labor market performance 
between these countries. They find for example that differences in social security rules are more 
important than tax differences.  
 
Reliable policy analysis requires a very careful parameterization of our model. Stokey and Rebelo 
(1995) have shown an extreme variation in the predictions of existing calibrated fiscal policy models. 
Results seem to be very sensitive to the choice of some parameters. Models with education may be 
particularly vulnerable due to a lack of robust evidence on the correct specification and 
parameterization of the human capital production function (Bouzahzah, de la Croix and Docquier, 
2002). We learn from this that, before using a calibrated model for policy analysis, it is particularly 
useful to test its empirical validity. We here test our model for a group of 13 OECD countries. This 
group includes the US, the core countries of the euro area, the UK, Canada and the Nordic countries. 
Our procedure is as follows. We calibrate our model to match the data for one (small open) 
economy, Belgium. We then impose the obtained technology and preference parameters on all 
countries, together with country-specific fiscal policy parameters and education quality. Simulating 
the model for each country we require (and find) that its predictions match the main facts in most 
countries. These facts concern observed hours of work in three age groups (20-34, 35-49, 50-64), 
education of the young (20-34), the effective retirement age of older workers, and per capita growth 
in 1995-2007. We conclude that the model translates observable policy differences into performance 
differences which are roughly in line with observations in the data. This clearly raises confidence 
about the quantitative reliability of the model. Our approach also yields new evidence on the human 
capital production function. The data prefer a specification where effective human capital is 
produced from both private inputs (education time) and public inputs (productive government 
expenditures, mainly for education), with the degree of complementarity between them being much 
higher than in the Cobb-Douglas case. To match the data, it seems very important also to account for 
the quality of schooling.   
 
Having established its empirical reliability, we then use the model for policy simulations. Our main 
results are as follows. We identify cuts in labor taxes and non-employment benefits as the main 
policy variables promoting employment. Productive government expenditures are the most effective 
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with respect to long-run output and growth. Furthermore, we observe that output and growth may 
benefit from labor tax cuts targeted at middle-aged and older workers since these policies raise the 
return to investment in education when young. By contrast, labor tax cuts targeted at younger 
workers and non-employment benefit reductions imply lower future output and growth since they 
discourage the young to study. The net output and growth effects of overall labor tax cuts are 
positive, but quite small. Finding that (aggregate) employment, education and growth move in the 
same direction after some policy measures (labor tax cuts targeted at older workers), whereas they 
move in opposite directions after others (labor tax cuts for young workers, non-employment benefit 
cuts), underscores the importance of a model where all these variables are endogenous. Finally, we 
find that capital tax cuts have relatively strong positive and permanent effects on the level of output 
also, but almost negligible effects on long-run growth, and small effects on employment. In general, 
the size of the effects that we obtain is well within the range of existing studies, although often at the 
lower end.  
A key policy implication of our results for many European countries searching higher growth 
and employment, mainly among older workers, would be to cut non-employment benefits and to 
reallocate these resources to labor tax cuts on older workers and to higher productive expenditures. 
The US would also benefit from higher productive expenditures. Non-employment benefits being low 
in the US, higher productive expenditures may be financed also by higher consumption taxes. From a 
welfare perspective, these policies are beneficial to current young and future generations, but only 
some are likely to get support from current older and retired individuals. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we document differences in employment by age, 
education of the young and per capita growth across 13 OECD countries since 1995. Section 3 sets 
out our model. In Section 4 we calibrate the model on actual data and confront its predictions with 
the facts described in Section 2. Sections 5 and 6 include the results of a wide range of model 
simulations. In Section 5 we discuss the long-run equilibrium effects of policy changes, in Section 6 
the transitional dynamics, and the welfare effects per generation. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Cross-country differences in employment by age, tertiary education and per capita growth 
Table 1 contains key data on employment, education and growth in 13 OECD countries in 1995-2007. 
One would like a reliable model to match the main cross-country differences reported here. The 
employment rate in hours (n) indicates the fraction of potential hours that are actually being worked 
by the average person in one of three age groups: n1 for young persons (age 20-34), n2 for middle-
aged persons (35-49), and n3 for older persons (50-64). Potential hours are 2080 per person per year 
(52 weeks times 40 hours per week). The observed employment rate rises if more people in an age 
group have a job, and if the employed work more hours. The employment rate in the age group of 50 
to 64 is also affected by the average age at which older workers withdraw from the labor force. We 
also include the effective retirement age in Table 1. In most countries, this age is well below the 
official age to receive old-age pensions (65 in most countries, 60 in France). The education rate (e) is 
our proxy for the fraction of time spent studying by the average person of age 20-34. It has been 
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calculated as the total number of students in full-time equivalents, divided by total population in this 
age group. Our data for (average annual) real per capita growth concern real potential GDP per 
person of working age. We refer to Appendix 1 for further details on the calculation of all our data, 
and on the assumptions that we have to make. 
As is well-known, middle-aged individuals work most hours, followed by the young. The older 
generation works the lowest number of hours. Average employment rates over all countries in these 
three age groups are 55.0%, 63.7% and 43.6% respectively. Furthermore, the data reveal strong 
cross-country differences. We observe the highest employment rates in each age group in the US. 
Employment rates are much lower in the core countries of the euro area, with the gap being very 
large for older workers. The Nordic countries take intermediate positions, although they are close to 
the core euro area for the younger generation. The latter, however, seems to be related to 
education. Young people’s effective participation in education is by far the highest in the Nordic 
countries, in particular Denmark and Finland. The Nordic countries also show the highest potential 
per capita growth rates. On average, growth in the core euro area and the US was more than 0.5 
percentage points lower in the period under consideration. Finally, we note that the effective 
retirement age also varies across countries. The retirement age is quite low in Belgium (57.9) and 
France (58.8). By contrast, individuals in the Nordic and the Anglo-Saxon countries participate longer. 
Unsurprisingly, correlation between the effective retirement age and the employment rate among 
older workers (n3) is very high (0.89).   
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Table 1  
Employment rate in hours (n), effective retirement age, education rate (e) and per capita growth in 
OECD countries (1995-2006/7)  
 
n1 
(20-34) 
n2 
(35-49) 
n3 
(50-64) 
effective 
retirement 
age 
e 
 
annual real per 
capita growth 
       
Austria 59.9 64.3 34.7 59.5 12.8 2.06 
Belgium 51.1 56.8 29.3 57.9 14.1 1.77 
France 48.7 60.3 38.0 58.8 14.5 1.54 
Germany 49.7 55.2 34.9        61.1 16.7 1.56 
Italy 50.1 61.9 33.8 60.1 12.6 1.30 
Netherlands 50.8 54.6 34.2 60.0 14.9 2.20 
Core euro area 
average 
 
51.7 58.8 34.2 59.6 14.3 1.74 
Denmark 56.2 66.7 49.6 62.2 23.0 1.81 
Finland 55.6 69.0 47.3 60.2 23.5 2.72 
Norway 51.9 60.9 50.6 63.1 18.1 2.29 
Sweden 53.6 66.1 55.4 63.4 17.8 2.18 
Nordic 
average 
 
54.3 65.6 50.7 62.2 20.6 2.25 
US 65.6 74.2 59.6 64.2 12.5 1.54 
       
UK 60.8 68.4 49.4 62.0 11.8 2.13 
Canada 60.9 69.5 50.4 62.1 14.0 1.68 
       
All country 
average 
55.0 63.7 43.6 61.1 15.9 1.91 
    
Data sources: OECD (see Appendix 1); data description: see main text and Appendix 1. The data for 
employment, education and growth concern 1995-2007, those for the effective retirement age 1995-2006. 
 
3. The model 
Our analytical framework consists of a computable four-period OLG-model for an open economy. We 
assume perfect international mobility of physical capital but immobile labor and human capital. 
Seminal work in the OLG tradition has been done by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) initiated the study of public finance shocks in a computable OLG 
model. Buiter and Kletzer (1993) developed an open economy version of the model with endogenous 
growth, putting human capital at the centre. As we have documented in Section 1, a large literature 
has studied the effects of fiscal policy on employment, assuming exogenous growth, or on human 
capital and growth, ignoring the labor-leisure choice and assuming exogenous employment. New in 
our model is that employment by age, education and human capital, and growth, are jointly 
endogenous.  
 
We consider three active adult generations, the young, the middle-aged and the older, and one 
generation of retired agents. All generations are of equal size, normalized to 1. Population is 
constant. Within each generation agents are homogeneous. Individuals enter the model at age 20. In 
line with our data in the previous section, each period is modeled to last for 15 years. Per period, 
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individuals are endowed with one unit of time. Young people can choose either to work and generate 
labor income, to study and build human capital, or to devote time to ‘leisure’ (including other non-
market activities). Middle-aged and older workers do not study anymore, they only work or have 
‘leisure’. The statutory old-age retirement age is 65. Individuals may however optimally choose to 
leave the labor force sooner in a regime of early retirement. Domestic firms act competitively and 
employ physical capital together with existing technology and effective labor provided by the three 
active generations. A final important assumption is that education generates a positive externality in 
the sense of Azariadis and Drazen (1990). The average level of human capital of a middle-aged 
generation is inherited by the next young generation. 
 
In what follows, we concentrate on the core elements of the model: the optimizing behavior of 
individuals, the production of effective human capital, the behavior of domestic firms, and the 
determination of aggregate output and growth, capital and wages.    
 
3.1. Individuals 
 
An individual reaching age 20 in t maximizes an intertemporal utility function of the form: 
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Lifetime utility (1) depends on consumption (cj) and enjoyed ‘leisure’ (ℓj) in each period of life.  
Superscript t indicates the period of youth, when the individual comes into the model. Subscript j 
refers to the jth period of life. Furthermore,   is the discount factor (0<<1). The intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in consumption is 1, the intertemporal elasticity to substitute leisure 1/. 
Finally,  specifies the relative value of ‘leisure’ versus consumption. Note that  may be different in 
each period of life. Except for the latter assumption, our specification of the instantaneous utility 
function is quite common in the macro literature (e.g. Rogerson, 2007; Erosa et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 1 shows the life-cycle of an individual reaching age 20 in t. Individuals choose time devoted to 
work (nj) in the three active periods and education time (e) when young. Since individuals only 
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allocate time to education in their first period, we drop the subscript 1. Time endowment is 
normalized to 1 in each period. Following the approach in Buyse, Heylen and Van de Kerckhove 
(2013), the determination of early retirement is part of individuals’ optimal choice of ‘leisure’ time in 
the third period of life (50-65). Individuals choose R which relates to the optimal effective retirement 
age and which is defined as the fraction of time between age 50 and 65 that the individual 
participates in the labor market; (1-R) is then time in early retirement. We use n3 to denote the 
fraction of time devoted to work between 50 and 65, and  ̃  as the fraction of time devoted to work 
before early retirement, but after 50. As labor market exit is irreversible and post-retirement 
employment is not allowed in our model, the relationship between n3 and  ̃  is as follows: n3 =    ̃ . 
 In the first two periods of active life, ‘leisure’ falls in labor supply and in education time 
(Equations 2 and 3). In the third period, ‘leisure’ time consists of two parts: non-employment time 
before the effective retirement age       ̃ )), and time in early retirement after it (1-R). Equation 
(4) then describes composite enjoyed ‘leisure’ of an older worker as a CES-function of both parts. 
Like Buyse et al. (2013) we assume imperfect substitutability between the two leisure types. The idea 
here is that ‘leisure’ time after and between periods of work is not the same as ‘leisure’ time in 
periods when individuals are not economically active anymore2. Equation (4) expresses that 
individuals prefer to have a balanced combination of both rather than an ‘extreme’ amount of one of 
them (and very little of the other). In this equation ρ is the constant elasticity of substitution, π is a 
usual share parameter and Ω is added as a normalization constant such that the magnitude of ℓ3 
corresponds to the magnitude of total leisure time 1-n3.
 3  The latter assumption allows to interpret 3 
as the relative value of ‘leisure’ versus consumption in the third period, comparable to 1 and 2.  
 
Figure 1. Life-cycle of an individual of generation t 
 
     
 
Period t t+1 t+2 t+3 
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Study   
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‘Leisure’ time     
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2
 Think of the former as time to relax and time to spend on personal activities of short duration. Think of the 
latter as time to enjoy activities that last longer and that ask for longer term commitment (e.g. long journeys, 
non-market activity as a volunteer).  
3
 The main results in this paper are not in any way influenced by the magnitude of π, Ω or ρ. 
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Individuals will choose consumption, labor supply, education, and their effective retirement age to 
maximize Equation (1), subject to Equations (2)-(4) and the constraints described in (5)-(12).  
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c t t t( )c a w h n ( ) b w h ( )( n e ) z                 (5) 
 
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 11 1 1 1 1
t t t t t t t
c t t t t( )c a w h n ( ) b w h ( )( n ) ( r )a z                  (6) 
3 33 3 2 3 3 2 3 3
2 3 3
3
3 2 2 2
1 1 1
1 1
1
1
t tt t t t
c t t
t
t
t t
a
t t
b t t
( )c a w h n ( ) b w h ( )R n )
                                             b w h ( )( R
R (
) ( r )a +z
  

 
  
      
    
    (7) 
 
4 3 3 4 31 1
t t t
c t t( )c ( r )a pp z                (8) 
 
    with:   1
1 2
t t
h h

            (9) 
  3 2 11t t t tyh h ( e ,g ,q ) h                  >0, '(.)>0         (10) 
  4
3
4 1
1
1
1
3
t t t
t j j j j
j
pp b w h n ( ) 

         (11) 
 33
tt tn R n
          (12) 
 
 
The LHS of Equations (5)-(8) shows that individuals allocate their disposable income to consumption 
(including consumption taxes, c) and the accumulation of non-human wealth a. We denote by 
t
ja  
the stock of wealth that an individual who enters the model at time t holds at the end of his jth 
period of life. Note in Equation (8) that the retired only consume.  
 
During the three periods of active life disposable income at the RHS includes after-tax labor income, 
non-employment benefits, interest income and lump sum transfers. In the Equations (5)-(8) wk 
stands for the real wage per unit of effective labor at time k, rk is the exogenous (world) real interest 
rate at time k, and zk is the lump sum transfer that the government pays out to all individuals at time 
k. Effective labor of an individual depends on hours worked (  
 ) and effective human capital (  
 ).  
Since young individuals allocate a fraction   
  of their time to work, and pay a tax rate on labor 
income 1, they earn an after-tax real wage equal to 1 1 11
t t
tw h n ( ) . After-tax labor income of 
middle-aged and older workers in equations (6) and (7) is determined similarly. Note that the 
government has the possibility to levy different tax rates on the different age groups. A young worker 
inherits his effective human capital from the middle-aged generation, as shown in Equation (9). 
During the second and third period, workers supply more units of effective human capital. It is our 
assumption in Equation (10) that h rises in education time when young (e), productive government 
spending in percent of GDP (gy, mainly education) and the quality of education (q). We specify and 
discuss the effective human capital production function in Section 3.2. Individuals take gy and q as 
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exogenous. We also assume in Equation (10) that human capital remains unchanged between the 
second and third period. We have in mind that learning by doing in work counteracts depreciation4.  
 
For the fraction of time that young, middle-aged and older individuals are inactive, they receive a 
non-employment benefit from the government. Older workers may be eligible to two kinds of 
benefits: standard non-employment benefits (analogous to what young and middle-aged workers 
receive) as long as they are on the labor market, and early retirement benefits after having 
withdrawn from the labor market. All benefits are defined as a proportion of the after-tax wage of a 
full-time worker. The replacement rate for standard non-employment benefits is bj with j=1,2,3a, for 
early retirement benefits it is b3b.
5 Like taxes, replacement rates may differ across age groups.  
 
After the statutory retirement age (65) individuals have no labor income and no non-employment 
benefits anymore. They then receive an old-age pension benefit (pp) and the lump sum transfer. 
Equation (11) describes the old-age pension. We assume a public PAYG pension system in which 
pensions in period k are financed by contributions (labor taxes) from the active generations in that 
period k (see below). Individual pension benefits are related to earlier labor income. Individuals earn 
a net pension which is a fraction of their so-called pension base. The latter is equal to the average of 
net labor income in each of the three active periods of life. The net replacement rate is b4. The 
pension rises in the individual’s hours of work   
  and his human capital   
 . It will be lower when the 
individual retires early (lower Rt). Fourth generation individuals consume their pension and the lump 
sum transfer, as well as their accumulated wealth from the third period plus interest (Equation 8). 
They leave no debts, nor bequests. 
 
Substituting Equations (2)-(4) for   
  and (5)-(8) for   
  into Equation (1), and maximizing with respect 
to 31 2 3 1 2
tt t t t t t
,a ,a ,n ,n ,na ,e and 
t
R , yields eight first order conditions for the optimal behavior of an 
agent entering the model at time t. Equation (13) expresses the law of motion of optimal 
consumption over time. Equations (14.a), (14.b) and (14.c) describe the optimal labor-leisure choice 
in each period of active live. In each period, individuals supply labor up to the point where the 
marginal utility of leisure equals the marginal utility gain from work. The latter  consists of two parts. 
Working more hours in a particular period raises additional resources for consumption both in that 
                                                          
4
 Our assumptions imply a constant hourly wage profile in the third period. Although the consensus view in 
labor economics is that the wage profile is hump-shaped, and declines around the age 50-55, our assumptions 
are fully in line with recent micro evidence from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics which challenges this 
consensus view (Rupert and Zanella, 2010). 
5 Our approach to model early retirement benefits as a function of a worker’s last labor income, similar to 
standard non-employment benefits, reflects regulation and/or common practice in many countries. In some 
countries (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands) workers can enter the early retirement regime only from 
employment, with their benefits being linked to the last wage. In other countries (e.g. Denmark) there is only 
access from unemployment, with the early retirement benefit being linked to the unemployment benefit 
(Salomäki, 2003). As to common practice, Duval (2003) confirms that in many countries, unemployment-related 
or disability benefits can be used de facto to bridge the time between the effective retirement age and old-age 
pension eligibility. Again there is a link between benefits and former wages.  
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period and when retired. The marginal utility gain from work is higher when initial consumption is 
lower, and when an extra hour of work yields more extra consumption. Higher human capital (and its 
underlying determinants), lower taxes on labor, lower taxes on consumption and lower non-
employment benefits contribute to the gain from work. Extra consumption during retirement rises in 
the pension replacement rate (b4).  
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Equation (15) describes the first order condition for the optimal effective retirement age. The LHS 
represents the utility loss from postponing retirement. Later retirement reduces enjoyed leisure as 
early retiree, but raises enjoyed leisure in between periods of work for given work time  ̃3. The RHS 
shows the marginal utility gain from postponing retirement. This marginal gain follows from 
consuming the extra labor income (vis-à-vis the early retirement benefit) in the third period, and the 
higher future old-age pension after 65. The latter effect rises in b4. 
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(15) 
Finally, equation (16) imposes that the marginal utility loss from investing in human capital when 
young equals the total discounted marginal utility gain in later periods from having more human 
capital. Individuals will study more the higher future versus current after-tax real wages and the 
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higher the marginal return of education to human capital ( / e )  . Labor taxes during youth 
therefore encourage individuals to study, whereas labor taxes in later periods of active life 
discourage them. Notice also that high benefit replacement rates in later periods (b2, b3a, b3b) and a 
high income-related pension replacement rate (b4) will encourage young individuals to study. The 
reason is that any future benefits and the future pension rise in future labor income, and therefore 
human capital. A final interesting result is that young people study more – all other things equal – if 
they expect to work harder in later periods (n2, n3=R. ̃3). 
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3.2. Production of effective human capital 
The specification and parameterization of the human capital production function is often a problem 
in numerical endogenous growth models. In contrast to goods production functions, there is not 
much empirical evidence and no consensus about the determinants of human capital growth, nor 
about the underlying functional form and parameter values (Bouzahzah et al, 2002, Arcalean and 
Schiopu, 2010). The literature shows a variety of functions, typically including one or two of the 
following inputs: individual time allocated to education, private expenditures on education by 
individuals themselves or by their parents, and government expenditures on education (e.g. Lucas, 
1988, Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Docquier and Michel, 1999, Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; 
Bouzahzah et al., 2002; Fougère et al., 2009; Arcalean and Schiopu, 2010). In case of two inputs, the 
adopted functional form is very often Cobb-Douglas (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Kaganovich 
and Zilcha, 1999; Docquier and Michel, 1999).  
 
Our specification also includes education time of young individuals and education expenditures by 
the government. We see these variables as indicators for the quantity of invested private and public 
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resources. Compared to most of the literature, however, we differ in three respects. First, we adopt a 
more flexible CES functional form, allowing the elasticity of substitution to differ from 1. Second, we 
take recent empirical evidence seriously that the quality of education and the schooling system is 
very important (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009, 2011). Better quality implies higher cognitive 
abilities for the same allocation of resources. As a proxy for quality we will use OECD PISA science 
scores (see Section 4.2 for further discussion). As a third extension, our definition of relevant 
(productive) government expenditures includes more than education. It also includes expenditures 
for training in the context of active labor market policy, public R&D expenditures and public fixed 
investment. This approach goes back to our use of the broader concept of effective human capital. As 
in Dhont and Heylen (2008, 2009), effective human capital and worker productivity rise not only in 
accumulated schooling or training, but also in the productive efficiency of accumulated schooling. 
Education and training expenditures directly contribute to more human capital being accumulated, 
public R&D and fixed investment expenditures will mainly raise the productive efficiency of 
accumulated human capital.  
 
All these arguments find their way in Equation (17). The growth rate of effective human capital is a 
flexible CES function of education time when young (e) and productive government expenditures 
in % of output (gy). In steady state both determinants are constant, which will imply constant steady 
state growth. We add the quality of education (q) in a multiplicative way. We allow q to vary across 
countries in later sections. Next to q we introduce (constant, common) technical parameters:   is a 
positive efficiency parameter,  a scale parameter, v is a share parameter and   the elasticity of 
substitution. These parameters will be calibrated.  
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Due to lack of existing empirical evidence, an ex-ante assessment of our specification is difficult. In 
Section 4.3., however, we confront our model’s predictions with the facts about education and 
growth in 13 OECD countries. This confrontation reveals that our specification of the human capital 
production function performs better than alternative ones without quality, with a narrower 
definition of government expenditures, or with a Cobb-Douglas functional form.    
 
3.3. Domestic firms, output and factor prices 
Firms act competitively on output and input markets and maximize profits. All firms are identical. 
Total domestic output (Yt) is given by the production function (18). Technology exhibits constant 
returns to scale in aggregate physical capital (Kt) and effective labor (Ht), so that profits are zero in 
equilibrium. Equation (19) describes total effective labor supplied by young, middle-aged and old 
workers. Note our assumption that each generation has size 1 and that young workers inherit the 
human capital of the middle-aged ( 1t2
t
1 hh
 ).  
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and where we use Equations (9) and (10).  
 
Competitive behavior implies in Equation (20) that firms carry physical capital to the point where its 
after-tax marginal product net of depreciation equals the world real interest rate. Physical capital 
depreciates at rate δk. Capital taxes are source-based: the tax rate k applies to the country in which 
the capital is used, regardless of who owns it. The real interest rate being given, firms will install 
more capital when the amount of effective labor increases or the capital tax rate falls. In that case 
the net return to investment in the home country rises above the world interest rate, and capital 
flows in. Furthermore, perfect competition implies equality between the real wage and the marginal 
product of effective labor (Equation 21). Higher real wages follow from an increase in physical capital 
per unit of effective labor. Taking into account (20), real wages per unit of effective labor will 
therefore fall in the world real interest rate and in domestic capital tax rates. 
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Substituting (19) for Ht and (20) for Kt/Ht, we can rewrite (18) as  
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If we finally recognize that in steady state r, k, x, e, and nj are constant, we obtain the long-run (per 
capita) growth rate of the economy as 
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In line with earlier models (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Buiter and Kletzer, 1993), 
the long-run (per capita) growth rate is positively related to the quality of schooling (q) and to the 
fraction of time that young people allocate to education (e). It is also positively related to the share 
of productive government expenditures (gy), like in Barro (1990).  
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3.4. Government 
Equation (23) describes the government’s budget constraint. Productive expenditures Gyt, 
consumption Gct, benefits related to non-employment Bt (including early retirement benefits), old-
age pension benefits PPt, lump sum transfers Zt, and interest payments rtDt at time t are financed by 
taxes on labor Tnt, taxes on capital Tkt, and taxes on consumption Tct, and/or by new debt Dt+1. We 
define Dt as outstanding public debt at beginning of period t. 
 
1 1t t t yt ct t t t t t nt kt ctD D D G G B PP Z r D T T T               (23)  
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Following Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009), we assume that the government claims 
given fractions gy and gc of output for productive expenditures and consumption. Non-employment 
benefits Bt are an unconditional source of income support related to inactivity (‘leisure’) and non-
market household activities. Although it may seem strange to have such transfers in a model without 
involuntary unemployment, one can of course analyse their employment and growth effects as a 
theoretical benchmark case (see also Rogerson, 2007; Dhont and Heylen, 2009). Moreover, there is 
also clear practical relevance. Unconditional or quasi unconditional benefits to structurally non-
employed people are a fact of life in many European countries. Note also our assumption that the 
pension system is fully integrated into government accounts. We do not impose a specific financing 
of the PAYG pension plan, the government can use resources from the general budget to finance 
pensions. Finally, as we have mentioned before, the government pays the same lump sum transfer zt  
to all individuals living at time t.  
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3.5. Aggregate equilibrium and the current account 
Optimal behavior by firms and households, and government spending for productive and 
consumption purposes, underlie aggregate domestic demand for consumption and investment goods 
in the economy. Our assumption that the economy is open implies that aggregate domestic demand 
may differ from supply and income, which generates international capital flows and imbalance on the 
current account. Equation (24) describes aggregate equilibrium as it can be derived from Equations 
(5)-(8), defined for all generations living at time t, Equations (18)-(21) and Equation (23). The LHS of 
(24) represents national income. It is the sum of domestic output Yt and net factor income from 
abroad rtFt, with Ft being net foreign assets at the beginning of t. The aggregate stock of wealth At 
accumulates wealth held by individuals who entered the model in t-1, t-2 and t-3. At the RHS of (24) 
CAt stands for the current account in period t.  
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4. Parameterization and empirical relevance of the model  
The economic environment described above allows us to simulate the transitory and steady state 
growth and employment effects of various fiscal policy changes. This simulation exercise requires us 
first to parameterize and solve the model. In Section 4.1 we discuss our choice of preference and 
technology parameters. Starting from actual cross-country fiscal policy data in Section 4.2, we 
compare in Section 4.3 our model’s predictions with the employment and growth differences that we 
have reported in Table 1. This comparison provides a first and simple test of our model’s empirical 
relevance. In Section 5 we consider long-run equilibrium effects of policy changes. Section 6 
discusses transitional dynamics, and welfare effects per generation. To solve the model and to 
perform the simulations, we choose an algorithm that preserves the non-linear nature of our model. 
We follow the methodology basically proposed by Boucekkine (1995) and implemented by Juillard 
(1996) in the program Dynare. 
 
4.1. Preference and technology parameters 
Table 2 contains an overview of all parameters. Following among others Barro (1990), we set the rate 
of time preference equal to 2% per year. Considering that periods in our model consist of 15 years, 
this choice implies a discount factor  equal to 0.74. With respect to effective labor, we assume a 
share coefficient 1-  equal to 0.7. This value is well in line with the literature. For example, King and 
Rebelo (1990) also model goods production as a function of effective labor (human capital) and 
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physical capital. They assume a value for 1- equal to 2/3. There is more controversy in the literature 
about the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in leisure (1/). Micro studies often 
reveal very low elasticities. However, given our macro focus, these studies may not be the most 
relevant ones (Rogerson and Wallenius, 2009; Fiorito and Zanella, 2012). Rogerson (2007) also 
adopts a macro framework. He puts forward a reasonable range for   from 1 to 3 (Rogerson, 2007, 
p. 12). In line with this, we impose  to be equal to 2. The world real interest rate is assumed 
constant and equal to 3% per year, which is approximately the average real return on 10 year US 
government bonds in the last decade. Considering a period of 15 years, this implies that r = 0.558. 
Finally, we set the physical capital depreciation rate to 8% per year, which implies δk=0.714. This 
value is also within the range of existing studies (see e.g. Heijdra and Romp, 2009). 
 
A second series of parameters have been determined by calibration: three taste for leisure 
parameters (1, 2, 3), two parameters in the human capital production function (the efficiency 
parameter  and the scale parameter ), and the elasticity of substitution () in the composite 
leisure function in Equation (4). We have calibrated these parameters to Belgium. We choose this 
country since it is one of the most open economies in the set of countries that we focus on. 
Moreover, the calculation of non-employment benefits and public pension benefits in Belgium fits 
exactly within the way we model it6. The parameters 1, 2, 3, ,  and  have been determined such 
that with observed levels of the policy variables (tax rates, benefit replacement rates, pension 
replacement rate, etc.) and the observed level of schooling quality (q)7 in Belgium, the model 
correctly predicts Belgium’s employment rates (n1, n2, n3), per capita growth rate, education rate (e) 
and effective retirement age (R) in 1995-2007. Underlying performance and policy data are reported 
in Tables 1, 3 and 4. We find that the taste for leisure rises with age (1=0.059, 2=0.110, 3=0.204). 
Furthermore, we observe decreasing returns in human capital production ( =0.837), and a stronger 
degree of substitutability than in the Cobb-Douglas case between the two types of leisure for older 
workers (ρ = 1.60).  
 
Finally, we had no strong ex ante indication on two parameters in the human capital production 
function: the share parameter v and the elasticity of substitution parameter . We could assign 
sensible values to these parameters thanks to a sensitivity analysis on the results that we report in 
the next section. There we evaluate the capacity of our fiscal policy model to explain six important 
macro variables in 13 OECD countries. Although the influence of v and  on the explanatory power of 
our model is very limited, our guideline to pin down specific values for these parameters (within a 
sensible range) was to minimize the deviation of our model’s predictions from the true data8. This 
                                                          
6
 See footnote 5 for early retirement benefits. As to public pensions in Belgium, these are proportional to 
average annual labor income earned over a period of 45 years, with equal weights to all years (OECD, 2005). 
7
 And with the values of two parameters in the human capital production function (v, ) that we discuss below 
(see also footnote 8). 
8
 From our model’s predictions and the true data for 13 countries we computed for each variable (n1, n2, n3, e, 
R, growth) the root mean squared error normalized to the mean. We minimized the average normalized RMSE 
over all six variables. More precisely, we adopted the following iterative procedure. We chose values for v and 
 and then calibrated the efficiency parameter  and the scale parameter . The values for v and  had no 
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procedure implied v=0.25 and  = 0.55. The result for  reveals a higher degree of complementarity 
between private education time and government expenditures than in the Cobb-Douglas case. The 
result for v demonstrates relatively high importance for human capital formation of private 
education time versus productive public expenditures. Neither did we have an ex ante indication on 
the remaining parameters in the composite leisure function in Equation (4). We impose equal weight 
for both leisure types (π=0.5). The normalisation parameter Ω equals 2. The size of this parameter 
has no impact at all on our country predictions or simulation results. 
 
 
Table 2 Basic parameterization: preference and technology parameters  
 
Production parameters (output)  1 0.7   
Effective human capital 
production 
 3 553 0 25 0 55 0 837     . , v . , . , .  
Preference parameters  
1 2 3,  ,  0.74 2 0.059,  0.110,  0.204          
  ,  ,  20.5 1.60      
World real interest rate  0 558r .  
Capital depreciation rate  0 714 k .  
 
 
4.2. Fiscal policy and education quality 
Tables 3 and 4 describe key characteristics of fiscal policy in 1995-2001/2004. Our proxy for the tax 
rate on labor income concerns the total tax wedge, for which we report the marginal rate in %. The 
data cover personal income taxes, employee and employer social security contributions payable on 
wage earnings and payroll taxes. The OECD publishes these marginal tax data for eight family and 
income situations. Our data for  in Table 3 are the average of all these situations. We take this tax 
rate as a measure for all three active age groups. Belgium, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Finland have 
marginal labor tax rates above 55% or even 60%. The US have marginal labor tax rates below 40%. 
Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax rates reported by the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(their EMTR, base case). Germany and Belgium have the highest rates. In contrast to labor (and 
consumption), capital is taxed relatively little in the Nordic countries. As to consumption taxes, we 
follow Dhont and Heylen (2009) in computing them as the ratio of government indirect tax receipts 
(net of subsidies paid) to total domestic demand net of indirect taxes and subsidies. Our simplifying 
assumption is that consumption tax rates correspond to aggregate indirect tax rates. The Nordic 
countries stand out with the highest consumption tax rates, the US with the lowest. The utter right 
column in Table 3 shows the average ratio of gross government debt to GDP in the period that we 
study. The data range from less than 50% in Norway and the UK to more than 100% in Belgium and 
Italy.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
influence on the calibration results for j and . Given the obtained values for  and , we computed the 
average normalized RMSE over all six variables. We then checked whether changes in v and , and a 
recalibration of  and  , could further reduce this statistic. We did this until no further reduction was possible.    
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Table 4 summarizes our data for the expenditure side of fiscal policy. A first variable is our proxy for 
the net non-employment benefit replacement rate. Since in our model non-employment is a 
structural or equilibrium phenomenon, the data that we use concern net transfers received by 
structurally or long-term unemployed people. They include social assistance, family benefits and 
housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt.   They also include unemployment insurance or 
unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still paid, i.e. if workers can be structurally 
unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit eligibility9. The data are expressed in 
 
Table 3 Fiscal policy (tax rates and government debt) 
 
tax rate on 
labor income  
(%) 
consumption 
tax rate 
(%) 
tax rate on 
capital income 
(%) 
Government 
debt  
(% of GDP) 
    Proxy for : 
 
1, 2, 3 
 
c 
 
k D/Y 
Austria 54.9 13.2 17.3 69.6 
Belgium  67.2 13.4 27.1 117.4 
France 52.9 17.1 21.7 68.9 
Germany 60.4 11.1 34.4 63.1 
Italy 55.2 14.7 14.9 122.1 
Netherlands 52.0 12.2 24.3 68.2 
Denmark 48.6 18.9 22.5 60.3 
Finland 56.2 15.2 17.2 54.1 
Norway 50.8 16.4 22.1 40.4 
Sweden 56.0 17.9 16.1 67.2 
UK 44.9 14.5 21.2 46.6 
US 37.4 7.2 23.6 61.9 
Canada 46.4 14.5 24.8 83.8 
     
Overall country 
average 
52.5 14.3 22.1 70.6 
Note:  Labor tax rates are data for the total tax wedge, marginal rate (OECD, Taxing Wages). Data are for 2000-04. Earlier 
data are not available. For details, see Appendix 1. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax rates (Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, their EMTR; data for 1995-2001, see also Devereux et al., 2002).  Consumption tax rate: see Dhont and 
Heylen (2009). Data for 1995-2001. 
 
percent of after-tax wages. In line with our approach to determine labor tax rates, we again compute 
the average of data reported by the OECD for a wide range of family and income cases to determine 
b (see Appendix 1). We take the outcome of this computation as a measure for all three active age 
groups, before early retirement. Overall, the euro area countries and the Nordic countries pay the 
highest net benefits on average. Transfers to structurally non-employed people are by far the lowest 
in the US. A related variable is our proxy for the net early retirement benefit replacement rate. The 
data are again expressed in percent of after-tax final wages. To assess the generosity of early 
retirement we integrate the information available via b and data for the implicit tax rate on 
continued work in the early retirement route as provided by Duval (2003) and Brandt et al. (2005). 
                                                          
9
 In the period that we study, this is the case in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, Ireland, and the UK. 
Workers cannot be structurally non-employed and still receive unemployment benefits in the Netherlands, 
Italy, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and the US (OECD, 2004, 
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Benefits and Wages, country specific files).  
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For details, see Appendix 1. We observe the most generous early retirement regimes in Belgium and 
Finland, whereas net early retirement benefits in Anglo-Saxon countries are much lower. 
 
 
Table 4  Fiscal policy (net transfer replacement rates, government consumption, productive  
               expenditures) and PISA education score   
 
Non-
employment 
benefit (net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
 Early 
retirement 
benefit (net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
 
Pension 
replace- 
ment rate 
(net, in %) 
government 
consumption  
 (% of GDP) 
Government 
productive 
expenditure  
 (% of GDP) 
PISA – 
science 
(divided 
by 1000) 
   Proxy for : b1, b2, b3a b3b b4 gc gy educ q 
        
Austria 56.3 71.6 88.9 14.6 8.8    5.9 0.507 
Belgium 59.6 79.0 63.1 16.9 7.9    5.5 0.505 
France 46.0 63.8 68.8 18.3 10.2    5.9 0.502 
Germany 64.7 70.8 71.8 15.3 7.9    4.7 0.502 
Italy 17.0 55.7 88.8 14.3 7.8     4.8 0.480 
Netherlands 55.0 68.1 84.1 18.4 8.9    5.0 0.525 
Denmark 61.9 43.2 54.1 18.4 11.4    8.2 0.484 
Finland 61.3 73.8 78.8 16.0 10.8    6.6 0.550 
Norway 56.9 39.9 65.1 14.7 11.6    7.4 0.490 
Sweden 55.4 39.0 68.2 20.0 12.6    7.9 0.507 
UK 51.1 39.4 47.6 14.4 7.0    4.9 0.523 
US 30.5 18.3 51.0 10.3 9.2    5.2 0.493 
Canada 44.4 27.0 57.1 14.7 8.9    5.9 0.527 
        
Overall 
average 
52.2 53.8 68.3 15.9  9.5        6.0 0.507 
Notes: A description of all variables is given in the main text. For more details, see Appendix 1. The data for the net 
benefit replacement rates are an average for 2001-2004 (earlier data are not available). The pension replacement rate 
concerns 2002 (OECD, 2005, p. 52). The data for government consumption and productive expenditures concern 1995-
2001. The PISA science scores are an average for 2000, 2003 and 2006. 
 
 
Our data for the net old-age pension replacement rate b4 concern an individual with mean earnings 
before retirement. The data include only (quasi-)mandatory pension programs, and are expressed in 
percent of this individual’s average lifetime net labor income, as is the case in our Equation (11). 
Voluntary occupational pensions are not included. The overall average replacement rate is 68.3%, 
but there are strong cross-country differences (OECD, 2005, p. 52). 
 
Our data for productive government expenditures (gy) in Table 4 include education, training as part 
of active labor market policy, government financed R&D and public investment. As can be seen, we 
also report education expenditures separately. On average, education expenditures constitute a little 
more than 60 % of total gy. Government consumption includes wage and non-wage consumption, net 
of public education outlays going to wages and working-expenses. The latter are included in 
productive expenditures. As a final variable in Table 4 we include PISA science scores. We use these 
data as a proxy for the quality of schooling (q) in the human capital production function (17). We 
concentrate on science scores given their expected closer link to growth (Barro, 2001). Although 
available PISA scores relate to secondary education, we do not see this as a weakness. PISA scores 
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may be very informative about the quality with which young people enter tertiary education. Quality 
at entrance should have a positive influence on people’s capacity to learn and to raise human capital 
during tertiary education. Furthermore, PISA scores have been found empirically very significant for 
growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009, 2011). Finally, these scores are easily available for all 
countries. Note that there is no correlation at all in Table 4 between productive government 
expenditures and the PISA score. Correlation is -0.07. Correlation between public education 
expenditures and the PISA score is -0.12. Both variables seem to tell different stories (see also 
Woessmann, 2003).    
 
 
4.3 Predicted versus actual employment by age, education of young, and growth in the OECD  
 
In this section we confront our model’s predictions with the facts that we have reported in Table 1. 
The main idea is to test (and show) the model’s empirical validity before using it for policy analysis. 
Even if this exercise is subject to various limitations10, it is important. A first reason goes back to 
Stokey and Rebelo’s (1995) observation of an extreme variation in the predictions of existing 
calibrated fiscal policy models. Results seem to be very sensitive to the choice of some parameters. 
Careful calibration seems no guarantee for reliable predictions. We here do not want to add just 
another series of computed fiscal policy effects, even if they are derived from a model which explains 
all key variables endogenously within one framework. We also want additional evidence that these 
computed effects are realistic and reliable. A second motivation for this test is that, like most models, 
our model is highly stylized, and may miss potential determinants of growth or employment. For 
example, assuming perfect competition, we disregard differences in labor and product market 
institutions, which some authors consider of crucial importance (see e.g. Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel, 
2005; Aghion and Howitt, 2006). Also, our model assigns a key role to investment in human capital 
for growth. However, despite the major role of the human capital production in a lot of work on 
growth, the literature provides no hard empirical evidence on this function and its determinants. Our 
specification of the effective human capital growth rate in Equation (17) as a CES function of 
education time and productive government spending in % of GDP, and with the quality of schooling 
(PISA) entering in a multiplicative way as an overall productivity parameter, is not standard in the 
literature. If our specifications or assumptions were flawed, or if crucial elements for an analysis of 
fiscal policy effects are missing in our model, one may expect a confrontation of the model’s 
predictions with the true data to reveal this.   
 
We proceed as follows. Our calibration implies that our model’s prediction perfectly matches 
employment rates by age, the effective retirement age of older workers, education, and per capita 
growth in Belgium. A test of the model’s validity is whether it can also match the data for the other 
countries, and cross-country differences. To obtain individual country predictions we impose the 
                                                          
10
 For example, even if we compute the true data in Table 1 as averages over a longer period, these averages 
need not be equal to the steady state. Countries may still be moving towards their steady state. Also, this 
exercise only concerns the last 15 years. Due to lack of data – especially with respect to marginal labor tax rates 
and non-employment benefits before the mid 1990s – it is impossible for us to relate changes in growth and 
employment to changes in policy within countries over longer time periods. 
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same preference and technology parameters, reported in Table 2, on all countries. Only fiscal policy 
variables and education quality differ11. As a part of fiscal policy, lump sum transfers also differ across 
countries. Underlying our model’s predictions for each country, is the assumption of a constant debt 
to GDP ratio at the level reported for that country in Table 3. Lump sum transfers adjust 
endogenously in Equation (23) to obtain this equilibrium debt to GDP ratio.  
Simulating the model for each individual country we find that its predictions match the main 
facts in most countries. We conclude that the model translates observable policy differences into 
performance differences which are roughly in line with observations in the data. 
 
Figures 2 to 4 relate our model’s predictions for three employment rates to actual observations for 
all countries. We add the 45°-line to assess the absolute differences between predictions and facts, 
as well as the coefficient of correlation between predictions and facts. Our model performs quite 
well. In each age group, it correctly predicts high employment rates in the US and Canada, and low 
employment in Germany. For young workers it also correctly predicts relatively low employment in 
most other countries of the core euro area, and in the Nordic countries. For older workers it has 
relatively high employment right in the Nordic countries. Overall correlation between the model’s 
predictions and the actual data in Figure 1 is 0.31. If we drop Italy, for which there are good 
reasons12, this rises to 0.61. Correlation in Figure 2 is 0.52, in Figure 3 it is 0.78. Moreover, in each 
figure - again after dropping Italy from Figure 1 - the regression line (not shown) is close to the 45°-
line, which suggests that our model correctly assesses the size of the employment effects of policy 
differences across countries. Next to Italy, there are a few other countries, where our model 
somewhat over- or underpredicts. The model’s employment predictions tend to be too high for 
France, Italy and (except in Figure 1) the Netherlands. They tend to be too low in general for Finland. 
All in all, however, our model matches actual employment rates quite well for a large majority of 
countries. Given all underlying assumptions, we basically confirm earlier results of Ohanian et al. 
(2008), Dhont and Heylen (2008) and Erosa et al. (2012) that fiscal policy differences, rather than 
variation in taste for leisure or different market rigidities, are critical to explain cross-country 
variation in labor market performance. 
 
Figure 5 relates our model’s predictions to the facts for the effective retirement age. The model again 
captures the large differences between countries. It predicts the highest retirement age in the Anglo-
Saxon and Nordic countries and a much lower retirement age in core euro area countries. Correlation 
between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.91. 
 
                                                          
11
 A similar approach has been adopted before by Dhont and Heylen (2008), Alonso-Ortiz (2011) and Erosa et 
al. (2012). 
12
 A major element behind the deviation for this country seems to be underestimation of the fallback income 
position for structurally non-employed young workers. OECD data show very low replacement rates in Italy. 
However, as shown by Reyneri (1994), the gap between Italy and other European countries is much smaller 
than it seems. Reyneri (1994) points to the importance of family support as an alternative to unemployment 
benefits. Fernández Cordón (2001) shows that in Italy young people live much longer with their parents than in 
other countries. In 1995 for example about 56% of people aged 25-29 were still living with their parents in Italy. 
In about all other countries this fraction was below 23%. Of all non-working males aged 25-29 in Italy more 
than 80% were living with their parents. In France or Germany the corresponding numbers were close to 40%.   
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Figure 2. Employment rate in hours of young individuals (n1), in %, 1995-2007 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.31. 
             Excluding Italy correlation rises to 0.61.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Employment rate in hours of middle-aged individuals (n2), in %, 1995-2007 
 
 
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.52.  
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Figure 4.  Employment rate in hours of older individuals (n3), in %, 1995-2007 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.78.  
 
Figure 5.  Effective retirement age, 1995-2006 
 
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.91. 
  
 
In Figures 6 and 7 we relate our model’s predictions to the facts for education and growth. For 
education, the model correctly captures key differences between the Nordic countries on the one 
hand and countries like the UK and Italy on the other. Predictions for education are quite close to the 
45°-line for all individual countries except Denmark, Sweden and Austria. Our model also has 
important cross-country differences right for growth. It has difficulty, however, to explain observed 
growth for France and the UK. Correlation between the model’s predictions and the true data is 0.78 
for education, and 0.73 for growth. For both variables the regression line is again very close to the 
45°-line. 
The model’s good performance for education and growth is strongly related to our specification of 
the effective human capital production in Equation (17). We have adopted various alternative 
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specifications where we (i) disregard differences in the quality of schooling (PISA) across countries 
(i.e. drop q), (ii) impose a Cobb-Douglas human capital production function (κ → 1), (iii) include only 
education expenditures instead of total productive expenditures, and (iv) disregard productive 
government expenditures (i.e. impose v = 0). Compared to the specification adopted in this paper, all 
these alternatives imply a match between predictions and facts which is (much) less good13. 
Explanatory power falls most in (iv) when we drop productive government expenditures and in (ii) 
when we move to a Cobb-Douglas specification. We also observe a significant fall in explanatory 
power for growth when we neglect quality of education differences. Here our results confirm 
Hanushek and Woessmann’s (2009, 2011) findings.  
 
Figure 6. Tertiary education rate in individual countries, in %, 1995-2007  
 
  
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.78.  
 
 
Figure 7. Annual per capita potential GDP growth in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
    
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.73. 
 
                                                          
13
 The (minimized) average root mean squared error normalized to the mean over our six endogenous variables 
of interest is always higher. See also footnote 8. More details are available upon request.  
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5. Numerical steady state effects of fiscal policy shocks 
 
Having established the empirical relevance of our model, we now simulate a series of fiscal policy 
shocks. Our aim is to discover the (relative) effectiveness of changes in individual policy variables for 
the employment rate of three age groups, aggregate employment, and growth. In this section we 
focus on steady state effects. The next section discusses transitional dynamics as well as welfare 
effects per generation. The particular pattern of transitory effects implies that subsequent 
generations’ welfare may be affected differently. 
 
5.1. Basic setup  
 
We consider the effects of reductions in tax rates on labor, consumption and capital, reductions in 
non-employment benefit replacement rates, and increases in government expenditures. All shocks 
are therefore expected to increase employment. Starting from budget balance, we impose in each 
scenario a permanent shock of the same size, equal to 2% of initial output. More precisely, if 
everything else remained unchanged, each single policy measure would have an effect on the 
government budget balance equal to 2% of GDP. The benchmark from which we start, and against 
which all policy shocks are evaluated, is the average for the six core euro area countries in our 
sample (see Table 1)14. Table 5 considers the effects of policy changes on steady state growth and 
employment, assuming that policy changes are financed by changes in lump sum transfers (z) to 
maintain budget balance. The total change in lump sum transfers is indicated at the bottom of the 
table. It is spread equally among all living generations. In Table 6 we assume shocks to be 
compensated by a change in another fiscal policy variable. Throughout all our policy simulations the 
ratio of public debt to GDP remains constant.  
 
5.2. Employment effects (lump sum financed policies) 
 
Our results in Table 5 allow us to establish a ranking of individual policy measures in their steady 
state effects on employment. If we are guided by aggregate employment n, cuts in non-employment 
benefit replacement rates are by far the most effective. We find that an overall reduction of the net 
benefit replacement rate by 9.3%-points raises the aggregate employment rate in hours by 2.44%-
points. Considering that the aggregate employment rate in hours in the benchmark is about 55%, the 
corresponding increase in the volume of hours worked (N) is 4.45%. A more targeted approach 
where only particular age groups are affected by a change in benefits does not bring larger aggregate 
employment gains. Effects on the target group itself are stronger of course, but this stronger effect 
may be counteracted by a reduction of labor supply and employment among other age groups 
(intertemporal substitution). On the other hand, the particular need in many countries to encourage 
labor supply among older workers and postponement of retirement, may make more focus on this 
group crucial. Among all policy measures (of the same size) in Table 5, we observe the strongest 
                                                          
14
 The choice of 2% is arbitrary. Imposing smaller or larger shocks would not generate different results as far as 
the sign and the relative size of effects is concerned.  
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employment effect for the group of older workers (n3) from reducing both the standard non-
employment benefit after the age of 50 (b3a) and the early retirement benefit (b3b). If an increase in 
the effective retirement age (R) is the main goal, priority should be given to a reduction of early 
retirement benefits only, maintaining non-employment benefits at younger ages. This policy still has 
considerable aggregate employment effects. It would raise the aggregate employment rate in hours 
by 1.93%-points, total hours worked by 3.51%, and the effective retirement age by 2.35 years. 
  
Second in our ranking of policies to promote employment, is a reduction of labor tax rates. Like a 
reduction of non-employment benefits, this also raises the marginal utility of work versus inactivity. 
A comparable overall labor tax rate cut by 2.9%-points would increase the aggregate employment 
rate by 0.87%-points, and the volume of hours worked (N) by 1.59%. In the case of labor taxes, 
however, a targeted approach could be more effective than an overall change. Employment effects 
are the stronger when tax cuts are focused on young workers and older workers. Low actual 
employment among these age groups implies the lowest disutility from additional work. As to the 
size of tax effects, our results for overall labor tax cuts tend to be in the middle of existing studies. 
Effects are smaller than those obtained by Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2007) and Dhont and Heylen 
(2009), but larger than those of Turnovsky (2000). Our results are in the same range as those 
obtained by Coenen et al. (2008).   
 
Lower consumption taxes and lower capital taxes also promote work in our model, but their effects 
are smaller than those of labor tax cuts (which is in line with the literature). A reduction of 
consumption taxes raises the return to working since the same wages buy more goods. The effect on 
employment will be smaller than in the case of labor tax cuts since also the non-employed fully enjoy 
the benefit of lower consumption taxes. A reduction of capital taxes stimulates the inflow of physical 
capital, which permanently raises labor productivity and wages. Higher wages introduce a positive 
substitution effect, which encourages individuals to supply labor. This positive effect will be partly 
offset however due to the income effect from permanently higher productivity, which raises demand 
for ‘leisure’. Positive net employment effects in Table 5 are mainly due to the reduction in lump sum 
transfers imposed on workers by the government to finance the capital tax cuts. The same negative 
income effect caused by a reduction of lump sum transfers also explains the rise of labor supply and 
employment when the government raises public consumption.   
 
The effects of higher productive expenditures on employment are comparable to those of a 
reduction in capital taxes. They induce higher productivity and have to be financed by a fall in lump 
sum transfers. The main difference is that higher productivity here is to an important extent 
dependent on, and related to, young workers’ education. Higher productive expenditures encourage 
young individuals to study rather than work. They shift part of this work to later periods of life. In net 
terms we observe that a 2% of output increase in productive government expenditures implies a 
slight decline in the aggregate employment rate by 0.20%-points. The volume of hours worked would 
fall by 0.37%. These effects are less favorable than those obtained by Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont 
and Heylen (2009). In their models, however, individuals do not allocate time to education.   
37 
 
Table 5. Effects of fiscal shocks equal to 2% of output,  compensated by changes in lump sum  
    transfers (z) – benchmark: average of six core euro area countries 
      
  
Notes :  (a) change in policy variable, in percentage points 
                (b) difference in percentage points between new steady state and benchmark, except N/N  
                (c) change in optimal effective retirement age in years 
           
      
(d) change in (weighted) aggregate employment rate in hours
 
               (e) change in volume of employment in hours, in %. Approximately, N/N = n/n with N total hours  
      worked (and assuming potential hours constant) 
             
   
(f) change in lump sum transfer (as a fraction of output) to maintain budget balance, in %-points.  
 
5.3. Education and growth effects (lump sum financed policies) 
 
To promote long-run growth, three policy measures stand out as most effective: a cut in labor taxes 
on middle-aged workers, a cut in labor taxes on older workers, and an increase in productive 
government expenditures. Our results in Table 5 predict positive effects on the steady state annual 
growth rate of 0.13 to 0.16%-points in the first two cases and 0.27%-points in the third. Each of these 
policy measures raise hours worked and after-tax wages when middle-aged and older. Since these 
variables are key components of the lifetime return to investing in human capital when young, 
individuals will study more. The education rate among young individuals rises by about 2.3 to 2.8%-
points. Thanks to the positive externalities caused by human capital accumulation, any increase of 
investment in education has permanent growth effects. An increase in productive government 
expenditures generates the strongest rise in growth since this measure also directly improves the 
productivity of education in Equation (17). 
The effects from other policy measures on growth are much smaller or even negative. Most striking 
are the negative growth effects from labor tax cuts on the young generation. These tax cuts raise the 
opportunity cost of studying, which discourages human capital accumulation. The negative growth 
effects from labor tax cuts on the young also explain why overall (labor) tax cuts have only marginal 
Change in 
policy 
variable
(a)
 
1=2 
=3 
=-2.9 
1= 
-7.8 
2= 
-6.8 
3= 
-13.2 
c= 
-4.1 
k= 
-13.2 
b1=b2 
b3a=b3b 
=-9.3 
b1= 
-34.1 
b2= 
-27.7 
b3a= 
b3b 
-23.5 
b3b = 
-37.5 
gc= 
+2.0 
gy= 
+2.0 
Effect 
(b)
:              
∆n1 0.53 5.55 -2.53 -3.19 0.24 0.27 2.27 5.97 0.39 0.20 0.15 0.35 -2.70 
∆n2 0.84 -0.80 2.59 -0.02 0.47 0.54 1.82 -0.46 5.75 -0.72 -0.60 0.56 0.87 
∆n3 1.31 -1.24 -0.01 7.09 0.73 0.84 3.45 -0.71 -0.91 8.71 7.24 0.87 1.36 
R 
(c)
 0.12 -0.12 0.00 0.67 0.07 0.09 0.46 -0.07 -0.09 1.08 2.35 0.08 0.13 
∆e 0.14 -3.32 2.25 2.83 0.12 0.13 -0.60 -0.08 -0.77 -0.69 -0.56 0.09 2.83 
              
∆n 
(b, d) 0.87 1.23 0.10 0.96 0.47 0.53 2.44 1.65 2.00 2.33 1.93 0.58 -0.20 
N/N 
(e)
 1.59 2.25 0.18 1.75 0.85 0.97 4.45 3.01 3.64 4.24 3.51 1.06 -0.37 
∆ annual 
growth 
rate
(b)
 
0.01 -0.22 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.27 
∆z ex-post 
(f) -2.57 -2.98 -2.39 -3.05 -1.74 -1.99 2.83 2.36 2.32 2.62 2.17 -1.96 -1.47 
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growth effects. Cuts in benefit replacement rates also have limited negative growth effects. The 
reason is that benefits in our model are linked to wages and effective human capital. A lower 
replacement rate especially in the second or the third period of active life then reduces the expected 
return to studying when young, and participation in education. Our model’s prediction that overall 
changes in labor tax rates have only very limited growth effects, is in line with often cited empirical 
findings by Mendoza et al. (1997). Positive links between social security, education and growth have 
been demonstrated earlier by e.g. Zhang (1995) and Zhang and Zhang (2004).  
 
The steady state growth effects of a reduction in capital tax rates are also positive, but almost 
negligible. Clearly, this does not exclude significant and permanent output level effects. As we show 
in the next Section, among all simulated policy shocks, we observe the strongest ‘short-run’ output 
gain when capital tax rates are cut. Capital inflow and rising employment explain this output gain. In 
the long run, output remains about 5% above the benchmark after a 13.2%-points capital tax rate 
cut. This increase is substantial, and larger than in a recent study by Bettendorf et al. (2009). It is 
smaller, however, than the strong effects reported by e.g. Arnold et al. (2011).   
 
5.4. Employment, education and growth effects from combined fiscal policy changes 
 
In Table 6 we show the results of (maybe more realistic) combined fiscal policy changes. The size of 
the initial shock is again equal to 2% of output, but now it is financed by change in another fiscal 
policy variable. The results are in line with those reported in Table 5. To obtain a significant increase 
in employment, cuts in benefits seem unavoidable. A shift of taxes from labor to consumption has 
positive effects, but they are much more limited. So are the effects of a labor tax cut financed by 
lower government consumption (not shown in the Table). 
 
However, to raise not only employment but also growth, it is of crucial importance how the 
government allocates the money that it saves by cutting benefits. Growth does not rise when savings 
are allocated to overall labor or consumption tax cuts. Overall benefit cuts have the strongest 
positive effects on employment, in particular among older workers, and growth when savings feed 
through into either tax cuts on older workers only, or higher productive expenditures. As to the 
latter, our simulations suggest that a budget neutral policy change involving an overall 9.3%-points 
cut in the net benefit replacement rate to finance higher productive expenditures would in the 
longer run imply an increase of average annual growth by 0.43%-points, an increase of the aggregate 
employment rate by 2.08%-points, and an increase of the employment rate among older workers by 
5.73%-points. An important factor explaining the last result is the increase in the effective retirement 
age by 0.67 years. The long-run growth rate also rises strongly (+0.3%-points) when higher 
productive expenditures are financed by lower government consumption. In this case, however, 
aggregate employment falls moderately. Note that the same growth and employment effects follow 
when higher productive expenditures are financed by higher consumption taxes (not shown). 
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Table 6. Fiscal shocks in the model equal to 2% of output, compensated by a change in another 
                fiscal policy variable – benchmark: average of six core euro area countries 
 
Change in 
policy 
variable 
(a)
 
1=2 
=3 
=-2.9 
3= 
-13.2 
b1=b2 
b3a=b3b 
=-9.3 
b1=b2 
b3a=b3b 
=-9.3 
b1=b2 
b3a=b3b 
=-9.3 
b1=b2 
b3a=b3b 
=-9.3 
gy= 
+2.0 
Compensating 
change 
(f) 
c= 
6.1 
c= 
7.4 
1=2 
=3 
=-3.2 
3 
=-12.6 
 
c= 
-6.5 
 
gy= 
3.6 
gc= 
-1.5 
Effect 
(b)
:        
∆n1 0.09 -3.73 2.81 -0.74 2.72 -2.37 -2.95 
∆n2 0.14 -0.88 2.75 1.82 2.59 3.30 0.45 
∆n3 0.22 5.92 4.87 9.90 4.63 5.73 0.70 
∆R
(c)
 0.02 0.56 0.59 1.05 0.57 0.67 0.00 
∆e 0.02 2.68 -0.42 2.10 -0.45 4.31 2.75 
        
∆n 
(b, d) 
0.15 0.12 3.38 3.29 3.22 2.08 -0.63 
N/N 
(e)
 0.27 0.22 6.17 6.00 5.87 3.79 -1.15 
∆ annual 
growth rate
(b)
 
0.00 0.15 -0.03 0.12 -0.03 0.43 0.27 
 
Notes :  (a) change in policy variable, in percentage points 
               (b) difference in percentage points between new steady state and benchmark, except N/N.  
               (c) change in optimal effective retirement age in years 
               (d) change in (weighted) aggregate employment rate in hours 
               (e) change in volume of employment in hours, in % 
               (f) compensating change, in percentage points 
 
6. Transitional dynamics and welfare effects per generation 
 
We now describe the transitory adjustment path of key variables, including welfare, after the fiscal 
policy changes discussed in the previous section. We assume that these policy changes are 
unanticipated and permanent.   
Figure 8 shows the aggregate output level effects of the lump sum financed policy changes of 
Table 5. Policy measures are introduced at the beginning of period 1. As we have already mentioned, 
despite weak long-run growth effects, we observe the strongest output gain on impact when capital 
tax rates are cut. After one period (15 years) a 13.2%-point reduction of the capital tax rate raises 
output by about 5% compared to the benchmark. Long-run output gains are of the same size. The 
strongest ‘long-run’ output effects follow from an increase in productive expenditures. After 4 
periods, output is 11% above the benchmark. After 5 periods that is almost 16% after. A cut in labor 
taxes on older workers follows next, with output being 11% higher after 5 periods. The ‘short-run’ 
output effects of these two policy changes are very close to zero, however. The reason is that they 
encourage the young to study, reducing employment in the short-run15. The opposite (i.e. a short-run 
output gain, but long-run output loss) occurs when labor tax rates on the young are cut. Finally, 
                                                          
15
 Employment effects after the policy changes reported in Table 5 are available upon request. In general, 
employment rates adjust to the new steady state reported in Table 5 quite rapidly. 
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despite strong employment gains, the output level effects of benefit reductions are very limited, 
both in the short and the long run. As we observed in Table 5, benefit reductions make all 
generations work more than in the benchmark, but human capital may be lower.  
 
Figure 8 Output level evolution after unanticipated and permanent lump sum financed policy shocks 
in period 1 (index, benchmark=1) 
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gov. consumption increase productive expenditure increase
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Figures 9 and 10 describe the evolution of the aggregate output level and the aggregate employment 
rate after more realistic, combined fiscal policy shocks (see Table 6). In line with the above, for strong 
output gains in the long-run, it is required either to increase productive expenditures or to cut labor 
taxes on older workers. The more effective way to finance these policies is to cut non-employment 
benefits. Figure 9 also shows that if these policies are financed by higher consumption taxes or lower 
government consumption, output may fall in the short run (period 1). The latter is related to the fall 
in employment (Figure 10).   
 
Figure 9. Output level evolution after permanent policy shocks in period 1 (index, benchmark=1) 
  
 
Figure 11 shows the welfare effects of these policy changes for current and future generations. We 
report on the vertical axis the welfare effect on the generation born in t+k, where k is indicated on 
the horizontal axis, and where t is the period when the (permanent, unanticipated) policy change is 
introduced. Our welfare measure is the (constant) percentage change in benchmark consumption in 
each period of remaining life that individuals should get to attain the same lifetime utility as after the 
policy shock (see also King and Rebelo, 1990). To compute this percentage change we keep 
employment rates at the benchmark. For example, concentrating on the first policy measure, an 
overall labor tax cut financed by higher consumption taxes implies welfare losses for the current 
retired (k=-3) and older workers (k=-2). The loss is equal to 4% of benchmark consumption for the 
retired and equal to 1% of benchmark consumption in each of the two remaining periods of life for 
the older workers. The current middle-aged (k=-1) and young workers (k=0) gain, but their gain is 
very limited (less than 1% of benchmark consumption). Future generations (k=+1,.., +4) can also be 
expected to realize limited welfare gains. Considering the policy measures that contribute most to 
long-run output, we observe that these are also among the most favorable to the welfare of current 
0,95
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1,15
1,25
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
overall labor tax cut - consumption tax increase
labor tax cut, older - consumption tax increase
overall benefit cut - overall labour tax cut
overall benefit cut - labor tax cut, older
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overall benefit cut - productive spending increase
productive spending increase - government consumption cut
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young and future generations. Labor tax cuts on older workers, financed by overall benefit 
reductions, are most likely to obtain support from the representative individual in each generation. 
Tax cuts on older workers financed by consumption taxes also raise the lifetime utility of current 
middle-aged and older workers, but they imply a strong welfare reduction for retired individuals. An 
increase of productive expenditures financed by overall benefit reductions, by lower government 
consumption or (not shown) by higher consumption taxes, is less likely to get support from current 
generations, despite its very positive long-run output effect. Current retired and older generations 
see no, or only a very small gain.16 
 
Figure 10. Aggregate employment rate (in hours) after permanent policy shocks in period 1 
                 (benchmark in period 0 is the initial steady state)  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
16
 Current young and future generations experience strong gains from substituting productive government 
spending for public consumption (gy>0, gc<0). Note, however, that this result partly reflects our 
assumption that public consumption is not useful to the individuals. Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen 
(2009) do include public consumption in the individuals’ utility function. In that case, welfare effects of 
substituting gy for gc are still positive, but much smaller than in the case where productive spending is financed 
by overall benefit cuts.  
53,0
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Figure 11. Welfare effects for current and future generations after fiscal policy changes 
 
 
Note:  The vertical axis indicates the welfare effect for the generation born in t+k, where t is when the fiscal 
policy change is introduced. The horizontal axis indicates k.   
 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
We study the effects of changes in the composition of fiscal policy in an open economy OLG model 
which explains hours of work among young, middle-aged and older workers, human capital 
formation by the young, and aggregate per capita growth, within one coherent framework. The 
government sets tax rates on labor, capital and consumption. It allocates its revenue to productive 
expenditures (mainly for education), consumption, non-employment benefits and pensions. Labor 
taxes and benefits may differ across age groups. Studying fiscal policy effects in a model where 
employment by age, education and human capital, and growth, are all endogenous, is the main 
contribution of this paper. Existing models explaining employment generally disregard growth, some 
exceptions notwithstanding. Models explaining education and growth generally disregard the labor-
leisure choice and labor supply (by age).  
We check the validity of our model and our calibration by simulating the model for 13 OECD 
countries and comparing its results with the true data. Imposing common technology and preference 
parameters but country-specific policy parameters, we find that the predictions of our model match 
the main facts quite well. A confrontation with the facts, in particular for education and growth, also 
allows us to reduce the uncertainty in existing literature about the human capital production 
function. The data prefer a specification where effective human capital is produced from both private 
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inputs (education time) and public inputs (productive government expenditures, mainly for 
education), with the degree of complementarity between them being much higher than in the Cobb-
Douglas case. To match the data, it is very important also to account for the quality of schooling.   
 
Our policy simulations reveal a clear ranking of policy measures in their effectiveness to promote 
employment and growth. As to employment, a reduction of non-employment benefit generosity has 
the strongest effects, followed by labor tax cuts. The employment effects of other policy measures, 
e.g. capital tax cuts or productive expenditure increases, are (much) more limited. Shifting taxes from 
labor to consumption has positive effects on employment, but these are very limited. Long-run 
output and growth are supported most by higher productive government expenditures. 
Furthermore, output and growth may benefit from labor tax cuts targeted at middle-aged and older 
workers. The perspective of increased future hours of work at lower tax rates raises the lifetime 
utility gain from building human capital when young. This encourages young individuals to study, 
which is a key condition for growth. By contrast, labor tax cuts targeted at younger workers and non-
employment benefit reductions, imply lower future growth since they discourage the young to study. 
Finally, a reduction of capital tax rates has relatively strong positive and permanent effects on the 
level of output also, but almost negligible effects on long-run growth. 
Rising pressure on the welfare state due to ageing, and the need to bring down high public debt to 
GDP ratios, force all OECD countries to develop effective employment and growth policies. The need 
to raise employment is particularly pressing in the euro area, and most so among older workers. A 
key implication of our results for fiscal policy in these countries is to cut non-employment benefits 
and to reallocate these resources to labor tax cuts on older workers and to higher productive 
expenditures (tertiary education, infrastructure). The US would also benefit strongly from higher 
productive expenditures. Non-employment benefits being low in the US, higher productive 
expenditures may be financed also by higher consumption taxes. From a welfare perspective, these 
policies are beneficial to current young and future generations, but only some are likely to get 
support from current older and retired individuals. 
This paper gives room to various extensions, which we are currently exploiting. First, our results and 
policy implications have been derived under the assumption of homogeneous individuals per 
generation, each working the same hours, having the same talent to study, etc. Distributional issues 
between those within a generation who have high ability and those who have not, or between those 
who work a lot and those who live more on benefits, are therefore inexistent. In Van de Kerckhove 
and Heylen (2012) we allow for individuals with heterogeneous ability to build human capital. 
Second, we plan to pay more attention to important differences in school systems between 
countries, e.g. differences in tuition fees, study grants, and education quality. The empirical 
importance of such differences has been demonstrated most clearly recently by Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2011).  
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Appendix 1: Construction of data and data sources 
 
In this appendix we provide more detail on the construction of some of our performance variables 
and policy variables.  
 
Employment rate in hours (in one of three age groups, 1995-2007) 
Definition: total actual hours worked by individuals in the age group / potential hours worked. 
Actual hours worked = total employment in persons x average hours worked per week x average 
number of weeks worked per year 
Potential hours = total population in the age group x 2080 (where 2080 = 52 weeks per year x 40 
hours per week) 
Data sources:  
* Total employment in the age group / total population in the age group: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics by Sex and Age. Data are available for many age groups, among which 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 
45-49, 50-54, 55-64. We constructed the data for our three age groups as weighted averages. 
* Average hours worked per week: OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics, Average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job. These data are available only for age groups 15-24, 25-54, 55-64. We use 
the OECD data for the age group 15-24 as a proxy for our age subgroup 20-24, the OECD data for the 
age group 25-54 as a proxy for our age (sub)groups 25-34, 35-49 and 50-54. 
* Average number of weeks worked per year: Due to lack of further detail, we use the same data for 
each age group. The average number of weeks worked per year has been approximated by dividing 
average annual hours actually worked per worker (total employment) by average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job by all workers (total employment). Data source: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics, Hours worked. 
 
Education rate of the young (age group 20-34, 1995-2007) 
Definition: total hours studied by individuals of age 20-34 / potential hours studied 
As a proxy we have computed the ratio:  20 34 20 24 25 34 20 340 5 0 25fts . pts . pts / pop      
with:  fts the number of full-time students in the age group 20-34 
           pts the number of part-time students in the age groups 20-24 and 25-34. 
           pop total population of age 20-34 
Full-time students are assumed to spend all their time studying. For part-time students of age 20-24 
we make the assumption (for all countries) that they spend 50% of their time studying, part-time 
students of age 25-34 are assumed to spend 25% of their time studying. Due to the limited number 
of part-time students, these specific weights matter very little.  
Data sources:  
* Full-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes, full-time)  
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* Part-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes). We subtracted the data for full-
time students from those for ‘full-time and part-time students’.  
Data are available in 1995-2007. However, for several countries (quite) some years are missing. 
Period averages are computed on the basis of all available annual data.  
 
Average effective retirement age (1995-2006) 
Definition: Average age of all persons (being 40 or older) withdrawing from the labor force in a given 
period.   
Data sources: 
* OECD, Ageing and Employment Policies – Statistics on average effective age of retirement 
 
Annual real potential per capita GDP growth rate (aggregate, 1995-2007) 
Definition: Annual growth rate of real potential GDP per person of working age 
Data sources:  
* real potential GDP: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, supply block, series GDPVTR. 
* population at working age: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, labour markets, 
series POPT. 
 
Tax rate on labor income (j for j=1,2,3) 
Definition: Total tax wedge, marginal tax rate in % of gross wage earnings. The data cover personal 
income taxes, employee and employer social security contributions payable on wage earnings and 
payroll taxes.  
Data source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, Financial and Fiscal Affairs, Taxing Wages, Comparative 
tax rates and benefits (new definition). 
The OECD publishes marginal labor tax rates for several family and income situations: single persons 
at 67%, 100% and 167% of average earnings (no children), single persons at 67% of average earnings 
(two children), one-earner married couples at 100% of average earnings (two children), two-earner 
married couples, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 33 % (no children, 2 children), 
two-earner married couples, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 67 % (2 children). Our 
data in Table 3 are the averages of these eight cases. Data for 2000-04. 
 
Government debt (Dt) 
Definition: General government gross financial liabilities.  
Data source: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, N° 89, Government Accounts. 
 
Net benefit replacement rates (bj for j=1,2,3a) 
Definition: The data concern net transfers received by long-term unemployed people and include 
social assistance, family benefits and housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also 
include unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still 
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paid, i.e. if workers can be structurally unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit 
eligibility. The data are expressed in % of after-tax wages. The OECD provides net replacement rates 
for six family situations and three earnings levels. Our data in Table 4 are the averages of these 18 
cases. Data for 2001-04. 
Data source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives 
Data adjustment: Original OECD data for Norway include the so-called “waiting benefit” 
(ventestønad), which a person could get after running out of unemployment benefits. Given the 
conditional nature of these “waiting benefits”, they do not match our definition of benefits paid to 
structurally non-employed individuals. We have therefore deducted them from the OECD data, which 
led to a reduction of net replacement rates by about 19 percentage points. For example, recipients 
should demonstrate high regional mobility and willingness to take a job anywhere in Norway. The 
“waiting benefit” was terminated in 2008. We thank Tatiana Gordine at the OECD for clarifying this 
issue with us.   
 
Early retirement replacement rates (b3b) 
To calculate our proxy for b3b we have focused on the possibility for older workers in some countries 
to leave the labor market along fairly generous early retirement routes. Duval (2003) and Brandt et 
al. (2005) provide data for the so-called implicit tax rate on continued work for five more years in the 
early retirement route at age 55 and age 60. The idea is as follows. If an individual stops working 
(instead of continuing for five more years), he receives a benefit (early retirement, disability…) and 
no longer pays contributions for his future pension. A potential disadvantage is that he may receive a 
lower pension later, since he contributed less during active life. Duval (2003) calculated the 
difference between the present value of the gains and the costs of early retirement, in percent of 
gross earnings before retirement. We use his data as a proxy for the gross benefit replacement rate 
for older workers in the early retirement route. To compute the net benefit replacement rate, we 
assume the same tax rate on early retirement benefits as on unemployment benefits. We call this net 
benefit replacement rate rer. However, these implicit tax rates are only very rough estimates of the 
real incentive to retire embedded in early retirement schemes and are subject to important caveats 
(Duval, 2003, p. 15). The available implicit tax rates take into account neither the strictness of 
eligibility criteria nor the presence of alternative social transfer programs that may de facto be used 
as early retirement devices. Our assumption will be that a realistic replacement rate for the early 
retirement route (b3b) will be a weighted average of rer and b3a, where we take the latter as a proxy 
for the replacement rate in alternative social transfer programs. If rer > b3a, older workers will aim for 
the official early retirement route, but they may not all meet eligibility criteria and have to fall back 
on alternative programs. If rer < b3a, workers will aim for the alternative, but again they may not be 
eligible. We propose that b3b = ξb3a + (1-ξ)rer. Underlying the data in Table 4 is the assumption that 
ξ=0.5. Correlation between b3b and rer lies around 0.92. Cross-country differences roughly remain 
intact. Our results in the main text do not depend in any serious way on this assumption for ξ.  
Data Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Duval (2003), 
Brandt et al. (2005).  
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Net pension replacement rates (b4) 
OECD (2005, p. 52) presents net pension replacement rates for individuals at various multiples of 
average individual earnings in the economy. We consider the data for individuals with average 
earnings. 
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Abstract 
We build and parameterize a general equilibrium OLG model for an open economy to jointly study 
hours of work of young, middle aged and older individuals, education of the young, and aggregate 
growth. We distinguish within each age group three types of individuals, with high, medium or low 
ability to build human capital. The composition of taxes and government expenditures plays a crucial 
role in our model. The government sets tax rates on labor, capital and consumption. It allocates its 
revenue to productive expenditures (mainly to promote human capital accumulation), study grants, 
consumption and ‘non-employment’ benefits. Labor taxes and benefits may differ across age groups 
and across ability types. We find that our model’s predictions match the facts well for key variables in 
many OECD countries. We then use the model to investigate the effectiveness of various fiscal and 
educational policy measures in promoting employment and growth. We also evaluate welfare effects 
for current and future generations. Our main results support a reduction of labor taxes on older 
workers and on low-wage earners, as well as an increase of productive expenditures, financed by a 
reduction of ‘non-employment’ benefits. 
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1. Introduction 
Rising pressure on the welfare state due to ageing forces all OECD countries to develop effective 
employment and growth policies. The need to raise employment is particularly pressing among older 
and lower skilled workers. Concern for employment and growth is not new, however. They have 
been high on the agenda of both policy makers and researchers since at least two decades.  
 
Many researchers have demonstrated in theoretical and/or empirical work the major influence on 
employment of the composition of fiscal policy, i.e. the level and structure of government 
expenditures and taxes (e.g. Prescott, 2004; Rogerson, 2007; Dhont and Heylen, 2008; Ohanian, Raffo 
and Rogerson, 2008; Olovsson, 2009; Berger and Heylen, 2011). Fiscal policy composition is also a 
central element in the ‘capital accumulation’ endogenous growth framework, as initiated by Barro 
(1990) and King and Rebelo (1990). More recently many fiscal policy models have introduced 
education expenditures/subsidies as a major component of productive government expenditures, 
enhancing effective human capital accumulation and possibly growth (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 
1992; Buiter and Kletzer, 1993; Docquier and Michel, 1999; Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; Bouzahzah, 
de la Croix and Docquier, 2002; Dhont and Heylen, 2009). Empirical work by e.g. Kneller, Bleany and 
Gemmell (1999) and Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008) confirms the importance of fiscal policy for 
growth in OECD countries. Others find evidence for a significant role of education and/or public 
education expenditures (e.g. Barro, 2001; Nijkamp and Poot, 2004; de la Fuente and Doménech, 
2006; Blankenau, Simpson and Tomljanovich, 2007)1. Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) emphasize 
the crucial role of education quality and the institutional features of the schooling system for growth. 
 
The above mentioned literature has strongly improved our understanding of employment and 
growth. Still, it is limited in some respects. First, most of the above mentioned studies focus on only 
one aspect of macro performance, either employment or growth. Most studies explaining 
employment disregard human capital and/or growth, whereas models explaining education and 
growth generally ignore the endogeneity of labor supply and the labor-leisure choice. Turnovsky 
(2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009) are exceptions in this respect. Second, a few recent exceptions 
notwithstanding (e.g. Rogerson and Wallenius, 2009; Fougère et al., 2009; Ludwig, Schelkle and 
Vogel, 2012), most studies neglect life cycle patterns in labor supply and employment differences 
across age groups. The data, however, show that in all countries the middle aged work more hours 
than the young and the older. Third, most existing studies disregard differences in abilities and 
motivation of people to learn. With some exceptions (e.g. Azariadis and de la Croix, 2002), models 
with education and growth typically assume that everyone is able to study and succeed in education. 
Reality is different, however. Data reveal that in 2008 about 30% of the 25-64 year old population on 
average in the OECD has no upper secondary degree. About 44% has an upper secondary degree but 
no tertiary degree. The fraction of people with a tertiary degree therefore remains below 30%. 
                                                          
1
 Not all studies investigating the relationship between human capital accumulation and growth, come up with 
significant positive results, however (e.g. Pritchett, 2001). De la Fuente and Doménech (2006) point at the low 
quality of schooling and human capital data as an important factor that may explain the mitigated results in 
many studies. 
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Among young cohorts, educational attainment is higher. Yet, the fraction that does not complete 
upper secondary education is still about 20% on average. About 40% obtains an upper secondary 
degree, but no tertiary degree. More or less another 40% completes both secondary and tertiary 
education (OECD, Education at a Glance, Tables A1, A2.2, A3.2). Cross-country variation in these data 
suggests that differences in the schooling system and government policies, for example policies 
affecting the cost of education, may have an important influence on these numbers. But the simple 
fact that innate ability as for example reflected by IQ varies across people, implies that one can never 
expect everyone to succeed at the tertiary level. A second important observation here is that these 
differences in school results feed through directly into labor market outcomes. On average in the 
OECD, the employment rate among people of age 25 to 64 with less than an upper secondary degree 
is less than 60%, the employment rate among people with a tertiary degree is higher than 80% 
(OECD, Employment Outlook). 
 
In our previous work (see Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2010) we responded to the first and the 
second limitation that characterize most existing literature. We studied the effects of fiscal policy in a 
general equilibrium OLG model for an open economy where the employment rate of young, middle 
aged and older individuals, the fraction of time that young individuals allocate to (tertiary) education, 
and economic growth are all endogenous. We introduced a rich specification of fiscal policy, with the 
government setting tax rates on labor, capital and consumption, and allocating its revenue to 
productive expenditures (mainly for education), consumption, pensions and ‘non-employment’ 
benefits.  However, we disregarded differences in ability.  
 In this paper we maintain two contributions to the literature that we made in our earlier 
work2, but now extend our OLG model by allowing heterogeneous abilities. We make the assumption 
that within each generation three ability groups exist. These groups differ both in the degree to 
which they (when young) assimilate existing knowledge and inherit human capital from the middle 
aged generation, and in their productivity of schooling when spending time studying. One group has 
low ability. They inherit relatively little human capital from the middle aged generation, and will 
never engage in tertiary education. They will only work or have ‘leisure’. A second group has medium 
ability, a third group high ability. These groups inherit higher fractions of existing human capital, and 
do allocate time to tertiary education. Given the variation between them in the productivity of 
schooling, the amount of time will differ, however. The extension allows a richer and more realistic 
analysis of public policy effects. Labor taxes and benefits may not only differ across age groups, but 
also across ability groups. Moreover, it will be possible to investigate welfare effects not only by age, 
but also by ability group. Differences can be studied between individuals with high versus low human 
capital and income, both among current and future generations.   
                                                          
2
 I.e., to study public policy effects, we again model the various linkages between labor supply and employment 
in different periods of life, human capital formation when young, physical capital formation, and aggregate 
growth. Furthermore, we again pay special attention to a careful parameterization of our model, and check its 
empirical validity before using it for policy simulations. Basically, we calibrate our model to the average of 13 
OECD countries, and then vary fiscal policy parameters for each country. It is required that the model’s 
predictions for key variables in individual countries match the cross-country differences that one can observe in 
the data. Observable policy differences should be translated into realistic performance differences.    
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Our main findings are the following. First, we confirm our earlier results in Heylen and Van de 
Kerckhove (2010). We again identify labor taxes and (especially) ‘non-employment’ benefits as the 
main policy variables affecting employment. Productive government expenditures are the most 
effective with respect to long-run output and growth. Again we observe that output and growth may 
benefit also from labor tax cuts targeted at older workers, whereas the opposite holds for labor tax 
cuts targeted at young workers. Second, however, a first new result in this paper is that if these 
policies are imposed, they also imply clearly differential welfare effects between the ability groups. 
Current and near future low ability individuals may experience welfare losses. Third, better overall 
employment effects and better welfare effects for low ability groups, at a slight cost in terms of 
growth, are possible if one complements policies that cut labor taxes on older workers with labor tax 
cuts on the low-wage earners. In our model, the latter include all low-ability individuals and the 
young medium-ability individuals. Their net wage income is less than two thirds of the average net 
wage income in the economy. The best effects on employment follow if this combined tax cut is 
financed by overall benefit cuts.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we document differences in employment by age 
and educational attainment, education of the young, and per capita growth across 13 OECD countries 
since 1995. Section 3 sets out our model. In Section 4 we calibrate the model on actual data and 
confront its predictions with the facts described in Section 2. Our procedure is as follows. We impose 
common technology and preference parameters on all countries, but country-specific fiscal policy 
and education quality parameters. Simulating the model for each country we find that its predictions 
match the main facts in most countries. We conclude that the model translates observable policy 
differences into performance differences which are roughly in line with observations in the data. 
Section 5 includes the main results of a wide range of policy simulations. In this section we discuss 
the long-run equilibrium effects and the welfare effects per generation and ability group of fiscal 
policy changes. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Cross-country differences in employment, tertiary education and per capita growth 
Table 1 contains key data on employment, education and growth in 13 OECD countries in 1995-2007. 
One would like a reliable model to match the main cross-country differences reported here. The 
employment rate in hours (n) indicates the fraction of potential hours that are actually being worked 
by the average person in one of three age groups: n1 for young persons (age 20-34), n2 for middle 
aged persons (35-49), and n3 for older persons (50-64). Potential hours are 2080 per person per year 
(52 weeks times 40 hours per week). The observed employment rate rises if more people in an age 
group have a job, and if the employed work more hours. The fourth column in Table 1 reports 
employment differences by ability. Since data on hours worked per person by ability level are not 
available (as far as we know), it is not possible to compute data that are comparable to the 
employment rates by age. We therefore focus on employment rates in persons, i.e. the fraction of 
people with a certain educational attainment who have a job. Concentrating on the upper and lower 
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group, we present the ratio of the employment rate in persons among people with less than upper 
secondary education to the employment rate among those with a tertiary degree. If it can be 
assumed that hours worked per employed person are comparable, these data would act as a (rough) 
proxy for nL / nH. The education rate (e) is our proxy for the fraction of effective time spent studying 
by the average young person. The data combine fractions of time as such spent in tertiary education, 
and completion rates3. Taking into account completion rates is one (possible) way to control for the 
fact that students may spend time on a program but in the end fail. Our data for (average annual) 
real per capita growth concern real potential GDP per person of working age. We refer to Appendix 
1 for further details on the calculation of all our data, and on the assumptions that we have to make. 
 
Table 1  
Employment rate in hours (n), education rate (e) and per capita growth in OECD countries  
 (1995-2007)  
 n1 
(20-34) 
n2 
(35-49) 
n3 
(50-64) 
 
nL / nH 
 
 
e 
Annual real per 
capita growth 
       
Austria 59.9 64.3 34.7 63.4 15.5 2.06 
Belgium 51.1 56.8 29.3 58.1 19.5 1.77 
France 48.7 60.3 38.0 67.3 19.1 1.54 
Germany 49.7 55.2 34.9 61.0 16.0 1.56 
Italy 50.1 61.9 33.8 62.0    9.5 1.30 
Netherlands 50.8 54.6 34.2 67.4 15.2 2.20 
Core euro 
area Average 
 
51.7 58.8 34.2 63.2 15.8 1.74 
Denmark 56.2 66.7 49.6 70.7 22.3 1.81 
Finland 55.6 69.0 47.3 67.5 22.5 2.72 
Norway 51.9 60.9 50.6 71.3 17.8 2.29 
Sweden 53.6 66.1 55.4 80.8 16.4 2.18 
Nordic 
Average 
 
54.3 65.6 50.7 72.6 19.7 2.25 
US 65.6 74.2 59.6 66.9 13.8 1.54 
       
UK 60.8 68.4 49.4 66.7 12.9 2.13 
Canada 60.9 69.5 50.4 66.9 16.1 1.68 
       
Overall 
average 
55.0 63.7 43.6 66.9 16.7 1.91 
    
Data sources:   OECD and Eurostat (see Appendix 1); data description: see main text and Appendix 1. The data 
for employment by age and growth concern 1995-2007, those for education 1998-2007. The 
data for nL /nH  are an average for 1995, 2000 and 2006. All data are in percent. 
 
                                                          
3
 We calculate the fraction of time as such as the total number of tertiary students in full-time equivalents, 
divided by total population in the age group 20-34. To obtain the fraction of effective time we multiply by the 
completion rate (normalized to its cross-country average). The completion rate indicates the percentage of 
students who follow tertiary education, and also graduate from a tertiary program. The OECD average in 2008 
was about 69%. It was much less for example in the US and Italy, much higher in Denmark and France (OECD 
Education at a Glance, 2010). For details, see also Appendix 1. 
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As is well-known, middle aged individuals work most hours, followed by the young. The older 
generation works the lowest number of hours. Average employment rates over all countries in these 
three age groups are 55.0%, 63.7% and 43.6% respectively. Furthermore, the data reveal strong 
cross-country differences. We observe the highest employment rates in each age group in the US. 
Employment rates are much lower in the core countries of the euro area. The Nordic countries take 
intermediate positions, although they are close to the core euro area for the younger generation. As 
to ability groups, we see in all countries lower employment rates among lower educated people than 
among people with a tertiary degree ( nL /nH <1). On average over all countries in Table 1, the former 
is only about 67% of the latter. Again we observe significant cross-country differences, with the 
lowest numbers in countries like Belgium and Germany, and the highest in the Nordic countries. 
 Young people’s effective participation in education is also by far the highest in the Nordic 
countries. These countries also show the highest potential per capita growth rates. On average, 
growth in the core euro area and the US was more than 0.5 percentage points lower in the period 
under consideration. The US and the other Anglo-Saxon countries tend to have the lowest effective 
participation in education among people of age 20 to 34.  
 
When it comes to data in this paper, one further point of clarification may be useful. As we have 
done in Table 1 for nL and nH, we will use data for people with below upper secondary education as a 
proxy for the low ability group, data for people with an upper secondary but no tertiary degree as a 
proxy for the medium ability group, and data for people with a tertiary degree as a proxy for the high 
ability group. Considering the distribution of these degrees within the population, and even within 
young cohorts (as we have mentioned in the introduction), the match between these data and our 
model with three equal sized ability groups is close. The median low ability individual in our model 
would be at the 17th percentile, the median medium ability individual at the 50th percentile and the 
median high ability person at the 83th percentile. In the data individuals at the 17th percentile have no 
upper secondary degree in most countries. Individuals at the 83th percentile have a tertiary degree. 
 
3. The model 
Our analytical framework consists of a computable four-period OLG-model for a small open 
economy. We assume perfect international mobility of physical capital but immobile labor and 
human capital. Seminal work in the OLG tradition has been done by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond 
(1965). Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) initiated the study of public finance shocks in a computable 
OLG model. Buiter and Kletzer (1993) developed an open economy version of the model with 
endogenous growth, putting human capital at the centre. As we have documented in Section 1, a 
large recent literature has used OLG models to study the effects of fiscal policy on employment, 
assuming exogenous growth, or on human capital and growth, ignoring the labor-leisure choice and 
assuming exogenous employment. New in this paper is that we explain both employment by age, and 
human capital and growth as endogenous variables, and that we realistically take into account 
differences in individuals’ innate abilities. 
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We consider three active adult generations, the young, the middle aged and the older, and 
one generation of retired agents. Within each generation we assume three types of individuals with 
different ability a to build human capital: a group H with high ability, a group M with medium ability 
and a group L with low ability. These groups differ both in the degree to which they (when young) 
assimilate existing knowledge, i.e. inherit human capital from the middle aged generation, and in 
their productivity of schooling when they spend time studying. Low ability individuals inherit 
relatively little human capital from the middle aged generation, and will never engage in tertiary 
education. They will only work or have ‘leisure’. Medium and high ability individuals inherit higher 
fractions of existing human capital, and do allocate time to tertiary education. Given the variation 
between them in the productivity of schooling, this amount of time will differ, however. We assume 
that the three ability types are of equal size, and so are the different generations. We normalize each 
ability group to 1, so that the size of a generation is 3, and total population is 12, and constant.  
Our assumptions to model intragenerational heterogeneity are in line with recent literature. 
First of all, our approach is consistent with recent findings that heterogeneity in human capital 
endowment at young age and learning abilities, rather than shocks to human capital, account for 
most of the variation in lifetime utility. Our assumptions also match findings that learning ability and 
human capital at the age of 20 are strongly positively correlated (Huggett et al., 2006, 2011). Finally, 
our (simplifying) assumption that the three ability types are of equal size corresponds to the 
approach in Guvenen et al. (2009) to model learning ability and inherited human capital as uniformly 
distributed in the population. 
Individuals enter the model at age 20. Each period is modeled to last for 15 years. High and medium 
ability young people can choose either to work and generate labor income, to study and build human 
capital, or to devote time to ‘leisure’ (including other non-market activities). Low ability young 
individuals and all middle aged and older workers do not study anymore, they only work or have 
‘leisure’. Individuals retire at 65. The retirement age and decision are exogenous in our model.  
Output is produced by domestic firms which act competitively and employ physical capital 
together with existing technology and effective labor provided by the three active generations. A 
final important assumption is that education generates a positive externality in the sense of Azariadis 
and Drazen (1990). Each young generation inherits a fraction of the average level of human capital of 
a middle aged generation. The higher an individual’s ability, the larger the fraction he inherits. In 
what follows, we concentrate on the core elements of the model: the optimizing behavior of 
individuals, the production and inheritance of effective human capital, the behavior of domestic 
firms and the determination of aggregate output and growth, capital and wages.    
 
3.1. Individuals 
 
An individual with ability a (a=H,M,L) reaching age 20 in period t maximizes an intertemporal utility 
function of the form: 
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with 0<<1, j >0,  >0 ( 
 1) and where we shall impose that 
 
  2 3 4 4 10 0 and .
t t t t t
a a a a Le e e n e          (2) 
 
Superscript t indicates the period of youth, when the individual comes into the model. Subscript a 
refers to the ‘ability type’ and j refers to the jth period of life. Lifetime utility depends on 
consumption (cja) and ‘leisure’ in each period of life. Leisure falls in hours worked (nja) during the 
three active periods and - except for the low ability individuals, who do not study - in education time 
(e1a) when young. Since individuals only allocate time to education in their first period, we drop the 
subscript 1 in what follows. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is 1, the 
intertemporal elasticity to substitute leisure 1/. Finally,  is the discount factor and  specifies the 
relative value of ‘leisure’ versus consumption. The preference parameters ,  and  do not depend 
on ability type. Note, however, that  may be different in each period of life. Except for the latter 
assumption, our specification of the instantaneous utility function is quite common in the macro 
literature (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Rogerson, 2007).  
Individuals will choose consumption, labor supply and education to maximize Equation (1), 
subject to the constraints described in (2)-(10). Equations (3)-(5) describe the individuals’ dynamic 
budget constraints. The LHS of these equations shows that individuals allocate their disposable 
income to consumption (including consumption taxes, c), education expenditures net of government 
subsidies while young, and the accumulation of non-human wealth. In Equation (3), ec and es 
indicate full-time equivalent private education costs and education subsidies paid by the 
government, respectively. In each equation we denote by    
  the stock of wealth held by a type a 
individual who enters the model at time t at the end of his jth period of life. Equations (3) and (5) 
respectively indicate that individuals start and finish adult life with zero assets. During the three 
periods of active life, disposable income at the RHS includes after-tax labor income, non-employment 
benefits, interest income and lump sum transfers. In each equation, wa,k stands for the real wage per 
unit of effective labor supplied at time k by an individual with ability a, rk is the exogenous (world) 
real interest rate at time k, and zk is the lump sum transfer that the government pays out to all 
individuals at time k. Effective labor of an individual with ability a depends on hours worked ( t
jan ) 
and effective human capital ( t
jah ). Since young individuals with ability a pay a tax rate on labor 
income 1, they earn an after-tax real wage equal to        
    
      ). Note that the government 
has the possibility to levy different tax rates on the different age groups. To set different tax rates by 
ability is not possible for the government since ability is unobservable4. After-tax labor income when 
middle aged and older in Equation (4) is determined similarly.  
 
                                                          
4
 As we demonstrate later in Section 5 however the government may tax workers differently depending on the 
level of their income. Setting different tax rates on different income groups may be one (imperfect) way to try 
to target tax policy by ability. 
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For the fraction of time that young, middle aged and older individuals are inactive, they receive a 
non-employment benefit from the government. The net benefit replacement rate bj (with j=1,2,3) is 
defined as a proportion of the after-tax wage of a full-time worker. Retired individuals in Equation (5) 
have no labor income and no non-employment benefits anymore. They consume their savings from 
the third period, plus interest, a public pension pp and the lump sum transfer z. Equation (6) 
describes this pension. We assume a public PAYG pension system in which pensions in period k are 
financed by contributions (labor taxes) from the active generations in that period k (see below). 
Individual pension benefits are related to earlier labor income. Individuals earn a net pension which 
is a fraction of their so-called pension base. The latter is a weighted average of net labor income in 
each of the three active periods of their life. The net replacement rate is b4. The weights attached to 
each period are 1/3. A full pension is granted if one has a full career, which is achieved when 1
t
ja
n   
for j = 1,2,3. Intuitively this requires 45 years of full time work.   
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As we show in Equations (7) and (8), at the age of 20 a young worker with ability H inherits a fraction 
 of the average effective human capital of the middle aged generation. A young worker with ability 
M enters our model with only a fraction M , a young worker with ability L enters with an even lower 
fraction L. Lower ability may imply more difficulty to learn and accumulate knowledge at primary 
and secondary school. Lower ability individuals may as a result also be more likely to suffer from 
school fatigue. During their second and third period, workers supply more units of effective human 
capital. It is our assumption in Equation (9) that h2a, and therefore labor productivity, rise in 
education time when young (ea), productive government spending in percent of GDP (gy, mainly 
education spending) and an overall quality of schooling parameter (qa). Individuals take gy and qa to 
be exogenous. Note that the human capital accumulation function itself (
a ) also depends on innate 
ability. We specify and discuss effective human capital production and human capital inheritance in 
greater detail in Section 3.2. Finally, we assume in Equation (10) that human capital remains 
unchanged between the second and the third period. We have in mind that learning by doing in work 
may counteract depreciation. 
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Substituting Equations (3)-(5) for    
  into (1), and maximizing with respect to 
1 2 3 1 2 3
t t t t t t
a a a a a a, , ,n ,n ,n   and 
t
ae , yields seven first order conditions for the optimal behavior of 
an individual with ability a entering the model at time t. Equation (11) expresses the law of motion of 
optimal consumption over the lifetime. Equations (12.a) and (12.b) describe the optimal labor-leisure 
choice in each period of active live. Individuals supply labor up to the point where the marginal utility 
of leisure equals the marginal utility gain from work. The latter  consists of two parts. Working more 
hours in a particular period raises additional resources for consumption both in that period and when 
retired. The marginal utility gain from work rises when the marginal utility of consumption 1 tja( / c ) is 
higher, and when an extra hour of work yields more extra consumption. Higher human capital (and 
its underlying determinants), lower taxes on labor, lower taxes on consumption and lower non-
employment benefits contribute to the gain from work. Extra consumption during retirement rises in 
the pension replacement rate (b4).  
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Equation (13) imposes for high and medium ability individuals that the marginal utility loss from 
investing in human capital when young equals the total discounted marginal utility gain in later 
periods from having more human capital. Individuals will study more the higher future versus current 
(11) 
(12.a) 
(12.b) 
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after-tax real wages and the higher the marginal return of education to human capital a a( / e )  . 
Labor taxes during youth therefore encourage individuals to study, whereas labor taxes in later 
periods of active life and net education costs discourage them. Notice also that high benefit 
replacement rates in later periods (b2, b3) and a high pension replacement rate (b4) will encourage 
young individuals to study. The reason is that any future benefits rise in future human capital. A final 
interesting result is that young people study more – all other things equal – if they expect to work 
harder in later periods (n2a , n3a).   
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3.2. Inheritance and production of effective human capital  
Equations (7) and (8) above assume that when entering the model young workers with high ability 
inherit a fraction  of the average effective human capital of the middle aged generation. The value 
of  is to be calibrated. Individuals with medium and lower ability inherit less (L<M<1). A major first 
element behind these different capacities to assimilate existing knowledge is obviously ‘nature’ (see 
also Azariadis and de la Croix, 2006). New in this paper is that we introduce the schooling system as a 
second determinant of the gap between the human capital of different ability groups when entering 
the model. A look at OECD PISA scores, for example, supports the introduction of this determinant. In 
Appendix 2 we report data showing that in a country like Finland the test score for science of a 
student at the 17th percentile is about 73% of the test score of a student at the 83th percentile. In 
countries like France, Italy and the US this is only about 65%. Finland therefore seems to be more 
successful in bringing available knowledge also to lower ability individuals. Equation (14) captures 
both determinants, with Lo and Mo reflecting nature and qL /qH and qM /qH the schooling system. 
Countries may differ for the latter, but they will have the same Lo and Mo. 
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We will use as a proxy for Lo the average of the relative PISA science score of individuals at the 17
th 
percentile (relative to individuals at the 83th percentile) over all 13 countries that we focus on. We 
will use as a proxy for Mo the average of the relative PISA science score of individuals at the 50
th 
percentile (relative to individuals at the 83th percentile). This procedure implies values for Lo and Mo 
of 0.673 and 0.837 respectively (see also Section 4). Basically, we assume that on average over all 13 
countries, the schooling system’s impact on PISA scores is neutral. What then remains is ‘nature’. In 
individual countries, however, the influence of the schooling system need not be neutral. We will 
define qL as the quality of schooling related to low ability individuals and measure it as the PISA 
science score of individuals at the 17th percentile in a particular country relative to the average over 
all 13 countries. We define qM and qH analogously for individuals at the 50
th and the 83th percentile. 
For Finland for example qL /qH equals 1.080, for the US that is 0.972. 
 
After entering the model, young individuals may decide to study and accumulate more human 
capital. The specification and parameterization of the human capital production function a(.) 
in 
Equation (9) is often a problem in numerical endogenous growth models. In contrast to goods 
production functions, there is not much empirical evidence and no consensus about the 
determinants of human capital growth, nor about the underlying functional form and parameter 
values. The literature shows a variety of functions, typically including one or two of the following 
inputs: individual time allocated to education, private expenditures on education by individuals 
themselves or by their parents, and government expenditures on education (e.g. Lucas, 1988, Glomm 
and Ravikumar, 1992; Docquier and Michel, 1999, Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; Bouzahzah et al., 
2002; Fougère et al., 2009; Arcalean and Schiopu, 2010). In case of two inputs, the adopted 
functional form is very often Cobb-Douglas (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Kaganovich and Zilcha, 
1999; Docquier and Michel, 1999).  
 Our specification of the human capital production function also includes education time of 
young individuals and education expenditures by the government as indicators for the quantity of 
invested private and public resources. Compared to most of the literature, however, we differ in 
three respects. First, we adopt a more flexible CES functional form, allowing the elasticity of 
substitution to differ from 1. Second, our definition of relevant government expenditures includes 
more than education. It also includes active labor market expenditures, public R&D expenditures and 
public fixed investment. This approach goes back to our use of the broader concept of effective 
human capital5. Our third extension is - again - to take into account the quality of education and the 
schooling system. We recognize that better quality implies higher cognitive abilities for the same 
allocation of resources. Young individuals’ capacity to build human capital will then rise.  
All these arguments find their way in Equations (15.a) and (15.b). The former shows the 
growth rate of effective human capital for high and medium ability individuals as a CES specification 
                                                          
5
 As in Dhont and Heylen (2009), effective human capital (and worker productivity) rise not only in accumulated 
schooling or training, but also in the productive efficiency of accumulated schooling. Education and active labor 
market expenditures contribute directly to more human capital being accumulated, public R&D and fixed 
investment expenditures will mainly raise the productive efficiency of accumulated human capital. 
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in education time when young (ea) and productive government expenditures in % of output (gy). In 
steady state both determinants are constant, which will imply constant steady state growth. We add 
the quality of the schooling system (qa) in a multiplicative way. In line with the above, we will use 
country-specific PISA science scores at the 83th and the 50th percentile (in deviation from their cross-
country average) as proxies for qH and qM 
6
. Next to qa we introduce (constant, common) technical 
parameters: a is a positive efficiency parameter reflecting natural ability,  
 a scale parameter, v is a 
share parameter and  the elasticity of substitution. These parameters will be calibrated. Note in 
Equation (15.b) that low ability individuals supply no education time, but they also enjoy positive 
effects on their effective human capital and productivity from productive government expenditures. 
Natural ability and the quality of received schooling also play a role here. 
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( , )L y L L L yg q q g
 
                   (15.b) 
Lack of existing empirical evidence makes an ex-ante assessment of our specification very difficult. In 
previous work, however, we have been able to verify that a specification like (15.a) performs better 
than alternative ones without quality, with a narrower definition of government expenditures, or 
with a different functional form (see Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2010; Buyse et al., 2011). 
 
3.3. Domestic firms, output and factor prices 
Firms act competitively on output and input markets and maximize profits. All firms are identical. 
Total domestic output (Yt) is given by the production function (16). Technology exhibits constant 
returns to scale in aggregate physical capital (Kt) and effective labor (Ht), so that profits are zero in 
equilibrium. Equation (17) defines total effective labor as a CES aggregate of effective labor supplied 
by the three ability groups. In this equation s is the elasticity of substitution between the different 
ability types of labor and ηH, ηM and ηL are the input shares. We will impose that ηH
 = 1–ηL–ηM. 
 
 
 1t t tY K H
                          (16) 
  
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1 1 1 1 1 1
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Equation (18) specifies effective labor per ability group. Within each ability group we assume perfect 
substitutability of labor supplied by the different age groups.  
 
                                                          
6
 Ideally, one would employ a quality indicator relating to tertiary education, but this is not (yet) available. Still, 
PISA scores may be very useful. They are informative about the quality that young people attain in secondary 
education, and with which some enter tertiary education. Quality at entrance should have a positive effect on 
people’s capacity to learn and to raise human capital in tertiary education. Furthermore, PISA scores have been 
found empirically significant for growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009).  
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To derive Equation (18) we make use of Equations (9) and (10) and we define: 
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Substituting Equation (18) for H, M and L into (17), and recognizing differences in the capacity  to 
inherit human capital as indicated by Equations (7) and (8), yields Equation (21).  
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Competitive behavior implies in Equation (22) that firms carry physical capital to the point where its 
after-tax marginal product equals the world real interest rate (see also Backus et al., 2008). We 
assume no depreciation of physical capital. Capital taxes are source-based: the tax rate k applies to 
the country in which the capital is used, regardless of who owns it. The real interest rate being given, 
firms will install more capital when the amount of effective labor increases or the capital tax rate 
falls. In that case the net return to investment in the home country rises above the world interest 
rate, and capital flows in. Furthermore, perfect competition implies for each ability type equality 
between the real wage and the marginal product of effective labor (Equation 23). Workers of a 
particular ability type will earn a higher real wage when their supply is relatively scarce and when 
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physical capital per unit of aggregate effective labor is higher. Taking into account (22), real wages 
per unit of effective labor will therefore fall in the world real interest rate and in domestic capital tax 
rates. 
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Substituting (21) for Ht and (22) for Kt/Ht, we can rewrite (16) as  
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If we finally recognize that in steady state r, k, xa, ea and nja are constant, we obtain the long-run 
(per capita) growth rate of the economy as : 
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3
 
                          (24) 
 
In line with earlier models (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Buiter and Kletzer, 1993), 
the long-run (per capita) growth rate is positively related to the quality of schooling (q) and to the 
fraction of time that young people allocate to education (e). It is also positively related to the share 
of productive government expenditures (gy), like in Barro (1990). Growth will rise also if young 
individuals incorporate a larger fraction of average human capital of the middle aged generation (, 
). Schooling policies targeted at low and medium ability individuals may also play a role here (see 
Equation 14). 
 
  
70 
 
3.4. Government 
The government runs a balanced budget. Productive expenditures Gyt, consumption Gct, benefits 
related to non-employment Bt, old-age pension benefits Pt, education subsidies Et, and lump sum 
transfers Zt are financed by taxes on labor Tnt, taxes on capital Tkt, and taxes on consumption Tct.   
 
yt ct t t t t nt kt ctG G B P E Z T T T             (25) 
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Note our assumption that each ability group has size 1 and that each generation has size 3. Following 
Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009), we assume that the government claims given 
fractions gy and gc of output for productive expenditures and consumption. Non-employment 
benefits (Bt) are an unconditional source of income support related to inactivity (‘leisure’) and non-
market household activities. Although it may seem strange to have such transfers in a model without 
involuntary unemployment, one can of course analyse their employment and growth effects as a 
theoretical benchmark case (see also Rogerson, 2007; Dhont and Heylen, 2008, 2009). Moreover, 
there is also clear practical relevance. Unconditional or quasi unconditional benefits to structurally 
non-employed people are a fact of life in many European countries.  
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4. Parameterization and empirical relevance of the model  
 
The economic environment described above allows us to simulate the transitory and steady state 
growth and employment effects of various fiscal and educational policy changes. This simulation 
exercise requires us first to parameterize and solve the model. In Section 4.1 we discuss our choice of 
preference and technology parameters. Starting from actual cross-country policy data in Section 4.2, 
we compare in Section 4.3 our model’s predictions with the employment and growth differences that 
we have reported in Table 1. This comparison provides a first and simple test of our model’s 
empirical relevance. In Section 5 we consider long-run equilibrium effects of policy changes. Section 
6 discusses transitional dynamics, and welfare effects per generation and ability group. To solve the 
model and to perform the simulations, we choose an algorithm that preserves the non-linear nature 
of our model. We follow the methodology basically proposed by Boucekkine (1995) and 
implemented by Juillard (1996) in the program Dynare. We use Dynare 4.2. 
 
4.1. Preference and technology parameters 
Table 2 contains an overview of all parameters. Following among others Barro (1990), we set the rate 
of time preference equal to 2% per year. Considering that periods in our model consist of 15 years, 
this choice implies a discount factor  equal to 0.74. With respect to output and effective labor, we 
assume a share coefficient 1-  equal to 0.7. The elasticity of substitution s between the three ability 
types is set at 1.5. Both values are well in line with the literature (e.g. King and Rebelo, 1990; Caselli 
and Coleman, 2006). There is more controversy in the literature about the value of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in leisure (1/). Micro studies often reveal very low elasticities. However, 
given our macro focus, these studies may not be the most relevant ones. Rogerson and Wallenius 
(2009) show that micro and macro elasticities may be unrelated. Rogerson (2007) also adopts a 
macro framework. He puts forward a reasonable range for   from 1 to 3 (Rogerson, 2007, p. 12). In 
line with this, we impose  to be equal to 2. The world real interest rate is assumed constant and 
equal to 3% per year, which is approximately the average real return on 10 year US government 
bonds in the last decade. Considering a period of 15 years, this implies that r = 0.558.  
A second series of nine parameters have been determined by calibration: three taste for 
leisure parameters (1, 2, 3), the human capital inheritance parameter (), three efficiency 
parameters in the human capital production function (H, M and L) and two share parameters in 
aggregate effective labor (ηM and ηL, where ηH follows as 1–ηL–ηM). The nine target values to which 
these parameters have been calibrated are reported at the bottom of Table 2. Five of them concern 
the average employment, education, and growth rates over all 13 countries in our study. The other 
four are the relative wages of young and middle aged workers of low and medium ability in the US. 
Although in practice a whole system of simultaneous equations is solved in which each target value is 
important for each parameter to be calibrated, it may be useful for our exposition here to bring some 
more structure. Certain parameters are clearly more than others linked to certain target values. The 
leisure parameters are basically determined such that with observed average levels of the fiscal 
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policy variables (tax rates, benefit replacement rates, etc.) and the observed average levels of 
schooling quality (qa)
8 over all 13 countries, the model correctly predicts the average of these 
countries’ employment rates by age (n1, n2, n3). We find that the taste for leisure rises with age 
(1=0.041, 2=0.123 3=0.274). The human capital inheritance parameter is basically determined to 
match average per capita growth. We find an inheritance rate for the highest ability group of almost 
80% (=0.785). Taking into account the values for M0 and L0 that we have discussed in Section 3.2., 
we obtain inheritance rates for the medium ability and the low ability groups of about 66% 
(=0.785x0.837) and 53% (=0.785x0.673) on average over all countries.  
 
Table 2 Basic parameterization and benchmark equilibrium 
 
Technology and preference parameters 
Goods production (output) 1 0.7, 1.5, 0.47, 0.30, 0.23        H M Ls  
Effective human capital 
oduction 
5 17 5 76 3 26 0 25 0 55 0 60         H M L. , . , . ,v . , . , .  
Human capital inheritance 
0 0 ( ) ( )0.785,  0.837,  0.673,  0.827,  0.654        M L M US L US  
Preference parameters 1 2 3,  ,  0.74 2 0.041,  0.123,  0.274          
World real interest rate 0 558r .  
Fiscal policy parameters in benchmark 
(a, b)
 
Gov. Expenditures (%) 
variables (in %)  
9.5
y
g , 1 2 3 415.9,    50.8 51.9,  68.3,     cg b b b b     
 
Tax rates (in %)  22.1
k
  , 14.3,c  1 2 3 52.5      
Average schooling 
quality (benchmark) 
 
  1  
M L H
q q q
 
  Target values for calibration 
Benchmark equilibrium 
(a) 
n1 n2 n3 Per capita growth (annual) e  
55.0% 63.7 % 43.6 
% 
1.91 % 16.7 %  
Relative wages US (c)   
 wLh1L /
 wHh1H         wMh1M /
 wHh1H             wLh2L /
 wHh2H   wMh2M /
 wHh2H 
0.43                     0.63                                0.38             0.58  
Note: (a) Average for all 13 countries in Table 1; (b) For details on fiscal policy parameters and schooling quality, see the 
            next section (Tables 3 and 4); (c) As a proxy for the relative wage of low-ability (medium-ability) young workers, we 
use available data on earnings of workers of age 25-34 with below upper secondary education (secondary education) 
in the US relative to earnings of workers with a tertiary degree. For the relative wage of middle aged workers, we use 
the same kind of data. However, since middle age-specific data are missing, we use average values for the whole age 
group 25-64 as a proxy. Data for the age group 55-64 are about the same (0.38 and 0.55). Data source: OECD 
Education at a Glance, 2009, Table A7.1. 
 
 
Calibration of the share parameters ηM and ηL is mainly driven by the values for relative wages of 
young workers in the US. As shown by Equation (23), these share parameters are important 
determinants of the relative productivity of labor. Actual wages are informative if a close link can be 
assumed between wages and productivity. This condition is much more likely fulfilled in the US, 
                                                          
8
 And with the values of three parameters in the human capital production function (, v, ) that we discuss 
below (see also footnote 9). 
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which explains the introduction here of US relative wages rather than cross-country averages. We 
illustrate the key elements in our procedure to obtain values for ηL and ηM from these relative wage 
data in Appendix 3. The results imply ηL=0.23, ηM=0.30 and ηH=0.47. A similar procedure is applied to 
derive values for L, M and L. These are basically determined such that the model correctly predicts 
relative wages of middle aged workers in the US, as well the target value for the education rate e (see 
also Appendix 3). We obtain L=3.26, M=5.76 and H=5.17. 
Finally, we had no strong ex ante indication on three parameters in the human capital 
production function: the scale parameter , the share parameter v and the elasticity of substitution 
parameter . We could assign sensible values to these parameters thanks to a sensitivity analysis on 
the results that we report in the next section. There we evaluate the capacity of our model to explain 
the facts in 13 OECD countries that we reported in Table 1. Our guideline to pin down specific values 
for , v and  was to minimize the deviation of our model’s predictions from the true data9. This 
procedure implied =0.60, v=0.25 and =0.55. We observe decreasing returns in human capital 
growth. The result for  reveals a higher degree of complementarity between private education time 
and government expenditures than in the Cobb-Douglas case. The result for v demonstrates 
relatively high importance for human capital formation of private education time versus productive 
public expenditures.  
 
4.2. Fiscal policy and education quality 
Tables 3 and 4 describe key characteristics of fiscal policy in 1995-2001/2004. Our proxy for the tax 
rate on labor income concerns the total tax wedge, for which we report the marginal rate in %. The 
data cover personal income taxes, employee and employer social security contributions payable on 
wage earnings and payroll taxes. The OECD publishes these marginal tax data for several family and 
income situations. Our data for    in Table 3 are the average of all these situations. Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and Finland have marginal labor tax rates above 55% or even 60%. The US 
have marginal labor tax rates below 40%. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax 
reported by the Institute for Fiscal Studies
 (their EMTR, base case). Germany and Belgium have the 
highest rates. In contrast to labor (and consumption), capital is taxed relatively little in the Nordic 
countries. As to consumption taxes, we follow Dhont and Heylen (2009) in computing them as the 
ratio of government indirect tax receipts (net of subsidies paid) to total domestic demand net of 
indirect taxes and subsidies. Our simplifying assumption is that consumption tax rates correspond to 
                                                          
9
 From our model’s predictions and the true data for 13 countries we computed for each variable (n1, n2, n3, e, 
growth) the root mean squared error normalized to the mean. We minimized the average normalized RMSE 
over all five variables. More precisely, we adopted the following iterative procedure. We chose values for , v 
and  and then calibrated the other nine parameters (although it should be mentioned that the values for ,  v 
and  had no influence on the calibration results for j). Given the obtained values for the other parameters, we 
computed the average normalized RMSE over all five endogenous variables. We then checked whether changes 
in , v and , and a recalibration of the other parameters , could further reduce this statistic. We did this until 
no further reduction was possible.    
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aggregate indirect tax rates. The Nordic countries stand out with the highest consumption tax rates, 
the US with the lowest.  
 
Table 3  Fiscal policy ( Tax rates) 
 
tax rate on labor 
income  
(in %) 
consumption 
tax rate 
(%) 
tax rate on 
capital income 
(%) 
   Proxy for : 
 
              
Austria 54.9 13.2 17.3 
Belgium  67.2 13.4 27.1 
France 52.9 17.1 21.7 
Germany 60.4 11.1 34.4 
Italy 55.2 14.7 14.9 
Netherlands 52.0 12.2 24.3 
Denmark 48.6 18.9 22.5 
Finland 56.2 15.2 17.2 
Norway 50.8 16.4 22.1 
Sweden 56.0 17.9 16.1 
UK 44.9 14.5 21.2 
US 37.4 7.2 23.6 
Canada 46.4 14.5 24.8 
    
Overall 
average 
52.5 14.3 22.1 
Notes: Labor tax rates are data for the total tax wedge, marginal rate (OECD, Taxing Wages). Data are for 2000-2004. Earlier 
data are not available. For details, see Appendix 1. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax rates (Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, their EMTR, base case; data are for 1995-2001, see also Devereux et al., 2002). Consumption tax rates are 
from Dhont and Heylen (2009). Data are for 1995-2001 
 
Table 4 summarizes our data for the expenditure side of fiscal policy. A first variable is our proxy for 
the net non-employment benefit replacement rate    for young and middle aged workers. Since in 
our model non-employment is a structural or equilibrium phenomenon, the data that we use 
concern net transfers received by structurally or long-term unemployed people. They include social 
assistance, family benefits and housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also 
include unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still 
paid, i.e. if workers can be structurally unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit 
eligibility10. The data are expressed in percent of after-tax wages. In line with our approach to 
determine labor tax rates, we again compute the average of data reported by the OECD for a wide 
range of family and income cases to determine bj (see Appendix 1). Benefit replacement rates for 
older workers b3 are typically higher, at least in some countries due to the availability of generous 
                                                          
10
 In the period that we study, this is the case in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, Ireland, and the 
UK. Workers cannot be structurally non-employed and still receive unemployment benefits in the Netherlands, 
Italy, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and the US (OECD, 2004, 
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Benefits and Wages, country specific files).  
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early retirement regimes11. Overall, the euro area and the Nordic countries pay the highest net 
benefits. The only exception is Italy. Transfers to structurally non-employed people are by far the 
lowest in the US.  
 
Table 4  Fiscal policy (net transfer replacement rates, government consumption, productive  
               expenditures)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: A description of all variables is given in the main text. For more details, see Appendix 1. The data for net benefit 
replacement rates are an average for 2001-2004 (earlier data are not available). The data for government consumption and 
productive expenditures concern 1995-2001. Pension replacement rates have been taken from OECD (Pensions at a Glance, 
2005, p. 52). The data concern 2002 
 
Our data for productive government expenditures (gy) in Table 4 include education (except study 
grants to households), labor market training, government financed R&D and public investment, in 
percent of GDP. On average, education expenditures constitute close to 60% of total gy. 
Governments in the Nordic countries allocate by far the highest fractions of output to productive 
expenditures. Productive expenditures in percent of GDP are the lowest in the UK. The US and most 
core countries of the euro area take intermediate positions. Government consumption in percent of 
GDP is the highest also in the Nordic countries, followed at close distance by several countries of the 
core euro area12. In the US, government consumption is (much) lower. As a final variable in Table 4 
we include the net pension replacement rate. Available data concern an individual with mean 
                                                          
11
 To assess the generosity of early retirement we rely on data for the implicit tax rate on continued work in the 
early retirement route (see Duval, 2003; Brandt et al., 2005). For further details on the calculation of b3 we 
refer to Appendix 1.   
12
 Like Dhont and Heylen (2009) we calculate our data for government consumption as total government 
consumption in % of GDP, diminished with the fraction of public education outlays going to wages and working-
expenses. The latter are included in productive expenditures.  
 Non-employment 
transfer, young 
and middle aged 
(net replacement 
rate, %) 
Non-
employment 
transfer, older 
workers (net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
Pension 
replacement 
rate (net, 
in %) 
Government 
consumption 
(% of GDP) 
Government 
productive 
expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
Proxy for: b1,b2 b3 b4 gc gy 
      
Austria 56.3 64.0 88.9 14.6 8.8 
Belgium 59.6 69.3 63.1 16.9 7.8 
France 46.0 54.9 68.8 18.3 10.0 
Germany 64.7 67.8 71.8 15.3 7.8 
Italy 17.0 36.4 88.8 14.3 7.8 
Netherlands 55.0 61.5 84.1 18.4 8.4 
Denmark 61.9 52.6 54.1 18.4 10.8 
Finland 56.9 67.6 78.8 16.0 10.2 
Norway 55.4 48.4 65.1 14.7 11.5 
Sweden 53.5 47.2 68.2 20.0 12.2 
UK 51.1 45.2 47.6 14.4 6.9 
US 30.5 24.4 51.0 10.3 8.8 
Canada 44.6 35.6 57.1 14.7 8.8 
Overall 
average 
50.8 51.9 68.3 15.9 9.2 
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earnings before retirement. They include only (quasi-)mandatory public pensions, and are expressed 
as a percentage of this individual’s average lifetime labor income, as is the case in our Equation (6). 
Voluntary, occupational pensions are not included. The overall average replacement rate is 68.3%, 
but there are strong cross-country differences. 
 
A final set of data in Table 5 concern net education costs, and our indicator for education quality. 
Education costs include tuition fees, additional mandatory ancillary fees, costs of books and study 
material, and living costs13. Net costs can be obtained after deducting government grants. Net costs 
are among the highest in the US and the UK. They are among the lowest in the Netherlands, and the 
Nordic countries. We rely on PISA science scores to compute our proxy for the quality of schooling 
(qa) in the human capital formation functions (14, 15). We concentrate on science scores given their 
expected closer link to growth (Barro, 2001). Our procedure is as follows. The OECD presents for each 
country the mean PISA score obtained by pupils as well its standard deviation. We take the mean as 
representative for median ability individuals. The mean plus one standard deviation is relevant for 
high ability individuals, as only 16.6% will do better. The mean minus one standard deviation is 
relevant for low ability individuals, as only 16.6% will perform worse. We report the original OECD 
data in Appendix 2. The mean score is best in Finland, followed by the Netherlands, Canada and the 
UK. Finland also shows the lowest standard deviation, which goes along with the best test score in 
our sample also for low-ability individuals. As our proxy for education quality (qL, qM, qH) we divide 
each individual country score by its respective overall country average. These data are reported in 
Table 5. They reveal high quality across the board in Finland, the Netherlands, Canada and the UK. 
Quality is relatively low across the board in Italy, Denmark, Norway and the US. 
Note that there is no correlation between productive government expenditures in Table 4 
and the PISA scores in Table 5. Correlation with qM for example is -0.04. There is no correlation either 
if we restrict productive expenditures to education only. Both variables seem to tell different stories 
(see also Woessmann, 2003).  
                                                          
13
 Note that we report the data for a full-time student, in percent of per capita GDP. Given that e is the average 
fraction of time spent studying by the young generation, the size of which is ¼ of total population, aggregate 
private education costs in percent of GDP in our model can be computed as (ec.e)/4. On average over all 
countries in our sample, this is about 1.1% of GDP (0.263x0.167/4). Similarly computed grants are about 0.25% 
of GDP on average.  
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Table 5  Education (cost, subsidies, PISA science)  
 
 ‘Full-time’ 
education 
cost (% GDP 
per capita)
 (a) 
‘Full-time’ 
education grants 
(% of GPD per 
capita)
 (a) 
 
            PISA science score
 (b) 
         (relative to benchmark) 
 
Proxy for : 
 
ec 
 
es 
 
qL 
 
qM 
 
  qH    
         
Austria 24.35 2.85 1.010 1.000 0.993    
Belgium 18.31 0.91 0.978 0.996 1.008    
France 26.12 4.92 0.973 0.990 1.002    
Germany 23.54 1.14 0.975 0.990 1.000    
Italy 24.24 0.94 0.931 0.947 0.957    
Netherlands 23.51 13.51 1.049 1.036 1.026    
Denmark 24.63 11.68 0.944 0.955 0.962    
Finland 20.18 9.38 1.135 1.085 1.051    
Norway 17.18 3.86 0.958 0.966 0.972    
Sweden 23.57 10.37 1.002 1.000 0.998    
UK 43.75 3.55 1.032 1.032 1.031    
US 42.70 10.80 0.956 0.972 0.983    
Canada 29.74 3.64 1.061 1.039 1.025    
         
Overall 
average 
26.29 5.97    1.000          1.000             1.000  
    
Notes: (a) Education costs and grants have been taken from Usher and Cervenan (2005), complemented for Denmark and 
Norway by Usher and Medow (2010). The data relate to 2003, except for Denmark and Norway (2008).  
(b) Underlying data are PISA science scores at the 17
th
, 50
th
 and 83
th
 percentile in each country in 2000, 2003 and 
2006. In Appendix 2 we report the average score over these three years. The data for qL, qM and qH in this table are 
expressed relative to the overall country average. Actual overall country average scores are 408 (17
th
 percentile), 
507 (median) and 606 (83
th
 percentile). 
 
 
  
4.3 Predicted versus actual employment by age, education of young and growth in the OECD  
 
Can our model match the facts that we have reported in Table 1? In this section we confront our 
model’s predictions with the true data for 1995-2007. Clearly, one should be aware of the serious 
limitations of such an exercise. First of all, our model is highly stylized and may (obviously) miss 
potential determinants of growth or employment. Second, even if we compute the true data in Table 
1 as averages over a longer period, these averages need not be equal to the steady state. Countries 
may still be moving towards their steady state. Third, this exercise only concerns the last 15 years. 
Due to lack of data – especially with respect to marginal labor tax rates and non-employment 
benefits before the mid 1990s – it is impossible for us to relate changes in growth and employment 
to changes in policy within countries over longer time periods. In spite of all this, if one considers the 
extreme variation in the predictions of existing calibrated models investigating the effects of fiscal 
policy in the literature (see Stokey and Rebelo, 1995), even a minimal test of the ‘goodness of fit’ of 
our model is informative. This information is important to assess the value of the simulation results 
that we present in the next section, and their reliability for policy analysis. In most papers in the 
literature a test of the external validity of the model is missing.   
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 Our calibration implies that our model’s prediction matches the average over all 13 countries 
of employment rates by age, education and per capita growth. The test of the model’s validity is 
whether it also matches individual country data, and cross-country differences. Before one uses a 
model for policy analysis, one would like to see for example that the model does not overestimate, 
nor underestimate the performance differences related to observed cross-country policy differences. 
Our test is tough since we impose the same preference and technology parameters, reported in the 
upper part of Table 2, on all countries. Only the fiscal policy variables, education costs and grants, the 
pension replacement rate and education quality differ. Moreover, assuming perfect competition, we 
disregard differences in labor and product market institutions which some authors consider of crucial 
importance (see Section 1).  Still, we find that the model matches the facts remarkably well for a 
large majority of countries. Basically, we here confirm earlier findings by e.g. Ohanian et al. (2008) 
and Dhont and Heylen (2008) that once one controls for fiscal policy differences, variation in taste for 
leisure or different market rigidities are not critical to explain cross-country variation in labor market 
performance. 
Figures 1 to 3 relate our model’s predictions to actual observations for three employment 
rates by age (aggregated over the three ability groups). We add the 45°-line to assess the absolute 
differences between predictions and facts, as well as the coefficient of correlation between 
predictions and facts. Our model performs quite well. In each age group, it correctly predicts high 
employment rates in the US and Canada and low employment in Belgium and Germany. For young 
workers it also correctly predicts relatively low employment in most other countries of the core euro 
area, and in the Nordic countries. For older workers it has relatively high employment right in the 
Nordic countries and the UK. Overall correlation between the model’s predictions and the actual 
data in Figure 1 is 0.36. If we drop Italy, for which there are good reasons14, this rises to 0.66. 
Correlation in Figure 2 is 0.51, in Figure 3 it is 0.75. Moreover, in each figure - again after dropping 
Italy from Figure 1 - the regression line (not shown) is close to the 45°-line, which suggests that our 
model correctly assesses the size of the employment effects of policy differences across countries. 
Next to Italy, there are a few other countries, where our model somewhat over- or underpredicts. 
The model’s employment predictions tend to be too high for France, Italy and (except in Figure 1) the 
Netherlands. They tend to be too low in general for Denmark and Finland.  
 
  
                                                          
14
 A major element behind the deviation for this country seems to be underestimation of the fallback income 
position for structurally non-employed young workers. OECD data show very low replacement rates in Italy. 
However, as shown by Reyneri (1994), the gap between Italy and other European countries is much smaller 
than it seems. Reyneri (1994) points to the importance of family support as an alternative to unemployment 
benefits. Fernández Cordón (2001) shows that in Italy young people live much longer with their parents than in 
other countries. In 1995 for example about 56% of people aged 25-29 were still living with their parents in Italy. 
In about all other countries this fraction was below 23%. Of all non-working males aged 25-29 in Italy more 
than 80% were living with their parents. In France or Germany the corresponding numbers were close to 40%.   
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Figure 1. Employment rate in hours of young individuals in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.36. 
             Excluding Italy correlation rises to 0.66.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Employment rate in hours of middle aged individuals in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
  
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.51. 
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Figure 3.  Employment rate in hours of older individuals in individual countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
 
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.75.  
 
In Figures 4 and 5 we relate our model’s predictions to the facts for education and growth. For 
education, the model correctly captures key differences between the Nordic countries on the one 
hand and countries like the UK and Italy on the other. Predictions for education are quite close to the 
45°-line for all individual countries except Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden.  The model also has 
important cross-country differences right for growth. The model has more difficulty however to 
explain observed growth for France and especially the UK. Correlation between the model’s 
predictions and the true data is 0.71 for education and 0.76 for growth.  
 
 
Figure 4. Effective tertiary education rate in individual countries, in %, 1998-2007  
 
 
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.71.  
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Figure 5. Annual per capita potential GDP growth in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
 
 
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.76. 
  
 
Figure 6. Relative employment of low ability individuals (nL /nH) in % in 13 OECD countries (average for 1995, 
2000, 2006) 
 
Note:  Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.66. 
  
 
Figure 6 compares our model’s predictions with the facts for the employment rate of the low ability 
group relative to the employment rate of high ability group (twice aggregated over the three 
generations). Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.66, but the model 
overpredicts the facts. Our model predicts the low relative employment rate of the low ability group 
right for countries like Belgium and Germany on the one hand, and predicts the high relative 
employment rate of the young ability group right for countries as Sweden and Norway on the other, 
but it tends to fail for the US. As to the US, our model is not the only one that misses the rather low 
employment rate among low-ability Americans. A large literature has tried to explain this (see The 
Economist, 2011 for a recent article). 
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5. Numerical steady state and welfare effects of fiscal policy shocks 
 
Having established the empirical relevance of our model, we now simulate a series of fiscal policy 
shocks. In the next section we focus on education policy. Our aim is to discover the (relative) 
effectiveness of changes in individual policy variables for the employment rate of three age groups, 
the employment rate of three ability groups, aggregate employment, and growth. We report steady 
state effects and welfare effects for current and future generations.  
Starting from budget balance, we impose permanent (and unanticipated) fiscal shocks equal 
to 2% of initial output, i.e. output before any changes in employment or growth have taken place. 
We consider reductions in the tax rates and in the benefit replacement rates, and increases in 
government expenditures. All shocks are therefore expected to increase employment. Our 
benchmark from which we start, and against which all policy shocks are evaluated, is the average of 
13 countries as reported at the bottom of Table 215. Table 6 considers the effects of policy changes 
on steady state growth and employment, assuming that policy changes are financed by changes in 
lump sum transfers (z) to maintain budget balance. In Table 7 we assume shocks to be compensated 
by a change in another fiscal policy variable.  
Figure 7 shows the welfare effects of the policy measures described in Table 7 for the current 
and future generations of high and low ability individuals. Effects for the medium group are generally 
in between. We report on the vertical axis the welfare effect on the generation born in t+k, where k 
is indicated on the horizontal axis, and where t is the period when the (permanent, unanticipated) 
policy change is introduced. Our welfare measure is the (constant) percentage change in benchmark 
consumption in each period of remaining life that individuals should get to attain the same lifetime 
utility as after the policy shock (see also King and Rebelo, 1990). To compute this percentage change 
we keep employment rates at the benchmark. 
In Table 8 we integrate the welfare effects induced by each policy into a single aggregate 
summary measure. For each individual we first compute the present discounted value of the total 
consumption change over life that is required in the benchmark to make him equally well-off as 
under the policy reform. The basis of our computation is the data that we report in Figure 7. But now 
we also take into account differences in the length of remaining life. For young individuals the data in 
Figure 7 apply to four periods, whereas for retired individuals they only apply to one remaining 
period. Next, we impose that all those who lose under the new policy are compensated by the 
winners. Our summary measure is the present discounted value of the net aggregate consumption 
gain of all winners after having compensated the losers, in percent of initial GDP. The first row in 
Table 8 includes all current and four future generations of all three ability types into the 
computation. The second row includes only those generations that live at the moment the policy is 
announced. 
                                                          
15
 The choice of 2% is arbitrary. Imposing smaller or larger shocks would not generate different results as far as 
the sign and the relative size of effects is concerned. Our main conclusions do not change either if we impose 
the same policy shocks on a different benchmark, i.e. a different initial set of policy parameters and initial 
employment and growth (but the same preference and technology parameters). The size of effects is 
somewhat larger for example starting from the core euro area as benchmark.  
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Our main findings are as follows: 
(i)          We confirm our earlier results in Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2010) that the most effective 
policy to promote aggregate employment should include an overall cut in non-employment 
benefits, i.e. a cut for all age and ability groups (policy 3 in both Table 6 and Table 7). A key 
element is that this policy strongly raises the marginal utility from work versus inactivity. We 
observe positive responses among all age and ability groups. Young, older and lower ability 
individuals tend to show the strongest response. Overall labor tax cuts in policy 1 have much 
smaller effects, especially when financed by consumption taxes (Table 7).  
(ii)           The most effective fiscal policies to promote growth include a labor tax cut on older workers 
and an increase in productive government expenditures (policies 2 and 4 in both tables). Both 
these policies raise the marginal return to education, either by making education time more 
productive, or by encouraging individuals to work longer during their third period. Aggregate 
employment effects from policy 2 are still positive, but much smaller than from policy 3, mainly 
because the young (of medium and high ability) restrict hours worked and study more. Rising 
participation in education among high and medium ability youngsters will also explain why more 
productive government expenditures will not be successful in raising aggregate employment. The 
aggregate employment rate falls in particular when additional productive expenditures are 
financed by a reduction of government consumption (Table 7). The same result (not shown) 
follows in the case of consumption tax increases.   
(iii)  The bottom panel of Figure 7 reveals that the future generations of all ability groups benefit 
most from policies like policy 4, including higher productive expenditures (financed by a reduction 
of government consumption16). This holds also for the future low ability individuals, who inherit (a 
fraction of) the effective human capital accumulated by high and medium ability groups. For 
current generations, however, especially older and retired individuals, and individuals with low 
ability, this policy induces a welfare loss. This is confirmed in Table 8 where policy 4 induces the 
best net aggregate welfare effects for future generations but not for the current generations. 
(iv)          Welfare differences by ability are even more explicit under policy 2. With the exception of 
the retired, who pay higher consumption taxes but receive no compensating gain, all high ability 
individuals see their welfare increase after a labor tax cut on older workers. For future high ability 
generations, policy 2 is the second best among the fiscal policy measures that we have simulated. 
Low ability individuals see much smaller welfare gains. The current generation of young (and 
retired) even lose significantly. Nevertheless, net aggregate welfare effects in Table 8 are positive. 
(v)           Overall benefit cuts in policy 3 may be most effective to promote employment, but its long-
run welfare effects are among the poorest of all fiscal policy measures. A key element is that since 
benefits are related to a person’s human capital, they constitute part of the return to studying. 
Lower benefit replacement rates are therefore negative for education (see also Tables 6 and 7), 
and long-run output and growth. Table 8 reveals sizeable net aggregate welfare gains for policy 3. 
 
                                                          
16
 Again, the same results follow from financing by means of higher consumption taxes. 
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Table 6. Fiscal shocks in the model (equal to 2% of output, ex ante) - compensated by changes in  
     lump sum transfers (z) 
 
Change in 
policy 
variable
(a)
 
(1) 
 
1=2 
=3= 
-2.9 
(2) 
 
3= 
-11.2 
 
(3) 
 
b1=b2 
=b3= 
-8.3 
(4) 
 
gy= 
+2.0 
 
(5) 
 
low= 
-10.2 
 
(6) 
 
3=-8.5,  
low= -2.5 
 
(7) 
 
1= 
-11.2 
 
(8) 
 
1low= 
-19.4 
 
Effect 
(b)
:         
∆n1 0.40 -1.81 1.99 -2.35 2.51 -0.69 5.54 4.73 
∆n2 0.86 -0.02 1.65 0.86 0.46 0.10 -0.60 -0.80 
∆n3 1.34 5.62 2.35 1.34 0.72 4.51 -0.93 -1.25 
∆e 0.25 1.64 -0.54 2.28 -1.15 0.90 -2.83 -1.99 
         
∆n 
(b, c) 
0.84 1.01 1.97 -0.09 1.23 1.11 1.39 0.95 
N/N 
(d)
 1.54 1.83 3.58 -0.16 2.24 2.02 2.53 1.73 
         
∆nH 0.46 0.23 2.27 -0.73 0.51 0.32 1.67 0.55 
∆nM 0.79 0.79 2.01 -0.31 1.52 1.09 1.62 1.80 
∆nL 1.28 2.00 1.62 0.77 1.66 1.91 0.88 0.50 
∆eH 0.33 2.60 -0.78 3.75 0.02 1.97 -4.69 0.00 
∆eM 0.42 2.32 -0.84 3.10 -3.47 0.77 -3.81 -5.97 
         
∆ annual 
growth 
rate
(b)
 
0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.35 -0.07 0.05 -0.17 -0.12 
∆z ex-post 
(e) -2.54 -3.01 2.79   -1.66 -2.60 -2.86 -2.69 -2.69 
Notes :  (a) change in policy variable, in percentage points 
               (b) difference in percentage points between new steady state and benchmark, except N/N  
               (c) change in (weighted) aggregate employment rate in hours 
           
     
(d) change in volume of employment in hours, in %. Approximately, N/N = n/n with N total hours  
      worked (and assuming potential hours constant) 
             
  
(e) change in lump sum transfer (as a fraction of output) to maintain budget balance, in %-points.  
 
(vi)           In policy 5, we impose a labor tax cut on all low-wage earners. The latter include all low-
ability individuals in addition to the young medium-ability individuals. Labor tax cuts on the low-
wage earners have the second best effects on employment, but a negative effect on growth. 
Moreover, in Figure 7 they imply the strongest gap in welfare effects between ability groups. Low 
ability individuals win, all current and future high ability individuals lose. The political feasibility of 
policy 5 is therefore very unlikely, but its results may be inspiring for the development of a more 
balanced set of policies to the benefit all. Moreover, note in Table 8 that the net aggregate 
welfare effects of policy 5 are also negative. 
(vii)  Better overall employment effects, an improvement of the labor market position of the low 
ability group, and better welfare effects for this group, at a slight cost in terms of growth, are 
possible if one complements policies that cut labor taxes on older workers with labor tax cuts on 
the low wage earners (policy 6). The best effects on employment follow if this combined tax cut is 
85 
 
financed by overall benefit cuts (policy 6b in Table 7).  Policy 6b induces also very high and 
positive net aggregate welfare effects. 
(viii) Additional simulations (policy 8 in Table 6) reveal that focusing tax cuts on young low wage 
earners alone does not bring much gain, not even for the employment rate among the low ability 
group. Young low ability workers would simply substitute hours worked when young for hours 
worked when middle aged and older. An overall positive effect on their income would even 
discourage their labor supply. In line with our findings in Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2010) 
focusing labor tax cuts on all young workers (policy 7 in Table 6) has strong negative effects on 
growth. By raising the opportunity cost of studying, it pulls high and medium ability individuals 
out of education.  
 
Table 7. Fiscal shocks in the model (equal to 2% of output) - compensated by a change in another 
                fiscal policy variable  
 
Change in 
policy 
variable 
(a)
 
(1) 
1=2 
=3= 
-2.9 
(2) 
3= 
-11.2 
 
(3) 
b1=b2 
=b3= 
-8.3 
(4) 
gy= 
2.0 
 
(5) 
low= 
-10.2 
 
(6a) 
3 = -8.5 
   low = -2.5 
 
  (6b) 
3= -8.5, 
   low= -2.5 
 
Compensating 
change 
(e) 
c= 
5.8 
c= 
7.0 
c= 
-6.2 
gc= 
-1.7 
c= 
5.9 
 
c= 
6.6 
b1=b2 
=b3= 
-8.3 
Effect 
(b)
:        
∆n1 -0.11 -2.44 2.52 -2.70 2.03 -1.27 1.30 
∆n2 0.15 -0.90 2.43 0.37 -0.25 -0.72 1.77 
∆n3 0.23 4.39 3.55 0.58 -0.38 3.33 6.70 
∆e 0.21 1.59 -0.48 2.25 -1.20 0.86 0.37 
        
∆n 
(b, c) 
0.08 0.11 2.79 -0.61 0.49 0.27 3.04 
N/N 
(d)
 0.15 0.19 5.07 -1.11 0.89 0.49 5.54 
        
∆nH 0.00 -0.31 2.78 -1.04 0.02 -0.20 2.58 
∆nM 0.04 -0.09 2.81 -0.83 0.75 0.26 3.06 
∆nL 0.21 0.72 2.77 0.03 0.69 0.74 3.49 
∆eH 0.27 2.53 -0.70 3.70 -0.04 1.90 1.17 
∆eM 0.35 2.23 -0.74 3.05 -3.55 0.69 -0.05 
        
∆ annual 
growth rate
(b)
 
0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.35 -0.07 0.05 0.02 
 
 
Notes :  (a) change in policy variable, in percentage points. 
              (b) difference in percentage points between new steady state and benchmark, except N/N.  
              (c) change in (weighted) aggregate employment rate in hours 
              (d) change in volume of employment in hours, in % 
              (e) compensating change, in percentage points 
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Figure 7. Welfare effects of fiscal policy shocks on current and future high and low ability individuals 
       High ability        Low ability 
 
 
Note:  The vertical axis indicates the welfare effect for the generation born in t+k, where t is when the 
      fiscal policy change is introduced. The horizontal axis indicates k.  
 
 
Table 8. Net welfare effect after compensating welfare transfers (expressed as % of initial GDP) 
 
Included generations  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 5 Policy 6a Policy 6b 
All current + 4 future 0.6 4.4 4.8 16.2 -2.6 2.9 7.6 
All current 0.0 1.9 2.9 0.8 -0.6 1.3 4.2 
Note: for a description of the computation of these data, see main text. 
 
  
-7,0
0,0
7,0
14,0
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Policy 2
Policy 3
Policy 6a
Policy 6b
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
-10,0
0,0
10,0
20,0
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Policy 1
Policy 4
Policy 5
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
87 
 
6. Conclusions 
Rising pressure on the welfare state due to ageing forces all OECD countries to develop effective 
employment and growth policies. The need to raise employment is particularly pressing among older 
and lower ability workers. Concern for employment and growth is not new. They have been high on 
the agenda of both policy makers and researchers since at least two decades.  
 Our main contribution in this paper is study the effects of fiscal policy on hours of work of 
young, middle aged and older individuals, education of the young, and aggregate growth, within one 
coherent framework, where all these variables are endogenous. Moreover, we realistically take into 
account heterogeneity in individuals’ ability to build human capital. Our general equilibrium 
approach allows also to model important linkages between education (and growth) and labor supply 
during all periods of life. These linkages are generally lacking in the literature studying fiscal policy 
effects.  
We pay particular attention to a careful calibration of our model. Before using it for policy 
simulations, we evaluate its empirical relevance on a group of 13 OECD countries. While we exploit 
cross-country differences in the composition of fiscal policies we impose the same labor and product 
market institutions (perfect competition), the same taste for leisure, and the same technology in all 
countries. We find that the predictions of our model match the main facts well for all key variables in 
a large majority of countries.  
Our policy simulations investigate the strength of the effects of various fiscal policy shocks on 
steady state employment by age and ability, and growth. Our main findings are as follows. First, we 
confirm our earlier results in Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2010). We again identify labor taxes and 
(especially) ‘non-employment’ benefits as the main policy variables affecting employment. 
Productive government expenditures are the most effective with respect to long-run output and 
growth. Again we observe that output and growth may benefit also from labor tax cuts targeted at 
older workers. Second, however, a first new result in this paper, is that if these policies are imposed, 
they also imply clearly differential welfare effects between the ability groups. Current and near 
future low ability individuals may experience welfare losses. Third, better overall employment effects 
and better welfare effects for low ability groups, at a slight cost in terms of growth, are possible if 
one complements policies that cut labor taxes on older workers with labor tax cuts on all the low 
wage earners. The best effects on employment follow if this combined tax cut is financed by overall 
benefit cuts.  
A key policy implication of our results for many European countries would be to cut non-employment 
benefits, and to reallocate these resources to tax cuts on older workers, tax cuts on the low wage 
earners, and higher productive expenditures.  
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Appendix 1: Construction of data and data sources 
 
In this appendix we provide more detail on the construction of some of our performance variables 
and policy variables.  
 
Employment rate in hours (in one of three age groups, 1995-2007) 
Definition: total actual hours worked by individuals in the age group / potential hours worked. 
Actual hours worked = total employment in persons x average hours worked per week x average 
number of weeks worked per year 
Potential hours = total population in the age group x 2080 (where 2080 = 52 weeks per year x 40 
hours per week) 
Data sources:  
* Total employment in the age group / total population in the age group: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics by Sex and Age. Data are available for many age groups, among which 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 
45-49, 50-54, 55-64. We constructed the data for our three age groups as weighted averages. 
* Average hours worked per week: OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics, Average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job. These data are available only for age groups 15-24, 25-54, 55-64. We use 
the OECD data for the age group 15-24 as a proxy for our age subgroup 20-24, the OECD data for the 
age group 25-54 as a proxy for our age (sub)groups 25-34, 35-49 and 50-54. 
* Average number of weeks worked per year: Due to lack of further detail, we use the same data for 
each age group. The average number of weeks worked per year has been approximated by dividing 
average annual hours actually worked per worker (total employment) by average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job by all workers (total employment). Data source: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics, Hours worked. 
 
Employment rate by educational attainment 
We use data for the employment/population ratio by educational attainment for persons of age 25-
64. Our ratio nL/nH has been computed from data for people (both sexes) with less that upper 
secondary education and people with tertiary education. The data in Table 1 are an average for 1995, 
2000 and 2006.   
Data sources: OECD Employment Outlook, Statistical Annex, Table D. 
 
Effective education rate of young, e (age group 20-34, 1998-2007) 
Definition: total effective hours studied by individuals of age 20-34 / potential hours studied 
This variable is constructed as the fraction of hours spent by young people in tertiary education, 
multiplied by the normalized completion rate of tertiary education, as shown in the Table below.  
As a proxy for the fraction of hours spent by young people in tertiary education we use the ratio of 
students in tertiary education in full-time units, to population of age 20-34.  
Not all hours need to be effective hours, however. Students may take more years than required to 
complete a degree. Some students may never complete it. Countries may differ in the incidence of 
ineffective hours. Our approach is that the completion rate gives an indication of the overall 
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effectiveness of hours in tertiary education. This variable is computed as the ratio of the number of 
graduates from a degree in a particular year to the number of new entrants in this degree z years 
ago, where z is the number of years of full-time study required to complete the degree. We compute 
the effective time in tertiary education as the fraction of hours spent, multiplied by the completion 
rate normalized to the overall country average (see Table). We do not adjust by the absolute 
completion rate since that would imply that each successful year that a student spends in tertiary 
education would be classified as ‘leisure’ if he/she does not obtain the degree in the end. 
Data sources:  
* Students in tertiary education in full-time units: Eurostat, Students by ISCED level, study intensity 
(full-time, part-time) and sex [educ_enrl1ad], levels 5-6. Missing data for some years in some 
countries were obtained by interpolation from existing data.  
* Completion rate in tertiary education: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2009, Table A3.4. 
 
 
Unadjusted fraction 
of time in tertiary 
education, 1998-2007 
Completion 
rate, 2005 
Normalized 
completion 
rate effective e 
  
    
Austria 15.1 0.71 1.03 15.5 
Belgium (Fl) 16.5 0.82 1.19 19.5 
France 16.7 0.79 1.14 19.1 
Germany 14.4 0.77 1.11 16.0 
Italy 14.5 0.45 0.65 9.5 
Netherlands 14.8 0.71 1.03 15.2 
  
    
Denmark 18.2 0.85 1.23 22.3 
Finland 21.6 0.72 1.04 22.5 
Norway 18.9 0.65 0.94 17.8 
Sweden 16.4 0.69 1.00 16.4 
  
    
US 20.3 0.47 0.68 13.8 
UK 13.9 0.64 0.93 12.9 
Canada 15.5 0.72 1.04 16.1 
  
    
Overall average 16.7 0.69 1.00 16.7 
 
 
Annual real potential per capita GDP growth rate (aggregate, 1995-2007) 
Definition: Annual growth rate of real potential GDP per person of working age 
Data sources:  
* real potential GDP: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, supply block, series GDPVTR. 
* population at working age: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, labour markets, 
series POPT. 
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Tax rate on labor income (j  for j=1,2,3) 
Definition: Total tax wedge, marginal tax rate in % of gross wage earnings. The data cover personal 
income taxes, employee and employer social security contributions payable on wage earnings and 
payroll taxes.  
Data source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, Financial and Fiscal Affairs, Taxing Wages, Comparative 
tax rates and benefits (new definition). 
The OECD publishes marginal labor tax rates for several family and income situations: single persons 
at 67%, 100% and 167% of average earnings (no children), single persons at 67% of average earnings 
(two children), one-earner married couples at 100% of average earnings (two children), two-earner 
married couples, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 33 % (no children, 2 children), 
two-earner married couples, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 67 % (2 children). Our 
data in Table 3 are the averages of these eight cases. Data for 2000-04. 
 
Net benefit replacement rates when young and middle aged (b1,b2) 
Definition: The data concern net transfers received by long-term unemployed people and include 
social assistance, family benefits and housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also 
include unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still 
paid, i.e. if workers can be structurally unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit 
eligibility. The data are expressed in % of after-tax wages. The OECD provides net replacement rates 
for six family situations and three earnings levels. Our data in Table 4 are the averages of these 18 
cases. Data for 2001-04. 
Data source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives 
Data adjustment: Original OECD data for Norway include the so-called “waiting benefit” 
(ventestønad), which a person could get after running out of unemployment benefits. Given the 
conditional nature of these “waiting benefits”, they do not match our definition of benefits paid to 
structurally non-employed individuals. We have therefore deducted them from the OECD data, which 
led to a reduction of net replacement rates by about 19 percentage points. For example, recipients 
should demonstrate high regional mobility and willingness to take a job anywhere in Norway. The 
“waiting benefit” was terminated in 2008. We thank Tatiana Gordine at the OECD for clarifying this 
issue with us.   
 
Net benefit replacement rates (b3) 
To calculate our proxy for b3 we have taken into account the possibility for older workers in some 
countries to leave the labor market along fairly generous early retirement routes. Duval (2003) and 
Brandt et al. (2005) provide data for the so-called implicit tax rate on continued work for five more 
years in the early retirement route at age 55 and age 60. The idea is as follows. If an individual stops 
working (instead of continuing for five more years), he receives a benefit (early retirement, 
disability,…) and no longer pays contributions for his future pension. A potential disadvantage is that 
he may receive a lower pension later, since he contributed less during active life. Duval (2003) 
calculated the difference between the present value of the gains and the costs of early retirement, in 
94 
 
percent of gross earnings before retirement. We use his data as a proxy for the gross benefit 
replacement rate for older workers in the early retirement route. To compute the net benefit 
replacement rate, we assume the same tax rate on early retirement benefits as on unemployment 
benefits. We call this net early retirement benefit replacement rate r3.  
If we look at the data, we observe that r3 is higher than the net unemployment benefit replacement 
rate b2 in some countries (e.g. Belgium, France, Netherlands,…) but not in others (Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, US). It is unlikely that older workers will choose the early retirement option in the latter 
group of countries. They may however strongly prefer this option in the former group. The 
implication of these arguments is that we will assume b3 = b2 in countries where r3 < b2. By contrast, 
in countries where r3 > b2, it seems more adequate to model b3 as a weighted average of r3 and b2. 
The weight of each component would obviously depend on eligibility criteria in the early retirement 
system. Due to lack of specific data on this, however, we had to make a very rough assumption. 
Underlying the data in Table 4 is the assumption that b3 = 0.75b2 + 0.25r3. Clearly, our results in the 
main text do not depend in any serious way on this assumption.    
Data Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Duval (2003), 
Brandt et al. (2005).  
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Appendix 2: OECD PISA science scores (average for 2000, 2003, 2006) 
 
 
Median Standard 
deviation 
High Low 
 
  
        
Austria 507 95 602 412    
Belgium 505 106 611 399    
France 502 105 607 397    
Germany 502 104 606 398    
Italy 480 100 580 380    
Netherlands 
(a) 525 97 622 428    
Denmark 484 99 583 385    
Finland 550 87 637 463    
Norway 490 99 589 391    
Sweden 507 98 605 409    
UK 
(b) 523 102 625 421    
US 493 103 596 390    
Canada 527 94 621 433    
    
 
   
Overall average  507                      
         
99                               606                                 408  
Notes:  The median science score and the standard deviation in this table are based on OECD data for 2000, 2003 and 2006.  
High and low are computed as the median plus or minus one standard deviation. Given the close to normal 
distribution of individual PISA scores, they are proxies for individuals at the 83
th
 and the 17
th
 percentile.  
(a)Data are missing for 2000, (b) data are missing for 2003. 
Data source: www.pisa.oecd.org/ 
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Appendix 3: Detail on calibration procedure to determine a  and a  (with a=L, M) 
 
Given the data for US relative wages, we have for the low ability group that: 
1 1
1 1
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
   
(US )
(US )
t t
L,t L L,t L H L,t
Lt t
H ,tH ,t H H ,t H
w h w h w
. .
ww h w h
.   
We also know from Equation (23) that 
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Similarly, it is easy to obtain for the medium ability group:  
1
0 63 0 63
0 76
0 827
 
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 
/ s
H ,tM
(US )H M ,t M
H . .
.
H .

 
.  
If we finally take into account that ηH
 = 1–ηL–ηM, and we introduce values for H ,t M ,tH H and
H ,t L,tH H  which we simultaneously obtain elsewhere in the calibration (as functions of the 
employment rates and xL, xM and xH, which themselves depend on L, M and H), it is easy to see that 
we have three remaining equations in three unknowns (ηH, ηL, ηM) that can be solved. 
Along the same line of reasoning, we obtain values for L, M and L such that our model 
matches the relative wages of middle aged low and medium ability workers for the US, as well as the 
target value for education (e) over all 13 countries. The direct link between L, M, L and education, 
and these relative wages, is obvious form the following two equations:   
 
1 11 1
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1 1 1 1
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
 
  
where we know that xL, xM and xH are functions of L, M and H respectively and eM and eH. 
Furthermore, also wL /wH  and wM /wH  depend on these parameters via HH /HL  and HH /HM  as we 
have shown above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Pension reform in an OLG model with heterogeneous abilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
 
Pension reform in an OLG model with heterogeneous abilities 
 
Tim Buyse, Freddy Heylen and Renaat Van de Kerckhove 
 
SHERPPA, Ghent University  
 
 
Abstract 
We study the effects of pension reform in a four-period OLG model for an open economy where 
hours worked by three active generations, education of the young, the retirement decision of older 
workers, and aggregate growth, are all endogenous. Within each generation we distinguish 
individuals with high, medium or low ability to build human capital. This extension allows to 
investigate also the effects of pension reform on the income and welfare levels of different ability 
groups. Particular attention goes to the income at old-age and the welfare level of low-ability 
individuals.  
Our simulation results prefer an intelligent pay-as-you-go pension system above a fully-funded 
private system. When it comes to promoting employment, human capital, growth, and aggregate 
welfare, positive effects in a pay-as-you-go system are the strongest when it includes a tight link 
between individual labor income (and contributions) and the pension, and when it attaches a high 
weight to labor income earned as an older worker to compute the pension assessment base. Such a 
regime does, however, imply welfare losses for the current low-ability generations, and rising 
inequality in welfare. Complementing or replacing this ‘intelligent’ pay-as-you-go system by basic 
and/or minimum pension components is negative for aggregate welfare, employment and growth. 
Better is to maintain the tight link between individual labor income and the pension also for low-
ability individuals, but to strongly raise their replacement rate. 
 
Keywords: employment by age; endogenous growth; retirement; pension reform; heterogeneous 
abilities; overlapping generations 
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1. Introduction 
Concern for the long-run financial viability of public pension systems has put pension reform high on 
the agenda of policy makers and researchers. The past two decades have seen a wave of reforms in 
many countries (Whitehouse et al., 2009). At the same time the literature on pension economics has 
grown rapidly (see e.g. Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Barr, 2006; and many recent papers that we 
refer to below). To face the pension challenge, there seems to be general agreement on the need for 
higher employment, especially among older individuals, and higher productivity growth. Many 
studies have documented how the pension system may affect the incentives of individuals of 
different ages to work (e.g. Sheshinski, 1978; Auerbach et al., 1989; Gruber and Wise, 2002; Börsch-
Supan and Ludwig, 2010; Sommacal, 2006; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010; Jaag et al., 2010; de la Croix 
et al., 2013). Others have investigated the relationship between the pension system and investment 
in human capital formation, as a major determinant of productivity growth (e.g. Zhang, 1995; 
Kemnitz and Wigger, 2000; Zhang and Zhang, 2003; Kaganovich and Meier, 2008; Le Garrec, 2012). 
Still others have demonstrated the crucial role of human capital formation to counteract the negative 
effects of population ageing on per capita output (e.g. Docquier and Michel, 1999; Ludwig et al., 
2012). Consensus on what pension reform would serve the goals of higher employment, productivity 
growth, and welfare best, has however not been reached. The results in some papers support 
parametric adjustments in the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system that most countries rely on. Other 
papers prefer a gradual move to an actuarially neutral fully-funded private system. Often, differences 
in the particular specification of the model economy that is used for the analysis may explain the 
differences in results (Buyse et al., 2011). 
The above mentioned literature has strongly improved our understanding of the effects of pension 
systems on employment, education and growth. Still, it is limited in some respects. First of all, about 
all existing studies either investigate incentives to work in a model with exogenous human capital 
and growth, or investigate human capital and growth while ignoring the labor-leisure choice and the 
endogeneity of labor supply. Buyse et al. (2011) and Ludwig et al. (2012) are exceptions1. These two 
studies also clearly demonstrate the importance of modelling the many mutual relationships 
between key variables. For example, if policy can make people postpone retirement and work longer, 
the return to investment in education will rise, and so may human capital and growth. Conversely, 
policies that promote education will also encourage people to work longer since they will then get a 
higher return from their investment. Also, if pension reform discourages employment of the young, it 
may still be positive if this contributes to education and growth. For a proper assessment of the 
effects of pension reform it is important to take such interactions into account.  
 Second, with the exception of Sommacal (2006) who distinguishes exogenous fractions of 
skilled and unskilled workers, the above mentioned literature disregards differences in abilities and 
capacity of people to learn. Models with education and growth typically assume that everyone is able 
to study and succeed in education. Reality is different, however. Data reveal that in 2008 about 30% 
                                                          
1
 Ludwig et al. (2012) develop a model with endogenous employment by age and human capital, but they have 
exogenous growth. Buyse et al. (2011) also have endogenous growth.  
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of the 25-64 year old population on average in the OECD had no upper secondary degree. About 44% 
had an upper secondary degree but no tertiary degree. The fraction of people with a tertiary degree 
therefore remained below 30%. Among young cohorts, educational attainment is higher. Yet, the 
fraction that does not complete upper secondary education is still about 20% on average. About 40% 
obtains an upper secondary degree, but no tertiary degree. More or less another 40% completes 
both secondary and tertiary education (OECD, Education at a Glance, Tables A1, A2.2, A3.2). The 
simple fact that innate ability as for example reflected by IQ varies across people, implies that one 
can never expect everyone to succeed at the secondary, let alone the tertiary level.  
In this paper we study pension reform in a general equilibrium four-period OLG model where hours 
of work of young, middle aged and older individuals, education and human capital formation of the 
young, the retirement decision of the older generation, and aggregate per capita growth are all 
endogenous. We build on our earlier work in Buyse et al. (2011). The model includes a public PAYG 
old-age pension system which pays out pensions to a fourth generation of retired. The statutory 
retirement age in the model is 65 and exogenous. Old-age pensions are paid from this age onwards. 
Individuals, however, may optimally choose a lower effective (early) retirement age. They then 
receive early retirement benefits. Our main innovation in this paper is to introduce heterogeneous 
abilities. We make the assumption that within each generation three ability groups exist. These 
groups differ both in the degree to which they (when young) assimilate existing knowledge, i.e. 
inherit human capital from the middle aged generation, and in their productivity of schooling when 
they spend time studying. One group has low ability. They inherit relatively little human capital from 
the middle aged generation, and will never engage in tertiary education. They will only work or have 
‘leisure’. A second group has medium ability, a third group high ability. These groups inherit higher 
fractions of existing human capital, and do allocate time to tertiary education. Given the variation 
between them in the productivity of schooling, this amount of time will differ, however.  
Our aim is then to investigate the effects of various parametric adjustments in the old-age PAYG 
pension system on the employment rate of young, middle aged and older workers, education, 
growth and welfare. These parametric adjustments include changes in benefit levels, changes in the 
link between benefits and individual contributions, and changes in the weights of the three active 
periods in the computation of the old-age pension assessment base, i.e. earned labor income used to 
calculate pension benefits. We also consider the effects of moving to full private capital funding. An 
advantage of realistically introducing heterogeneous abilities, and therefore an important 
contribution of this paper, is that we will be able to study differential effects of pension reform on 
the income and welfare levels of individuals with different abilities and human capital. Particular 
attention goes to the income at old-age and the welfare level of the low-ability individuals. The link 
to a major issue as old-age poverty (see e.g. Kidd and Whitehouse, 2009) is obvious.  
Our results prefer an ‘intelligent’ PAYG system above a fully-funded private system. When it comes 
to promoting employment, human capital, growth, and aggregate welfare, we find positive effects in 
a PAYG system to be the strongest when it includes a tight link between individual labor income (and 
contributions) and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to labor income earned as an 
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older worker to compute the pension assessment base. Pension reform in this direction encourages 
young individuals to study and build human capital, which promotes long-run growth. Furthermore, 
it encourages older workers to postpone retirement. Strengthening the link between one’s future 
old-age pension, on the one hand, and one’s human capital and labor supply when older, on the 
other, introduces strong financial incentives which may bring about important changes in behavior. 
In this sense, our results fully confirm those of Buyse et al. (2011). However, our paper also sharply 
clarifies the limitations of neglecting heterogeneity in people’s ability. We find that the above 
described ‘intelligent’ PAYG system implies welfare losses for the current low-ability generations who 
cannot study and who earn low wages. Aggregate welfare inequality rises strongly. Complementing 
or replacing this system by basic and/or minimum pension components promotes welfare of the 
current and (maybe some) future low-ability generations, but it is negative for aggregate welfare, 
employment and growth. Labor supply and employment among low-ability individuals in particular 
fall sharply. Better is to maintain the tight link between individual labor income and the pension also 
for low-ability individuals, but to significantly raise their replacement rate.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we document differences in employment by 
age, education of the young, the effective retirement age, and per capita growth across 13 OECD 
countries since 1995. Section 3 sets out our model. Next to the pension system, we introduce a role 
for education quality as well as a rich fiscal policy block. The government in the model sets tax rates 
on labor, capital and consumption. It allocates its revenue to productive expenditures (mainly for 
education), consumption, ‘non-employment’ benefits (including early retirement benefits), old-age 
pensions, and interest payments on outstanding debt. In Section 4 we calibrate the model on actual 
data and confront its predictions with the facts described in Section 2. Section 5 includes the results 
of a range of model simulations. We investigate the steady state employment, education and growth 
effects of various reforms of the pension system. We also study welfare effects per generation and 
per ability group. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Cross-country differences in employment, tertiary education and per capita growth 
Table 1 contains key data on employment, education and growth in 13 OECD countries in 1995-2007. 
One would like a reliable model to match the main cross-country differences reported here. The 
employment rate in hours ( ) indicates the fraction of potential hours that are actually being worked 
by the average person in one of three age groups (20-34, 35-49, 50-64). Comparable data for hours 
worked by ability type (skill level) are not available. Potential hours are 2080 per person per year (52 
weeks times 40 hours per week). The observed employment rate rises if more people in an age group 
have a job, and if the employed work more hours. The employment rate in the age group of 50 to 64 
is also affected by the average age at which older workers withdraw from the labor force. We include 
the effective retirement age in the Table. In most countries, this age is well below the official age to 
receive old-age pensions (65 in most countries, 60 in France and Italy). The education rate ( ) is our 
proxy for the fraction of time spent studying by the average person of age 20-34. It has been 
calculated as the total number of students in full-time equivalents, divided by total population in this 
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age group. Our data for (average annual) real per capita growth concern real potential GDP per 
person of working age. We refer to Appendix 1 for details on the calculation of our data, and on the 
assumptions that we have to make. 
Table 1  
Employment rate in hours ( ) by age, effective retirement age, education rate ( ) and per capita 
growth in OECD countries (1995-2006/7)  
 
   
(20-34) 
   
(35-49) 
   
(50-64) 
Effective 
retirement 
age 
 
  
Annual real per 
capita growth 
       
Austria 59.9 64.3 34.7 59.5 12.5 2.06 
Belgium 51.1 56.8 29.3 57.9 14.1 1.77 
France 48.7 60.3 38.0 58.8 14.9 1.54 
Germany 49.7 55.2 34.9 61.1 17.2 1.56 
Italy 50.1 61.9 33.8 60.1 12.6 1.30 
Netherlands 50.8 54.6 34.2 60.0 14.7 2.20 
Core euro 
area average 
 
51.7 58.8 34.2 59.6 14.3 1.74 
Denmark 56.2 66.7 49.6 62.2 21.7 1.81 
Finland 55.6 69.0 47.3 60.2 23.1 2.72 
Norway 51.9 60.9 50.6 63.1 18.1 2.29 
Sweden 53.6 66.1 55.4 63.4 17.7 2.18 
Nordic 
Average 
 
54.3 65.6 50.7 62.2 20.2 2.25 
US 65.6 74.2 59.6 64.2 12.8 1.54 
       
UK 60.8 68.4 49.4 62.0 12.3 2.13 
Canada 60.9 69.5 50.4 62.1 13.6 1.68 
       
All country 
Average 
55.0 63.7 43.6 61.1 15.8 1.91 
    
Data sources: OECD (see Appendix 1); data description: see main text and Appendix 1. The data for 
employment and growth concern 1995-2007, those for education 1995-2006. The effective retirement age is an 
average for 1995-2006. All data are in percent, except the retirement age. 
As is well-known, middle aged individuals work most hours, followed by the young. The older 
generation works the lowest number of hours. Average employment rates across countries in these 
three age groups are 55.0%, 63.7% and 43.6% respectively. Furthermore, the data reveal strong 
cross-country differences. We observe the highest employment rates in each age group in the US. 
Employment rates are much lower in the core countries of the euro area. The Nordic countries take 
intermediate positions, although they are close to the core euro area for the younger generation. 
The latter, however, seems to be related to education. Young people’s effective participation in 
education is also by far the highest in the Nordic countries. These countries also show the highest 
potential per capita growth rates. On average, growth in the core euro area and the US was more 
than 0.5 percentage points lower in the period under consideration. The US and the other Anglo-
Saxon countries tend to have the lowest participation in education among people of age 20 to 34. 
Finally, we note that the effective retirement age also varies across countries. The retirement age is 
quite low in Belgium (57.9) and France (58.8). By contrast, individuals in Nordic or Anglo-Saxon 
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countries participate longer. Unsurprisingly, correlation between the effective retirement age and 
the employment rate among older workers (  ) is very high (0.89).   
 
3. The model 
 
Our analytical framework consists of a computable four-period OLG-model for a small open 
economy. We assume perfect international mobility of physical capital but immobile labor and 
human capital. Seminal work in the OLG tradition has been done by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond 
(1965). Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) initiated the study of public finance shocks in a computable 
OLG model. Buiter and Kletzer (1993) developed an open economy version of the model with 
endogenous growth, putting human capital at the centre. As we have documented in Section 1, a 
large literature has used OLG models to study the behavioral effects of the pension system either on 
employment assuming exogenous growth, or on human capital and growth ignoring the labor-leisure 
choice and assuming exogenous employment. New in this paper is that we explain both employment 
by age, and human capital and growth as jointly endogenous variables and that we realistically take 
into account differences in individuals’ innate abilities. 
 
We consider three active adult generations, the young, the middle aged and the older, and one 
generation of retired agents. Within each generation we assume three types of individuals with 
different ability a to build human capital: a group H with high ability, a group M with medium ability 
and a group L with low ability. The last group will never enter into tertiary education. We assume 
that the three ability groups are of equal size, and so are the different generations. We normalize 
each ability group to 1, so that the size of a generation is 3, and total population is 12, and constant2. 
Individuals enter the model at age 20. Each period is modeled to last for 15 years. High and medium 
ability young people can choose either to work and generate labor income, to study and build human 
capital, or to devote time to ‘leisure’ (including other non-market activities). Low ability young 
individuals and all middle aged and older workers do not study anymore, they only work or have 
‘leisure’. The statutory old-age retirement age in our model is 65. Individuals may however optimally 
choose to leave the labor force sooner in a regime of early retirement.  
 
Output is produced by domestic firms which act competitively and employ physical capital together 
with existing technology and effective labor provided by the three active generations. A final 
important assumption is that education generates a positive externality in the sense of Azariadis and 
Drazen (1990). Each young generation inherits a fraction of the average level of human capital of a 
middle aged generation. The higher an individual’s ability, the larger the fraction he inherits. In what 
follows, we concentrate on the core elements of the model: the optimizing behavior of individuals, 
the production and inheritance of effective human capital, the behavior of domestic firms and the 
determination of aggregate output and growth, capital and wages.    
                                                          
2
 Assuming demography and population to be constant may seem strange given that ageing is a crucial factor 
behind pension reform in many countries. Note however that this assumption is not uncommon (see also Jaag 
et al., 2010; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010; Buyse et al., 2011). Moreover, and most importantly, it need not be a 
limitation to disentangle behavioral effects from different routes of pension reform. 
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3.1. Individuals 
 
An individual with ability   (       ) reaching age 20 in period t maximizes an intertemporal 
utility function of the form: 
  
  ∑     (     
  
  
   
(   
 )
   
)                          (1) 
 
with                     ) and where we shall impose that 
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          (4) 
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Superscript t indicates the period of youth, when the individual comes into the model. Subscript j 
refers to the jth period of life and a refers to the ‘ability type’. Lifetime utility depends on 
consumption (   
 )  and enjoyed leisure (   
 ) in each period of life. The intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in consumption is 1, the intertemporal elasticity to substitute leisure 
 
 
. Finally,   is the 
discount factor and   specifies the relative value of leisure versus consumption. The preference 
parameters   and  do not depend on ability type. Note, however, that  may be different in each 
period of life. Except for the latter assumption, our specification of the instantaneous utility function 
is quite common in the macro literature (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Rogerson, 2007).  
 
Equations (2)-(4) describe the individual’s enjoyed leisure in each of the four periods of his life. For a 
proper understanding we summarize his life-cycle in Figure 1. Time endowment in each period is 
normalized to 1. Next to leisure, individuals devote time to work (   
 ) in their three active periods 
and to education (   
 ) when young. In the first period of active life, leisure therefore falls in labor 
supply and in education time. Only the low ability individuals do not study (   
   ). In the second 
and third period leisure falls in labor supply only. A key element in the individuals’ optimal choice of 
leisure time in the third period of life (50-65) is the determination of early retirement. Individuals 
choose   
  which relates to the optimal effective retirement age and which is defined as the fraction 
of time between age 50 and 65 that the individual participates in the labor market; (     
 ) is then 
time in early retirement. We use    
  to denote the fraction of time devoted to work between 50 and 
65, and  ̃  
  as the fraction of time devoted to work before early retirement, but after 50. As labor 
market exit is irreversible and post-retirement employment is not allowed in our model, the 
relationship between use    
  and  ̃  
  is as follows:    
    
   ̃  
 . In the third period, leisure time 
thus consists of two parts: non-employment time before the effective retirement age   
     ̃  
 ), 
and time in early retirement after it (     
 ). Equation (4) then describes composite enjoyed leisure 
of an older worker as a CES-function of both parts (see also Buyse et al., 2011). We assume imperfect 
substitutability between the two leisure types. The idea here is that leisure time after and between 
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periods of work is not the same as leisure time in periods when individuals are not economically 
active anymore3. Equation (4) expresses that individuals prefer to have a balanced combination of 
both rather than an ‘extreme’ amount of one of them (and very little of the other). In this equation   
is the constant elasticity of substitution,   is a usual share parameter and Γ is added as a 
normalization constant such that the magnitude of    
  corresponds to the magnitude of total leisure 
time       
 ). The latter assumption allows to interpret   as the relative value of leisure versus 
consumption in the third period, comparable to    and  . The main results in this paper are not in 
any way influenced by the magnitude of  ,   or  . 
 
Figure 1. Life-cycle of an individual of generation t and ability a 
 
     
 
Period t t+1 t+2 t+3 
Work    
     
     
    
  ̃  
  0 
Study    
   0 0 0 
leisure 
time 
     
     
       
  
  
     ̃  
 )   
     
 ) 
1 
 Note:    
   . 
 
Individuals will choose consumption, labor supply and education to maximize Equation (1), subject to 
Equations (2)-(4) and the constraints described in (5)-(13). Equations (5)-(8) describe the individuals’ 
dynamic budget constraints. The LHS of these equations shows that individuals allocate their 
disposable income to consumption (including consumption taxes,   ) and the accumulation of non-
human wealth. In each equation we denote by    
  the stock of wealth held by a type   individual 
who enters the model at time t at the end of his jth period of life. Equations (5) and (8) respectively 
indicate that individuals start and finish adult life with zero assets. During the three periods of active 
life, disposable income at the RHS includes after-tax labor income, non-employment benefits, 
interest income and lump sum transfers. In each equation,     stands for the real wage per unit of 
effective labor supplied at time k by an individual with ability a,    is the exogenous (world) real 
interest rate at time k, and    is the lump sum transfer that the government pays out to all 
individuals at time k. Effective labor of an individual with ability a depends on hours worked (   
 ) and 
effective human capital (   
 ). Given the tax rate on labor income   , young individuals earn an after-
tax real wage equal to        
    
      ). After-tax labor income when middle aged and older in 
Equations (6) and (7) are determined similarly.  
 
                                                          
3
 The former may be particularly valuable from the perspective of relaxation and time to spend on personal 
activities of short duration. The latter may be valuable to enjoy activities which take more time and ask for 
longer term commitment (e.g. long journeys, non-market activity as a volunteer).  
20             35            50               65               80 
𝑅𝑎
𝑡  
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For the fraction of time that young, middle aged and older individuals are inactive, they receive a 
non-employment benefit from the government. Older workers may be eligible to two kinds of 
benefits: standard non-employment benefits (analogous to what young and middle aged workers 
receive) as long as they are on the labor market, and early retirement benefits after having 
withdrawn from the labor market. All benefits are defined as a proportion of the after-tax wage of a 
full-time worker. The net replacement rate for standard non-employment benefits is  , for early 
retirement benefits it is    
4   
After the statutory retirement age (65) individuals have no labor income and no non-employment 
benefits anymore. They then receive an old-age pension benefit (   
 ) and the lump sum transfer. 
Equation (9) describes the old-age pension. We assume a public PAYG pension system in which 
pensions in period k are financed by contributions (labor taxes) from the active generations in that 
period k (see below). Individual net pension benefits consist of two components. A first one is related 
to the individual’s earlier net labor income. It is a fraction of his so-called pension base, i.e. a 
weighted average of revalued net labor income in each of the three active periods of life. The net 
replacement rate is    . The parameters       and    represent the weights attached to each 
period. This part of the pension rises in the individual’s hours of work   
  and his human capital    
 . 
It will be lower when the individual retires early (lower   
 ). Thanks to revaluation, this part of the 
net pension is adjusted to increases in the overall standard of living between the time that workers 
build their pension entitlements and the time that they receive the pension. We assume that past 
earnings are revalued in line with economy-wide wage growth   and hence follow practice in many 
OECD countries (OECD, 2005; Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006).5 The second component of the 
                                                          
4 Our approach to model early retirement benefits as a function of a worker’s last labor income, similar to 
standard non-employment benefits, reflects regulation and/or common practice in many countries. In some 
countries (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands) workers can enter the early retirement regime only from 
employment, with their benefits being linked to the last wage. In other countries (e.g. Denmark) there is only 
access from unemployment, with the early retirement benefit being linked to the unemployment benefit. As to 
common practice, Duval (2003) confirms that in many countries, unemployment-related or disability benefits 
can be used de facto to bridge the time between the effective retirement age and old-age pension eligibility. 
Again there is a link between benefits and former wages.  
5
 We explain economy-wide wage growth in Section 3.3. Individuals take it as exogenous. 
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pension is a flat-rate or basic pension. Every retiree receives the same amount related to average net 
labor income in the economy at the time of retirement. This assumption assures that also basic 
pensions rise in line with productivity. Here, the net replacement rate is    . Fourth generation 
individuals consume their pension and the lump sum transfer, as well as their accumulated wealth 
from the third period plus interest (Equation 8). They leave no debts, nor bequests. 
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With:            
 ∑     
 
     
   
    
  ̃  
   
                      
Note that we allow ability-specific pension replacement rates     and    . This specification is in line 
with the data in many countries, which show that the importance of own-income related versus flat 
components may be very different depending on people’s earned income, and therefore ability (see 
Section 4.2. and Table 5 below). For other policy variables like labor tax rates such differences are 
much smaller (Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2010). The introduction of ability-specific pension 
replacement rates also allows a richer policy analysis. 
 
Equations (10) and (11) describe the intergenerational transfer of human capital. At the age of 20 a 
young worker with ability   inherits a fraction   of the average effective human capital of the 
middle aged generation. A young worker with ability  enters our model with only a fraction   , a 
young worker with ability   enters with an even lower fraction    . Lower ability may imply more 
difficulty to learn and accumulate knowledge at primary and secondary school (Azariadis and de la 
Croix, 2006). During their second and third period, workers supply more units of effective human 
capital. It is our assumption in Equation (12) that     
 , and therefore labour productivity, rise in 
education time when young (   
 ), productive government spending in percent of GDP (  , mainly 
education spending) and an overall quality of schooling parameter ( ). Individuals take    and   to 
be exogenous. Note that the human capital accumulation function itself (  ) also depends on innate 
ability. We specify and discuss effective human capital production and human capital inheritance in 
greater detail in Section 3.2. Finally, we assume in Equation (13) that human capital remains 
unchanged between the second and the third period. We have in mind that learning by doing in work 
may counteract depreciation. 
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109 
 
Substituting Equations (2)-(4) for    
  and (5)-(8) for    
  into (1), and maximizing with respect to 
   
     
     
     
     
   ̃  
    
  and    
 , yields eight first order conditions for the optimal behavior of 
an individual with ability a entering the model at time t. Equation (14) expresses the law of motion of 
optimal consumption over the lifetime. Equations (15.a), (15.b) and (15.c) describe the optimal labor-
leisure choice in each period of active live. Individuals supply labor up to the point where the 
marginal utility of leisure equals the marginal utility gain from work. The latter consists of two parts. 
Working more hours in a particular period raises additional resources for consumption both in that 
period and when retired. The marginal utility gain from work rises when the marginal utility of 
consumption       
 ) is higher, and when an extra hour of work yields more extra consumption. 
Higher human capital (and its underlying determinants), lower taxes on labor, lower taxes on 
consumption and lower non-employment benefits contribute to the gain from work. Extra 
consumption during retirement rises in the own-income- related pension replacement rate (   ), in 
the weight attached to the relevant period when computing the pension base (  ), and in the 
revaluation parameters. Equations (15.a)-(15.c) highlight positive substitution effects from the 
pension replacement rate    . To the extent that higher replacement rates raise individuals’ 
consumption possibilities (   
 ), they also cause adverse income effects on labor supply. Basic 
pensions (   ) do not directly occur in Equations (15), but they do affect employment via this income 
effect. 
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Equation (16) describes the first order condition for the optimal effective retirement age. The LHS 
represents the utility loss from postponing retirement. Later retirement reduces enjoyed leisure as 
early retiree, but raises enjoyed leisure in between periods of work for given work time  ̃  
 . The RHS 
shows the marginal utility gain from postponing retirement. This marginal gain follows from 
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consuming the extra labor income (vis-à-vis the early retirement benefit) in the third period, and the 
higher future old-age pension after 65. The latter effect rises in     and   . 
 
 
  
(   
 )
 
     
 
   
  
      (    (   
     ))   
      )( ̃  
       ̃  
 )    )
   
      )
  
                
           (    (   
     ))   
  ̃  
      )    
   
      )
        (16) 
 
Finally, Equation (17) imposes for high and medium ability individuals that the marginal utility loss 
from investing in human capital when young equals the total discounted marginal utility gain in later 
periods from having more human capital. Individuals will study more the higher future versus current 
after-tax real wages and the higher the marginal return of education to human capital (
   
    
 )  Labor 
taxes during youth therefore encourage individuals to study, whereas labor taxes in later periods of 
active life discourage them. Notice also that high benefit replacement rates in later periods, and a 
high income-related pension replacement rate (   ), combined with high weights    and   , will 
encourage young individuals to study. The reason is that any future benefits and the future pension 
rise in future labor income, and therefore human capital. A final interesting result is that young 
people study more – all other things equal – if they expect to work harder in later periods (    
 , 
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It will be obvious from the above discussion that (for a given way of financing) the specific 
organization of pension benefits may have strong effects on behavior in earlier periods of life. Both 
income and substitution effects occur. The latter are particularly rich when pensions are linked to 
individuals’ own labor income. A higher replacement rate     raises the return to working ( , for all 
ability groups) and to building human capital (     for high and medium-ability individuals) in earlier 
periods. Changes in the particular weight attached to these earlier periods may modify these 
incentive effects. The return to education will rise in    and   , but fall in   . The return to working in 
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the third period will rise in   , etc. Policy makers may change all these parameters. We investigate 
the effects of policy interventions in Section 5.  
 
3.2. Inheritance and production of effective human capital  
Equations (10) and (11) above assume that when entering the model young workers with high ability 
inherit a fraction  of the average effective human capital of the middle aged generation. The value 
of  is to be calibrated. Individuals with medium and lower ability inherit less (      ). OECD 
PISA scores leave no doubt. On average over the 13 countries that we focus on in this paper, the test 
scores for science of students at the 17th and the 50th percentiles are 67.3% and 83.7% respectively of 
the test score of students at the 83th percentile. We take these numbers as proxies for   and   (see 
also Section 4). After entering the model, young individuals may decide to study and accumulate 
more human capital. The specification and parameterization of the human capital production 
function    ) 
in Equation (12) is often a problem in numerical endogenous growth models. In 
contrast to goods production functions, there is not much empirical evidence and no consensus 
about the determinants of human capital growth, nor about the underlying functional form and 
parameter values. The literature shows a variety of functions, typically including one or two of the 
following inputs: individual time allocated to education, private expenditures on education by 
individuals themselves or by their parents, and government expenditures on education (e.g. Lucas, 
1988, Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Docquier and Michel, 1999, Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; 
Bouzahzah et al., 2002; Ludwig et al., 2012). In case of two inputs, the adopted functional form is 
very often Cobb-Douglas (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; Docquier 
and Michel, 1999).  
 
Our specification of the human capital production function also includes education time of young 
individuals and education expenditures by the government as indicators for the quantity of invested 
private and public resources. Compared to most of the literature, however, we differ in three 
respects. First, we adopt a more flexible CES functional form, allowing the elasticity of substitution to 
differ from 1. Second, our definition of relevant government expenditures includes more than 
education. It also includes active labor market expenditures, public R&D expenditures and public 
fixed investment. This approach goes back to our use of the broader concept of effective human 
capital6. Our third extension is to take into account the quality of education and the schooling 
system. We recognize that better quality implies higher cognitive abilities for the same allocation of 
resources. Young individuals’ capacity to build human capital will then rise.  
 
All these arguments find their way in Equations (18.a) and (18.b). The former shows the growth rate 
of effective human capital for high and medium ability individuals as a CES specification in education 
                                                          
6
 As in Dhont and Heylen (2009), effective human capital (and worker productivity) rise not only in accumulated 
schooling or training, but also in the productive efficiency of accumulated schooling. Education and active labor 
market expenditures contribute directly to more human capital being accumulated, public R&D and fixed 
investment expenditures will mainly raise the productive efficiency of accumulated human capital. 
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time when young (   
 ) and productive government expenditures in % of output (  ). In steady state 
both determinants are constant, which will imply constant steady state growth. We add the quality 
of the schooling system ( ) in a multiplicative way. We will use country-specific PISA science scores 
as a proxy for q.7 Next to   we introduce (constant common) technical parameters: 
 
 is a positive 
efficiency parameter reflecting natural ability,   a scale parameter,   a share parameter and  the 
elasticity of substitution. These parameters will be calibrated. Note in Equation (18.b) that low ability 
individuals supply no education time, but they also enjoy positive effects on their effective human 
capital  from productive government expenditures. The quality of the schooling system   also plays a 
role here. 
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  (    )       
                 (18.b) 
 
Lack of existing empirical evidence makes an ex-ante assessment of our specification very difficult. In 
previous work, however, we have been able to verify that a specification like (18.a) performs better 
than alternative ones without quality, with a narrower definition of government expenditures, or 
with a different functional form (see Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2010; Buyse et al., 2011). 
 
3.3. Domestic firms, output and factor prices 
Firms act competitively on output and input markets and maximize profits. All firms are identical. 
Total domestic output (  ) is given by the production function (19). Technology exhibits constant 
returns to scale in aggregate physical capital (  ) and effective labor (  ), so that profits are zero in 
equilibrium. Equation (20) defines total effective labor as a CES aggregate of effective labor supplied 
by the three ability groups. In this equation s is the elasticity of substitution between the different 
ability types of labor and       and    are the input shares. We will impose that           . 
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Equation (21) specifies effective labor per ability group. Within each ability group we assume perfect 
substitutability of labor supplied by the different age groups.  
 
                                                          
7
 Ideally, one would employ a quality indicator relating to tertiary education, but this is not (yet) available. Still, 
PISA scores may be very useful. They are informative about the quality that young people attain in secondary 
education, and with which some enter tertiary education. Quality at entrance should have a positive effect on 
people’s capacity to learn and to raise human capital in tertiary education. Furthermore, PISA scores have been 
found empirically significant for growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009).  
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To derive Equation (21) we make use of Equations (12) and (13) where we define: 
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It then follows that:     
       
      
      
                
 
Furthermore, we exploit the result that8 : 
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where by definition:     (
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Substituting Equation (21) for       and   into (20), and recognizing differences in the capacity 
   to inherit human capital as indicated by Equations (10) and (11), yields Equation (24).  
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Competitive behavior implies in Equation (25) that firms carry physical capital to the point where its 
after-tax marginal product net of depreciation equals the world real interest rate. Physical capital 
depreciates at rate   . Capital taxes are source-based: the tax rate k applies to the country in which 
the capital is used, regardless of who owns it. The real interest rate being given, firms will install 
more capital when the amount of effective labor increases or the capital tax rate falls. In that case 
the net return to investment in the home country rises above the world interest rate, and capital 
flows in. Furthermore, perfect competition implies for each ability type equality between the real 
wage and the marginal product of effective labor (Equation 26). Workers of a particular ability type 
will earn a higher real wage when their supply is relatively scarce and when physical capital per unit 
of aggregate effective labor is higher. Taking into account (25), real wages per unit of effective labor 
will therefore fall in the world real interest rate and in domestic capital tax rates. 
                                                          
8
 Starting from Equation (10), and using (11), (12) and (22), it is easy to see that: 
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Human capital of the lower ability individuals (     ) will grow at the same rate 
   
 
   
    
     
 
     
    
   
 
   
    
which explains the first part of Equation (23). Lagging this result by one period, generates the second part. 
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Substituting (24) for   and (25) for     , we can rewrite (19) as  
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If we finally recognize that in steady state             and     are constant, we obtain the long-run 
(per capita) growth rate of the economy as 
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)     (27) 
 
In line with earlier models (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Buiter and Kletzer, 1993), 
the long-run (per capita) growth rate is positively related to the quality of schooling ( ) and to the 
fraction of time that young people allocate to education (   ). It is also positively related to the share 
of productive government expenditures (  ), like in Barro (1990). Growth will rise also if young 
individuals incorporate a larger fraction of average human capital of the middle aged generation 
     ).   
 
3.4. Government 
Equation (28) describes the government’s budget constraint. Productive expenditures    , 
consumption    , benefits related to non-employment    (including early retirement benefits), old-
age pension benefits    , lump sum transfers    and interest payments      are financed by taxes on 
labor    , taxes on capital    , and taxes on consumption     and/or by new debt      . We define 
   as outstanding public debt at the beginning of period t. 
 
                                                      (28) 
 
with:           
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Note our assumption that each ability group has size 1 and that each generation has size 3. Following 
Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009), we assume that the government claims given 
fractions    and    of output for productive expenditures and consumption. Non-employment 
benefits (  ) are an unconditional source of income support related to inactivity (leisure) and non-
market household activities. Although it may seem strange to have such transfers in a model without 
involuntary unemployment, one can of course analyse their employment and growth effects as a 
theoretical benchmark case (see also Rogerson, 2007; Dhont and Heylen, 2008, 2009). Moreover, 
there is also clear practical relevance. Unconditional or quasi unconditional benefits to structurally 
non-employed people are a fact of life in many European countries. Note also our assumption that 
the pension system is fully integrated into government accounts. We do not impose a specific 
financing of the PAYG pension plan, the government can use resources from the general budget to 
finance pensions. Finally, as we have mentioned before, the government pays the same lump sum 
transfer     to all individuals living at time t. 
 
3.5. Aggregate equilibrium and the current account 
Optimal behavior by firms and households, and government spending for productive and 
consumption purposes, underlie aggregate domestic demand for consumption and investment goods 
in the economy. Our assumption that the economy is open implies that aggregate domestic demand 
may differ from supply and income, which generates international capital flows and imbalance on the 
current account. Equation (29) describes aggregate equilibrium as it can be derived from Equations 
(5)-(8), defined for all generations living at time t, Equations (19)-(21), (25)-(26) and (28). The LHS of 
(29) represents national income. It is the sum of domestic output    and net factor income from 
abroad     , with    being net foreign assets at the beginning of t. The aggregate stock of wealth    
accumulates wealth held by individuals who entered the model in t-1, t-2 and t-3. At the RHS of (29) 
    stands for the current account in period t. 
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                                         (29) 
  
with:              
                               
               
 
4. Parameterization and empirical relevance of the model  
The economic environment described above allows us to simulate the transitory and steady state 
growth and employment effects of various changes in fiscal policy and the pension system. This 
simulation exercise requires us first to parameterize and solve the model. In Section 4.1 we discuss 
our choice of preference and technology parameters. Starting from actual cross-country policy data 
in Section 4.2, we compare in Section 4.3 our model’s predictions with the employment and growth 
differences that we have reported in Table 1. This comparison provides a first and simple test of our 
model’s empirical relevance. In Section 5 we consider long-run equilibrium effects of policy changes, 
as well as welfare effects per generation and ability group. To solve the model and to perform the 
simulations, we choose an algorithm that preserves the non-linear nature of our model. We follow 
the methodology basically proposed by Boucekkine (1995) and implemented by Juillard (1996) in the 
program Dynare. We use Dynare 4.2. 
 
 
4.1. Preference and technology parameters 
Table 2 contains an overview of all parameters. We set the rate of time preference equal to 1.5% per 
year. Considering that periods in our model consist of 15 years, this choice implies a discount factor 
  equal to 0.8. In the production function we assume a capital share coefficient   equal to 0.285. 
The elasticity of substitution   between the different ability types of effective labor is set equal to 
1.5. Our values for the rate of time preference and the capital share are well within the range of 
values imposed in the literature (e.g. Docquier and Michel, 1999; Altig et al., 2001; Heijdra and Romp, 
2009). So is the value for s. The empirical labor literature consistently documents values between 1 
and 2 (see Caselli and Coleman, 2006). There is more controversy about the value of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in leisure (
 
 
). Micro studies often reveal very low elasticities. 
However, given our macro focus, these studies may not be the most relevant ones (Rogerson and 
Wallenius, 2009; Fiorito and Zanella, 2012). Rogerson (2007) also adopts a macro framework. He puts 
forward a reasonable range for   from 1 to 3 (Rogerson, 2007, p. 12). In line with this, we impose   
to be equal to 2. The world real interest rate is assumed constant and equal to 4.5% per year. 
Considering a period of 15 years, this implies that   = 0.935. Finally, we set the physical capital 
depreciation rate to 8% per year, which implies   =0.714. These values are also within the range of 
existing studies (see e.g. Heijdra and Romp, 2009).  
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Table 2 Basic parameterization and benchmark equilibrium 
 
Technology and preference parameters 
Goods production (output)                                        
Effective human capital 
 Oduction 
                                              
Human capital inheritance                           
Preference parameters                                         
                   
World real interest rate          
Capital depreciation rate           
 Target values for calibration 
Employment, growth and education (a) 
 
 
                                      
51.1% 56.8% 29.3% 57.9 1.77% 14.2% 
      
Relative wages US (b) 
                                                
0.43 0.63 0.38 0.58 
Notes:  (a) Values for Belgium, see Table 1;  
(b) As a proxy for the relative wage of low-ability (medium-ability) young workers, we use available data on 
earnings of workers of age 25-34 with below upper secondary education (secondary education) in the US relative 
to earnings of workers with a tertiary degree. For the relative wage of middle aged workers, we use the same kind 
of data. However, since middle age-specific data are missing, we use average values for the whole age group 25-
64 as a proxy. Data for the age group 55-64 are about the same (0.38 and 0.55). Data source: OECD Education at a 
Glance, 2009, Table A7.1. 
 
A second series of ten parameters have been determined by calibration: three taste for leisure 
parameters       ), the human capital inheritance parameter (), three efficiency parameters in 
the human capital production function (      and   ), the elasticity of substitution ( ) in the 
composite leisure function in Equation (4) and two share parameters in aggregate effective labor (   
and   , where    follows as        ). The ten target values to which these parameters have 
been calibrated are reported at the bottom of Table 2. Six of them concern the employment rates, 
the effective retirement age, education, and growth for Belgium in our study. We choose this country 
since in Belgium the calculation of pension benefits fits exactly within the way we model it. Public 
pensions are proportional to average annual labor income earned over a period of 45 years, with 
equal weights to all years. In our model this comes down to           and          
 
 
 9. 
The other four target values are the relative wages of young and middle aged workers of low and 
medium ability in the US. Although in practice a whole system of simultaneous equations is solved in 
which each target value is important for each parameter to be calibrated, it may be useful for our 
exposition here to bring some more structure. Certain parameters are clearly more than others 
linked to certain target values. The leisure parameters, including the elasticity of substitution in the 
                                                          
9
 Only individuals with labor income below about 75% of the mean receive an additional social assistance 
benefit. We include this as ‘basic pension’ for the low ability individuals (     , see Table 5, and our 
discussion there). 
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composite leisure function (4), are basically determined such that with observed average levels of 
the policy variables (tax rates, non-employment benefit replacement rates, pension replacement 
rates, etc.) and the observed level of schooling quality (q)10  in Belgium, the model correctly predicts 
Belgium’s employment rates by age (        ) and effective early retirement age ( ). We find that 
the taste for leisure rises with age                         ) and observe a stronger 
degree of substitutability than in the Cobb-Douglas case between the two types of leisure for older 
workers (      ). The human capital inheritance parameter is basically determined to match 
average per capita growth. We find an inheritance rate for the highest ability group of 85% (  
    ). Taking into account the values for   and  , we obtain inheritance rates for the medium 
ability and the low ability groups of about 71% (=0.85x0.837) and 57% (=0.85x0.673). As we have 
explained in the beginning of Section 3.2., we rely on PISA science scores to obtain   and    
 
Calibration of the share parameters    and    is mainly driven by the values for relative wages of 
young workers in the US. As shown by Equation (26), these share parameters are important 
determinants of the relative productivity of labour. Actual wages are informative if a close link can be 
assumed between wages and productivity. This condition is much more likely fulfilled in the US, 
which explains the introduction here of US relative wages rather than those in Belgium (or in any 
other European country). We illustrate the key elements in our procedure to obtain values for    and 
   from these relative wage data in Appendix 2. The results imply                 and 
       . A similar procedure is applied to derive values for
       and   . These are basically 
determined such that the model correctly predicts relative wages of middle aged workers in the US, 
as well the target value for the education rate   (see also Appendix 2). We obtain          
     and       . 
 
Finally, we had no strong ex ante indication on three parameters in the human capital production 
function: the scale parameter , the share parameter   and the elasticity of substitution parameter 
. We could assign sensible values to these parameters thanks to a sensitivity analysis on the results 
that we report in the next section. There we evaluate the capacity of our model to explain the facts 
in 13 OECD countries that we reported in Table 1. Our guideline to pin down specific values for 
   and  was to minimize the deviation of our model’s predictions from the true data11. This 
procedure implied                and        . We observe decreasing returns in human 
capital growth. The result for  reveals a higher degree of complementarity between private 
education time and government expenditures than in the Cobb-Douglas case. The result for v 
                                                          
10
 And with the values of three parameters in the human capital production function     ) that we discuss 
below (see also footnote 11). 
11
 From our model’s predictions and the true data for 13 countries we computed for each variable 
(                   ) the root mean squared error normalized to the mean. We minimized the average 
normalized RMSE over all six variables. More precisely, we adopted the following iterative procedure. We 
chose values for    and  and then calibrated the other ten parameters (although it should be mentioned that 
the values for    and  hardly affected the calibration results for   ). Given the obtained values for the other 
parameters, we computed the average normalized RMSE over all six endogenous variables. We then checked 
whether changes in    and   and a recalibration of the other parameters , could further reduce this statistic. 
We did this until no further reduction was possible.    
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demonstrates relatively high importance for human capital formation of private education time 
versus productive public expenditures. Neither did we have an ex ante indication on the remaining 
parameters in the composite leisure function in Equation (4). We impose equal weight for both 
leisure types ( =0.5). The normalisation parameter   equals 2. The size of this parameter has no 
impact at all on our country predictions or simulation results. 
 
4.2. Fiscal policy, pensions and education quality 
Tables 3 and 4 describe key characteristics of fiscal policy in 1995-2001/2004. Our proxy for the tax 
rate on labor income concerns the total tax wedge, for which we report the marginal rate in %. The 
data cover personal income taxes, employee and employer social security contributions payable on 
wage earnings and payroll taxes. The OECD publishes these marginal tax data for eight family and 
income situations. Our data for    in Table 3 are the average of all these situations. Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and Finland have marginal labor tax rates above 55% or even 60%. The US 
have marginal labor tax rates below 40%. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax rates 
reported by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (their EMTR, base case). Germany and Belgium have the 
highest rates. In contrast to labor (and consumption), capital is taxed relatively little in the Nordic 
countries. As to consumption taxes, we follow Dhont and Heylen (2009) in computing them as the 
ratio of government indirect tax receipts (net of subsidies paid) to total domestic demand net of 
indirect taxes and subsidies. Our simplifying assumption is that consumption tax rates correspond to 
aggregate indirect tax rates. The Nordic countries stand out with the highest consumption tax rates, 
the US with the lowest. The utter right column in Table 3 shows the average ratio of gross 
government debt to GDP in the period that we study. The data range from less than 50% in Norway 
and the UK to more than 100% in Belgium and Italy.  
Table 4 summarizes our data for the expenditure side of fiscal policy. A first variable is our proxy for 
the net non-employment benefit replacement rate  . Since in our model non-employment is a 
structural or equilibrium phenomenon, the data that we use concern net transfers received by 
structurally or long-term unemployed people. They include social assistance, family benefits and 
housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also include unemployment insurance or 
unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still paid, i.e. if workers can be structurally 
unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit eligibility12. The data are expressed in 
percent of after-tax wages. In line with our approach to determine labor tax rates, we again compute 
the average of data reported by the OECD for a wide range of family and income cases to determine 
b (see Appendix 1). Overall, the euro area countries and the Nordic countries pay the highest net 
benefits on average. Transfers to structurally non-employed people are by far the lowest in the US. A 
related variable is our proxy for the net early retirement benefit replacement rate ber. The data are 
                                                          
12
 In the period that we study, this is the case in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, Ireland, and the 
UK. Workers cannot be structurally non-employed and still receive unemployment benefits in the Netherlands, 
Italy, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and the US (OECD, 2004, 
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Benefits and Wages, country specific files).  
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again expressed in percent of after-tax final wages. To assess the generosity of early retirement we 
integrate the information available via b and data for the implicit tax rate on continued work in the 
early retirement route as provided by Duval (2003) and Brandt et al. (2005). For details, see Appendix 
1. We observe a very generous early retirement regime in Belgium and Finland, whereas net early 
retirement benefits in Anglo-Saxon countries are much lower. 
 
Table 3 Fiscal policy: Tax rates and government debt 
 
tax rate on labor 
income  
(in %) 
consumption 
tax rate 
(%) 
tax rate on 
capital income 
(%) 
Public debt  
(% of GDP) 
   Proxy for : 
 
             
Austria 54.9 13.2 17.3 69.6 
Belgium  67.2 13.4 27.1 111.7 
France 52.9 17.1 21.7 68.9 
Germany 60.4 11.1 34.4 63.1 
Italy 55.2 14.7 14.9 122.1 
Netherlands 52.0 12.2 24.3 68.2 
Denmark 48.6 18.9 22.5 60.3 
Finland 56.2 15.2 17.2 54.1 
Norway 50.8 16.4 22.1 40.4 
Sweden 56.0 17.9 16.1 67.2 
UK 44.9 14.5 21.2 46.6 
US 37.4 7.2 23.6 61.9 
Canada 46.4 14.5 24.8 83.8 
    
 
Overall 
average 
52.5 14.3 22.1 70.6 
Notes: Labor tax rates are data for the total tax wedge, marginal rate (OECD, Taxing Wages). Data are for 2000-2004. Earlier 
data are not available. For details, see Appendix 1. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax rates (Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, their EMTR, base case; data are for 1995-2001, see also Devereux et al., 2002). Consumption tax rates are 
from Dhont and Heylen (2009). Data are for 1995-2001. 
 
Our data for productive government expenditures (  ) in Table 4 include education, active labor 
market expenditures, government financed R&D and public investment, in percent of GDP. On 
average, education expenditures constitute close to 60% of total   . Governments in the Nordic 
countries allocate by far the highest fractions of output to productive expenditures. Productive 
expenditures in percent of GDP are the lowest in the UK. The US and most core countries of the euro 
area take intermediate positions. Government consumption in percent of GDP is the highest also in 
the Nordic countries, followed at close distance by several countries of the core euro area13. In the 
US, government consumption is (much) lower.  
 
 
  
                                                          
13
 Like Dhont and Heylen (2009) we calculate our data for government consumption as total government 
consumption in % of GDP, diminished with the fraction of public education outlays going to wages and working-
expenses. We include the latter in productive expenditures.  
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Table 4 Fiscal policy: net benefit replacement rates, consumption, productive expenditures  
 
 Non-
employment 
benefit (net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
Early 
retirement 
benefits (net 
replacement 
rate, %) 
government 
consumption  
 (% of GDP) 
 
government 
productive 
expenditures 
 (% of GDP) 
Proxy for : 
 
  
 
     
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
    
Austria 56.3 71.6  14.6  9.1 
Belgium 59.6 79.0  16.9  8.9 
France 46.0 63.8  18.3  11.0 
Germany 64.7 70.8  15.3  8.6 
Italy 17.0 55.7  14.3  8.0 
Netherlands 55.0 68.1  18.4  10.3 
Denmark 61.9 43.2  18.4  12.5 
Finland 61.3 73.8  16.0  11.4 
Norway 56.9 39.9  14.7  12.1 
Sweden 55.4 39.0  20.0  14.0 
UK 51.1 39.4  14.4  7.3 
US 30.5 18.3  10.3  9.3 
Canada 44.4 27.0  14.7  9.3  
Overall 
average 
52.2 53.8  15.9  10.1  
Notes: A description of all variables is given in the main text. For more details, see Appendix 1. The data for net benefit 
replacement rates are an average for 2001-2004 (earlier data are not available). The data for government consumption and 
productive expenditures concern 1995-2001.  
 
 
Table 5 contains our data for the net pension replacement rates    and    . The data have been 
taken or computed from OECD (2005). They include only (quasi-)mandatory pension programs14. In 
line with our specification in Equation (9),     is expressed as a percentage of an individual’s 
average lifetime net labor income, while     is expressed as a percentage of average economy-wide 
net labor income at the time of retirement. We consider individuals at 50 percent of mean earnings 
as representative for the low ability group, individuals with mean earnings as representative for the 
medium ability group, and individuals at twice the mean earnings as representative for the high 
ability group. Appendix 1 gives more details on the construction of the data. In the majority of 
countries individuals with mean or higher earnings only receive earnings-related pensions 
(            for      ). Among these countries, Austria and Italy pay the highest net 
replacement rates (   >85%), Belgium and the US the lowest (   < 65%)
15. Five countries also pay 
basic pensions to individuals with mean or higher earnings: the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, the 
UK and Canada. For individuals with low earnings, the situation is somewhat the opposite. Their 
                                                          
14
 In most countries mandatory programs are public. For Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden the data also 
include benefits from mandatory private systems. These benefits are earnings-related and included under    . 
Voluntary, occupational pensions are not included in our data. 
15
 Next to the pension level, differences exist also in the precise organization of the earnings-related system. 
Some countries have pure defined-benefit systems (e.g. Belgium, Finland, US), others have so-called point 
systems (Germany) or notional-account systems (Italy, Sweden).
 
Although these three systems can appear very 
different, OECD (2005) shows that they are all similar variants of earnings-related pension schemes. 
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pension includes a significant basic (or similar) component in most countries. Unsurprisingly, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and the UK pay the highest ‘basic’ amounts16.   
 
We emphasize that the straightforward way in which the OECD computes the pension replacement 
rates, in percent of an individual’s average lifetime labor income, comes down to assuming in our 
model that the weights       and    are all equal to 1/3. For reasons of consistency we will 
therefore make this assumption for all individual countries when we derive our model’s predictions. 
We are aware, however, that equal weights do not fully match practice in all countries. Some deviate 
from this prototype, to varying degrees17. When we compare our model’s predictions for these 
countries to the facts in the next section, we should take this into account. Assuming equal weights 
may slightly bias our predictions. 
 
Table 5 Net pension replacement rates and PISA education score  
 
Net earnings-related pension 
replacement rate (% average 
earned net labor income) 
Net basic pension replacement 
rate (% economy-wide average 
net labor income) 
PISA science 
score (divided 
by 1000) 
Proxy for : Low Medium High Low Medium High  
                           
        
Austria 88.7 88.9 75.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.507 
Belgium 55.4 63.1 42.7 17.2 0.0 0.0 0.505 
France 62.9 68.8 59.2 23.2 0.0 0.0 0.502 
Germany 60.4 71.8 67.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.502 
Italy 89.3 88.8 89.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.480 
Netherlands 0.0 42.1 62.9 46.4 42.1 36.2 0.525 
Denmark 15.3 11.0 10.0 43.6 43.1 42.2 0.484 
Finland 82.3 78.8 78.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.550 
Norway 36.4 43.0 38.4 26.4 22.1 20.3 0.490 
Sweden 64.6 65.9 74.3 13.6 2.3 0.0 0.507 
UK 0.0 5.0 8.0 43.6 42.6 41.2 0.523 
US 61.4 51.0 39.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.493 
Canada 31.6 33.9 18.1 31.5 23.2 23.3 0.527 
        
Overall average 49.9 54.8 51.0 19.3 13.0 12.6 0.507 
   Notes: Pension replacement rates have been taken or computed from OECD (2005, p. 52 and part II). The data concern  
   2002. For more details, see Appendix 1. The PISA science scores are an average for 2000, 2003 and 2006. 
 
A final variable in Table 5 is our indicator for education quality ( ) in the human capital production 
function (12, 18). For each country we use PISA science scores. We concentrate on test results for 
science given their expected closer link to growth (Barro, 2001). The mean score is best in Finland, 
followed by the Netherlands, Canada and the UK. Education quality is relatively low in Italy, 
                                                          
16
 As we explain in Appendix 1, it should be mentioned that our proxy for     also includes targeted and 
minimum pensions. Basic pensions pay the same amount to every retiree. Targeted plans pay a higher benefit 
to poorer pensioners and reduced benefits to better-off ones. Minimum pensions are similar to targeted plans. 
Their main aim is to prevent pensions from falling below a certain level (OECD, 2005, p. 22-23). Our main 
motivation to merge these three categories in our proxy for     is that they are not (or even inversely) linked to 
earnings. 
17
 In Austria, Norway and France earnings-related pensions are not calculated from average lifetime income but 
from average income during the final working years or a number of years with the highest earnings. Ideally, 
one would impose different weights p1, p2 and p3. However, the pension replacement rate reported by the 
OECD would then no longer be reliable since it is based on the assumption of equal weights. 
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Denmark, Norway and the US. Note that there is no correlation between productive government 
expenditures in Table 4 and the PISA scores in Table 5. The coefficient of correlation is -0.04. There is 
no correlation either if we restrict productive expenditures to education only. Both variables seem to 
tell different stories (see also Woessmann, 2003). 
 
 
4.3 Predicted versus actual employment by age, education of the young, and growth in the OECD  
 
Can our model match the facts that we have reported in Table 1? In this section we confront our 
model’s predictions with the true data for 1995-2007. Clearly, one should be aware of the serious 
limitations of such an exercise. First of all, our model is highly stylized and may (obviously) miss 
potential determinants of growth or employment. Second, even if we compute the true data in Table 
1 as averages over a longer period, these averages need not be equal to the steady state. Countries 
may still be moving towards their steady state. Third, this exercise only concerns the last 15 years. 
Due to lack of data – especially with respect to marginal labor tax rates and non-employment 
benefits before the mid 1990s – it is impossible for us to relate changes in growth and employment 
to changes in policy within countries over longer time periods. In spite of all this, if one considers the 
extreme variation in the predictions of existing calibrated models investigating the effects of fiscal 
policy in the literature (see Stokey and Rebelo, 1995), even a minimal test of the ‘goodness of fit’ of 
our model is informative. This information is important to assess the value of the simulations that we 
present in the next section, and their reliability for policy analysis. In most papers in the literature a 
test of the external validity of the model is missing.   
 
Our calibration implies that our model’s prediction matches the employment rates by age, the 
effective retirement age of older workers, education, and per capita growth in Belgium. The test of 
the model’s validity is whether it can also match the data for the other countries, and cross-country 
differences. Before one uses a model for policy analysis, one would like to see for example that the 
model does not overestimate, nor underestimate the performance differences related to observed 
cross-country policy differences. Our test is tough since we impose the same preference and 
technology parameters, reported in the upper part of Table 2, on all countries. Only fiscal policy 
variables, the pension replacement rate, and education quality differ. Moreover, assuming perfect 
competition, we disregard differences in labor and product market institutions which some authors 
consider of crucial importance (e.g. Nickell et al., 2005). Still, we find that the model matches the 
facts remarkably well for a large majority of countries. Basically, we here confirm earlier findings by 
e.g. Ohanian et al. (2008) and Dhont and Heylen (2008) that once one controls for fiscal policy 
differences, variation in taste for leisure or different market rigidities are not critical to explain cross-
country variation in labor market performance. 
As a part of fiscal policy, lump sum transfers also differ across countries. Underlying our model’s 
predictions for each country, is the assumption of a constant debt to GDP ratio at the level reported 
for that country in Table 3. Lump sum transfers adjust endogenously in Equation (28) to obtain this 
equilibrium debt to GDP ratio. 
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Figures 2 to 4 relate our model’s predictions to actual observations for three employment rates by 
age (aggregated over the three ability groups). We add the 45°-line to assess the absolute differences 
between predictions and facts, as well as the coefficient of correlation between predictions and 
facts. Our model performs quite well. In each age group, it correctly predicts high employment rates 
in the US and Canada and low employment in Germany. For young workers it also correctly predicts 
relatively low employment in most other countries of the core euro area, and in the Nordic countries. 
For older workers it has relatively high employment right in the Nordic countries and the UK. Overall 
correlation between the model’s predictions and the actual data in Figure 2 is 0.35. If we drop Italy, 
for which there are good reasons18, this rises to 0.69. Correlation in Figure 3 is 0.48, in Figure 4 it is 
0.76. Moreover, in each figure - again after dropping Italy from Figure 2 - the regression line (not 
shown) is close to the 45°-line, which suggests that our model correctly assesses the size of the 
employment effects of policy differences across countries. Next to Italy, there are a few other 
countries, where our model somewhat over- or underpredicts. The model’s employment predictions 
tend to be too high for France and the Netherlands. They are too low in Figures 2 and 3 for Denmark 
and Finland.  
 
Figure 2. Employment rate in hours of young individuals in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.35. 
  Excluding Italy correlation rises to 0.69.  
 
 
  
                                                          
18
 A major element behind the deviation for this country seems to be underestimation of the fallback income 
position for structurally non-employed young workers. OECD data show very low replacement rates in Italy. 
However, as shown by Reyneri (1994), the gap between Italy and other European countries is much smaller 
than it seems when family support as an alternative to unemployment benefits is taken into account. 
Fernández Cordón (2001) shows that in Italy young people live much longer with their parents than in other 
countries.   
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Figure 3. Employment rate in hours of middle aged individuals in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
  
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.48.  
 
 
Figure 4. Employment rate in hours of older individuals in individual countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.76.  
 
 
Figure 5 relates our model’s predictions to the facts for the effective retirement age. The model again 
captures the large differences between countries. It predicts the highest retirement age in the Anglo-
Saxon and Nordic countries and a much lower retirement age in core euro area countries. Correlation 
between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.91. In Figures 6 and 7 we relate our model’s 
predictions to the facts for education and growth. For education, the model correctly captures key 
differences between the Nordic countries on the one hand and countries like the UK and Italy on the 
other. Predictions for education are quite close to the 45°-line for all individual countries except 
Germany and (especially) Denmark and Finland. The model does not match the high participation in 
education in the latter two countries. Finally, our model has important cross-country differences 
right for growth. The model has some difficulty however to explain observed growth for the UK and 
Canada. Correlation between the model’s predictions and the true data is 0.76 for education and 
0.69 for growth. 
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Figure 5. Effective retirement age, 1995-2006 
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.91.  
 
 
Figure 6. Tertiary education rate in individual countries, in %, 1995-2006  
 
  Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.76.  
 
 
Figure 7. Annual per capita potential GDP growth in 13 countries, in %, 1995-2007 
 
 
    Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.69. 
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5. Public pension reform 
 
Having established the empirical relevance of our model, we now simulate a series of policy shocks. 
Our aim is to discover the (relative) effectiveness of various reforms of the pension system for the 
employment rate of three age and three ability groups, aggregate employment, education of the 
young,  growth, and income at old-age (especially for the low-ability group). We report steady state 
effects, and welfare effects per generation and per ability group. We also show the pension level of 
low-ability retirees. Throughout all our policy simulations we assume that the government maintains 
a constant debt to GDP ratio in each period. To reach this goal, it adjusts the consumption tax rate. 
Alternative simulations where the government adjusts lump sum transfers yield the same 
conclusions as the ones we report below. For a proper understanding of timing, it will be our 
assumption that the economy is in steady state at time t=-1. Reform is announced at time t=0 and 
implemented with a delay of 1 period, i.e. at time t=1. Hence, reforms apply to everyone except the 
generation of retirees at t=0, since they are no longer able to adapt their behavior19. 
Table 6 shows the steady state effects of seven (permanent) reforms in key features of the pension 
system. The benchmark from which we start, and against which all policy shocks are evaluated, is the 
average of the six core euro area countries in our sample. The parameters describing the benchmark 
pension system are indicated in the upper left corner of the table and in a first note below the table. 
Individual earnings-related replacement rates vary in the benchmark between 59% (   ) and 71% 
(   ). They are applied to a pension base where each active period has equal weight (   =1/3). 
Basic pensions take values between 6% (   ) and 15% (   ) of aggregate average net labor income. 
No particular minimum level is imposed to the pension (MP=0). The percentage point change in the 
consumption tax rate to maintain a constant debt to GDP ratio is indicated at the bottom of the 
table. 
                  
Figure 8 shows the welfare effects of these policy changes for high and for low-ability individuals of 
current and future generations. The results for medium-ability individuals are in general quite close 
to those for the high-ability group. We report on the vertical axis the welfare effect on individuals of 
the generation born k periods after the announcement of the policy reform, where k is indicated on 
the horizontal axis. So, the data at k=0 for example concern the young in the period of the policy 
announcement. The data at k=-3 concern the retirees in that period20. Our welfare measure is the 
(constant) percentage change in benchmark consumption in each period of remaining life that 
individuals should get to attain the same lifetime utility as after the policy shock (see also King and 
Rebelo, 1990). To compute this percentage change we keep employment rates at the benchmark. For 
example, policy 1 implies a welfare gain for the current high-ability young (k=0) equal to 1% of 
                                                          
19
 Current retirees will therefore not experience a change in their pension replacement rate(s), nor in the rules 
behind the computation of their pension assessment base. Their disposable income can change, however, 
when the government adjusts consumption taxes to keep the ratio of public debt to GDP constant, or when the 
aggregate average net wage (to which the basic pension replacement rate     applies) changes. 
20
 Consistent with footnote 19, these retirees are only indirectly affected by the policy change. 
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benchmark consumption. It implies a welfare loss for the current older low-ability individuals (k=-2) 
equal to 2% of their benchmark consumption.  
In Table 7 we integrate the welfare effects induced by each policy reform into a single aggregate 
summary measure. For each individual we first compute the present discounted value of the total 
consumption change over life that is required in the benchmark to make him equally well-off as 
under the policy reform. The basis of our computation are the data that we report in Figure 8. But 
now we also take into account differences in the length of remaining life. For young individuals the 
data in Figure 8 apply to four periods, whereas for retired individuals they only apply to one 
remaining period. Next, we impose that all those who lose under the new policy are compensated by 
the winners. Our summary measure is the present discounted value of the net aggregate 
consumption gain of all winners after having compensated the losers, in percent of initial GDP. The 
first row in Table 7 includes all current and four future generations of all three ability types into the 
computation. The second row includes only those generations that live at the moment the reform is 
announced. 
 
Given its importance for welfare at old-age, and the risk of old-age poverty, we focus in Figure 9 on 
the evolution of the pension level of low-ability retirees in the periods after a policy reform. 
Reported data at time t=0 concern the pension level of those who are retired at the moment of 
announcement of the new policy and who are only indirectly affected by it. Data at t=3 concern the 
pension level of those who are young at the time of announcement. All data are expressed relative to 
the benchmark. 
 
The starting point of our discussion is policy 1, which introduces for all individuals an increase in   , 
and a fall in   , along the lines preferred by Buyse et al. (2011). To compute the pension base, the 
weight of labor income earned as an older worker rises to 2/3, the weight of labor income earned 
when young falls to 0. Our results confirm the important positive effects of such a reform for 
aggregate employment and growth. The higher (lower) marginal utility from work when older 
(young) makes it interesting to shift work from the first period of active life to the third, and to 
postpone effective retirement (   and   rise,    falls). The positive effect that we observe on   and 
   is fully in line with earlier arguments by Sheshinski (1978) and Gruber and Wise (2002), among 
others. Jaag et al. (2010) also predict a shift from    to    when    falls and    rises. Unlike in Jaag et 
al., however, the role of endogenous education in our model strongly qualifies the fall in young 
workers’ labor supply. As is clear in Table 6, young individuals are encouraged to study (e increases) 
because the lifetime rate of return to building human capital rises. This follows first from the 
reduction of the opportunity cost of studying when young, second from the perspective of working 
longer, and third from the greater importance of effective human capital when old in the pension 
calculation. Extra schooling contributes to steady-state growth and reinforces incentives to work at 
older age. We observe an increase in the annual growth rate by 0.08 %-points. Note also that the 
employment rate rises in each ability group (        ), but most so among low-ability individuals 
(   =1.43). These individuals can only respond to the new policy by working longer, they cannot 
study and enjoy higher human capital. Interestingly, the government budget does not deteriorate. It 
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becomes possible to cut the consumption tax rate while keeping the ratio of public debt to GDP 
constant (see bottom of Table 6).  
 
A quick comparison with the other policies in Table 6, to be discussed immediately, reveals that most 
of them are less effective than policy 1 when it comes to promoting (aggregate) employment and 
growth. Table 7 also reveals significant net aggregate welfare gains. The main disadvantage of policy 
1, however, is the welfare loss that it imposes on the current older and middle aged generations of 
low-ability individuals (Figure 8, upper panel, RHS). These individuals work more, but can hardly 
consume more. Even if policy 1 offers a convincing solution to the overall challenge of employment 
and growth in today’s economies, and even if it may contribute to safeguard the welfare state in the 
future, it may also worsen conditions for a significant part of the lower ability individuals. Moreover, 
it may offer no solution to the problem of old-age poverty faced by many. Figure 9 shows an 
important fall relative to the benchmark in the pension level of many generations of low-ability 
individuals to come. These observations make it politically difficult to impose such a policy. 
  
 
Table 6. Steady state effects of pension reform – Effects for a benchmark of 6 core euro area 
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). 
 
Initial values: 
   =1/3 
   =1/3 
   =1/3 
  =0 
Policy 1 
   =0 
   =1/3 
   =2/3 
Policy 2 
  =0.6 
Policy 3 
   =0 
   =0.75 
 
 
Policy 4 
   =0 
   =1/3 
   =2/3 
   =0.6 
Policy 5 
   =0 
   =1/3 
   =2/3 
   =0.85 
Policy 6 
    =0 
    =1/3 
    =2/3 
   =0.85 
Policy 7 
Fully 
Funded 
Effect (a):        
     -3.41 -0.51 -1.06 -3.33 -3.56 -2.84 0.04 
     0.12 -1.00 -3.02 -0.92 0.36 0.29 -1.47 
     7.02 -3.48 -10.4 1.15 8.24 5.99 -7.80 
   (c) 0.85 -0.47 -1.41 0.09 1.00 0.80 -1.15 
    1.37 0.00 -0.46 1.37 1.37 1.41 -0.36 
        
   (a. b) 0.92 -1.55 -4.50 -1.14 1.31 0.88 -2.79 
     (d) 1.66 -2.81 -8.14 -2.06 2.37 1.62 -5.05 
     0.60 0.01 -3.88 0.61 0.59 0.60 -2.84 
     0.72 0.01 -4.66 0.73 0.72 0.72 -2.98 
     1.43 -4.68 -4.96 -4.75 2.61 1.10 -2.55 
∆ annual 
growth 
rate
(b)
 
0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08 -0.02 
∆  
 (e) -1.19 1.66 5.07 1.15 -0.38 0.13 7.50 
 
        Notes: Initial values:    =59.4,    =70.6,    =66.1,    =14.6,    =7.0,    =6.0. 
    (a) difference in percentage points between new steady state and benchmark. except      and  . 
 (b) change in (weighted) aggregate employment rate in hours, change in percentage points. 
    (c) change in optimal effective retirement age in years 
 (d) change in volume of employment in hours, in percent.  
 (e) change in consumption tax rate in percentage points to keep the ratio of debt to GDP constant. 
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Policies 2 and 3 focus on the problem of low pensions for low-ability individuals. Policy 2 maintains all 
benchmark replacement rates, but also introduces a minimum pension. Individuals are sure of a 
pension equal to at least 60% of average net labor income per worker in the economy. In practice the 
latter implies a strong increase in the pension level for the low-ability group (see also Figure 9), but 
no ex-ante change for the other two groups. Their optimal behavior given all policy variables implies 
a pension that is above 60% of the average net wage from the beginning. We remind that none of 
the policy reforms that we discuss apply to the retired at the moment of the announcement of the 
reform, so they are not eligible to the minimum pension. As shown by Figure 8, all low-ability 
individuals except the retired (k=-3) experience welfare increases up to about 4% under policy 2. For 
the welfare of all other individuals, however, these policies have very negative effects. A key element 
is the drastic drop in the employment rate among low-ability individuals. The perspective of a 
minimum pension introduces a strong disincentive for them to work (see also Sommacal, 2006). The 
implied fall in aggregate employment and its negative effects on the government’s budget, force the 
latter to raise consumption tax rates for all. Furthermore, medium and higher ability individuals can 
also expect a fall in their wage per unit of effective labor due to the reduction of low-ability labor 
supply21.  
 
Policy 3 imposes a shift from own-earnings related pensions to ‘basic’ pensions on all individuals. 
Every retiree gets a basic pension equal to 75% of average net labor income per worker in the 
economy. In our model    goes to zero for all ability groups,    becomes 0.75. This policy basically 
goes one step further than policy 2. It breaks the relationship between the pension and an 
individual’s human capital and labor supply also for the high and medium-ability groups. The fall in 
the return to studying and to working also for these groups is at the basis of an overall and strong fall 
in employment, education time and growth. Figure 8 reveals negative welfare effects almost across 
the board, especially for higher ability individuals and all future generations. Only current older low-
ability individuals gain. They benefit most from higher pensions. Due to lower growth, this gain will 
not persist for the future low-ability generations however. As a result, policy 3 shows among the 
worst net aggregate welfare effects in Table 7.  
 
Policies 4, 5 and 6 search for ways to combine the efficiency of policy 1 with the objective to reduce 
the risk of old-age poverty for low-ability individuals. Policy 4 extends policy 1 with a minimum 
pension equal to 60% of the average net wage, like in policy 2. This policy is most beneficial for the 
welfare of all low-ability individuals (except the retired). They enjoy both an immediate increase in 
their pension, for which they have to work less, and the benefits from increased human capital 
formation by the high and medium-ability groups. The latter immediately contributes to higher 
wages per person, also for the lower ability individuals, and to increased levels of inherited human 
capital for all future generations. Like policy 2, however, policy 4 also imposes significant welfare 
                                                          
21
 As a narrow alternative to policy 2, we also investigated the introduction of a minimum pension combined 
with an abolishment of all basic pensions. All effects were very similar. Only the required increase in the 
consumption tax rate was smaller, since the government could save money from     going to 0.   
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losses on the current generations of high and medium-ability individuals, which drastically reduces its 
chances politically. Net aggregate effects in Table 7 are still negative. 
  
Policy 5 tackles the problem of low income at old-age for the low-ability group by significantly raising 
their individual earnings-related pension replacement rate to 85% (     = 25.6%-points). This policy 
combines the efficiency gains from policy 1 with strong incentives for the low-ability group to work 
more and longer. In contrast to the disincentives induced by basic or minimum pensions, policy 5 
raises the return to work since it yields more future pension. Among all the policies that we discuss in 
Table 6, not one has more favorable effects on aggregate employment (  =1.31) or on the 
employment rate of low-ability individuals (   =2.61). Higher pensions can as a result be paid 
without the need for the government to raise consumption taxes. Given the strong rise in output and 
employment, c can even be reduced. Compared to policy 1, welfare effects for the low-ability group 
are better, without hurting the medium and high-ability groups. Policy 5 induces the best net 
aggregate welfare effects in Table 7. 
 
Figure 8. Welfare effects for individuals belonging to current and future generations after pension 
reform 
 
                                                              High ability                                                    Low ability 
               
 
 
Note:  The vertical axis indicates the welfare effect for individuals belonging to the generation born k periods  
            after the announcement of permanent pension reform. The horizontal axis indicates k. Negative  
              numbers for k point at generations born before the reform. 
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Table 7. Net welfare effect after compensating welfare transfers (expressed as % of initial GDP) 
 
Included generations  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 5 Policy 6 Policy 7 
All current + 4 future 1.8 -1.6 -6.1 -0.2 1.9 1.8 -2.8 
All current 0.6 -1.3 -4.2 -0.8 1.0 0.9 -4.5 
Note: for a description of the computation of these data, see main text. 
 
Policy 6 reconsiders the basic choice made in policy 1 to raise the weight of labor income earned as 
an older worker in the computation of the pension assessment base, and to reduce the weight of 
labor income earned as a young worker. One of the main advantages of this choice is that it 
promotes education and human capital formation. Given that low-ability individuals will never 
continue education at the tertiary level, however, one may question this change in weights for them. 
Policy 6 therefore maintains the much higher individual earnings-related replacement rate for the 
low-ability group (   =85%), but combines this with equal weights   =1/3 for this group. The shift to 
  =0,   =1/3 and   =2/3 only applies to medium and high-ability individuals. Employment and 
growth effects from policy 6 are better than, or at least as good as, those from policy 1. For the low-
ability individuals, who work the highest fraction of their time while they are young, maintaining    
at 1/3 in policy 6 implies a further increase in their pension benefit compared to policy 5. This further 
increase in pensions will force the government to slightly raise the consumption tax rate. All in all, 
however, the welfare effects from policy 6 are among the best for the low-ability individuals, with 
quasi no cost imposed on the others. Net aggregate welfare effects from policy 6 are in between 
those from policies 1 and  5.  
 
Figure 9. Pension level (relative to benchmark) of low-ability retirees at time t (where t=0 is when the  
                 policy reform is announced and t=1 is when it is implemented) 
 
 
Note: Policy 7 is not included. This policy implies a gradual reduction of public pensions to zero. 
 
Policy 7 is a gradual shift from the PAYG system in the benchmark to a system with full private capital 
funding. This policy completely abolishes old-age pension benefits (       ). For the government it 
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implies a drastic cut in pension expenditures. We assume that this drop in expenditures feeds 
through into lower social security contributions for all workers such that, ex ante, the decline in total 
labor tax receipts in % of GDP is exactly the same as the drop in pension expenditures.22 We observe 
in Table 6 that this transition to a private fully-funded pension scheme is not beneficial for 
employment. The new steady state shows lower hours worked among all ability groups and all age 
groups. The fall in employment is the strongest among older workers. The aggregate employment 
rate n drops by about 2.8%-points. An important element here is that a fully-funded system breaks 
the direct positive link between individual labor income and the pension, which exists in the PAYG 
system as we have modeled it. Steady state time allocated to education also falls, slightly. So does 
growth (-0.02%-points). Furthermore, we observe that a shift to a fully-funded system affects the 
government balance negatively (as the consumption tax rate has to be increased by more than 7 
percentage points). The latter is mainly due to the decline in the tax base as hours of work decrease. 
Another element is that, although we also find that moving to a system with private capital funding 
encourages national savings (see e.g. Feldstein, 1974, 2005), this need not imply an increase in 
domestic physical capital formation, and capital taxes. If effective labor supply and employment fall, 
so will the marginal product of physical capital, which causes savings to be invested abroad. Figure 8 
reveals a strong intertemporal trade-off in the welfare effects from moving to a fully-funded system. 
Future generations gain, but current, transitional generations experience large welfare losses23. This 
result is well-known in the literature. Although the future gains in Figure 8 are relatively strong when 
compared to those from e.g. policy 6, it should also be recognized that in the more distant future 
(k>5) a fully-funded system will bring less gains. A key element is that it lacks the incentives to 
promote human capital formation and growth inherent in policies 1, 5 and 6.  
 
The possibility that a fully-funded pension system has lower growth than a PAYG model has been 
shown before by Kemnitz and Wigger (2000), Zhang and Zhang (2003), and Kaganovich and Meier 
(2008). The endogeneity of education and human capital is crucial for that result also in their models. 
The inferior employment effects from a shift to a fully-funded system may, however, be surprising 
from the perspective of recent work by e.g. Börsch-Supan and Ludwig (2010), Ludwig et al. (2012) 
and Fisher and Keuschnigg (2010). For a discussion of this issue we refer to Buyse et al. (2011). A 
major element is that the existing literature generally compares a fully-funded system with a specific 
                                                          
22
 In particular, the gradual decline in     and     is announced at time t=0 and implemented as follows. 
Pension benefits are not reduced for retirees at the moment of policy announcement (t=0), since retirees are 
not able to react to a pension reduction. In t=1 and t=2 the replacement rates are respectively reduced to 2/3 
and 1/3 of their initial rates. From t=3 onwards,     and     are zero. At each moment, overall labor tax rates 
are reduced to ex ante compensate for the decline in pension expenditures. 
23
 The explanation for the welfare loss of current generations in our model is as follows. The announcement of 
the transition to a fully-funded system, and the perspective of a gradual fall in labor taxes during periods 1,2 
and 3, as described in footnote 22, makes individuals shift hours worked to the future. During transition the 
young will study more, but total effective labor falls. Since this reduces the marginal productivity of physical 
capital, it will also discourage investment. Capital flows out. The economy experiences a strong drop in 
aggregate output (and tax revenue), which will force the government to raise consumption taxes. In later 
periods the economy enjoys the benefits from having accumulated more human capital during transition, but 
increased education efforts are not permanent (on the contrary). 
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PAYG system which is less ‘intelligent’ than in our policies 5 or 6. Either one assumes for example a 
‘flat’ PAYG system where individuals’ pensions do not depend on their own human capital and labor 
earnings (as in our policy 3), or one models the public old-age pension system as an immediate 
alternative to work, neglecting the reality of early retirement systems.  
 
6. Conclusions 
        
We study the effects of pension reform in a four-period OLG model for an open economy where 
hours worked by three active generations, education of the young, the retirement decision of older 
workers, and aggregate growth, are all endogenous. Within each generation we distinguish 
individuals with high, medium or low ability to build human capital, which allows to investigate also 
the effects of pension reform on the income and welfare levels of different ability groups. Our 
specification of pension benefits allows for both own-earnings related and flat-rate or basic 
components. The weight of each component may differ for individuals with different abilities. Next to 
the pension system, we introduce a role for education quality as well as a rich fiscal policy block. The 
government sets tax rates on labor, capital and consumption. It allocates its revenue to productive 
expenditures (mainly for education), consumption, non-employment benefits (including early 
retirement benefits) and pensions.  
We check the validity of our model and our calibration by simulating the model for 13 OECD 
countries and comparing its results with the true data. Imposing common technology and preference 
parameters but country-specific policy parameters, we find that the predictions of our model match 
the main facts remarkably well.  
 
Simulating various models of pension reform, we find that an ‘intelligent’ PAYG system may have 
positive effects on both employment, the effective retirement age, education, aggregate growth and 
welfare. These positive effects are the strongest when the PAYG system includes a tight link between 
individual labor income (and contributions) and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to 
labor income earned as an older worker to compute the pension assessment base. Such a system 
stimulates individuals’ labor supply when they are middle aged and older, and education when they 
are young. Positive effects on human capital formation promote future productivity and earnings 
capacity, also for future generations. An ‘intelligent’ PAYG system may perform (much) better than a 
system with a strong basic pension component, or a system with full private funding.   
 
Recognizing realistic differences across people in ability to learn and to build human capital, 
however, we find that this ‘intelligent’ PAYG system implies significant welfare losses for current 
generations of low-ability individuals, who cannot study and who work at low wages. We therefore 
study various alternatives to maintain the aggregate efficiency gains of an ‘intelligent’ PAYG system, 
while at the same time contributing to higher income at old-age and welfare for all individuals. Most 
promising is to maintain the tight link between individual labor income and the pension also for low-
ability individuals, but to strongly raise their replacement rate. Such a system performs much better 
135 
 
economically, and may expect to receive much more support politically, than basic or minimum 
pension components to promote the income of low-ability individuals. A tight link between individual 
labor income and the pension, combined with a high replacement rate, is a very effective way to 
promote labor supply. Basic and minimum pension models by contrast have strong negative effects 
on labor supply of low-ability individuals. A second welfare increasing adjustment would be to 
maintain equal weights in the pension assessment base for low-ability individuals. Since these 
individuals cannot study at the tertiary level, it is not optimal to give a lower weight to the labor 
income they earn when young.  
 
Our findings tend to support recent pension reforms in countries like Sweden and Finland. Sweden 
moved from a quite non-actuarial PAYG system to a quasi-actuarial system with individual notional 
accounts (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; OECD, 2005). These accounts establish a close relationship 
between working hours, labor earnings and contributions on the one hand, and future pensions on 
the other, as in the case of a high replacement rate    in our model (and a low   ). Finland 
introduced a system where the pension accrual rate rises with age, which corresponds to the case of 
a rising pj as workers get older in our model (OECD, 2005). Our results support this policy, except for 
individuals with low capacity to study at the tertiary level.   
 
 
References 
Altig, D.A., Auerbach, A., Kotlikoff, L., Smetters, K. and Walliser, J. (2001) Simulating fundamental tax 
reform in the United States, American Economic Review 91, 574–595. 
Auerbach, A. and Kotlikoff, L. (1987) Dynamic Fiscal Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Auerbach, A., Kotlikoff, L., Hagemann, P. and Nicoletti, G. (1989) The Economic Dynamics of an 
Ageing Population: The Case of Four OECD Countries, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers 62, Economics Department 
Azariadis, C. and Drazen, A. (1990) Threshold Externalities in Economic Development, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 105, 501-526.  
Azariadis, C. and de la Croix, D. (2006) Financial Institutional Reform, Growth, and Equality? , in 
Institutions, Development, and Economic Growth, T. Eicher and C. Garcia Peñalosa eds, 35-64, 
MIT Press. 
Barr, N. (2006) Pensions: Overview of the issue, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22, 1-14. 
Barro, R.J. (1990) Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth, Journal of Political 
Economy, 98, S103-125. 
Barro, R.J. (2001) Human capital and growth, American Economic Review, 91, 12-17. 
Benhabib, J. and Farmer, R. (1994) Indeterminacy and increasing returns, Journal of Economic Theory, 
63, 19-41. 
Börsch-Supan, A.H. and Ludwig, A. (2010) Old Europe ages: Reforms and Reform Backlashes, NBER 
Working Paper, N° 15744. 
136 
 
Boucekkine, R. (1995) An alternative methodology for solving non-linear forward-looking models. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19, 711–734. 
Bouzahzah, M., de la Croix, D. and Docquier, F. (2002) Policy reforms and growth in computational 
OLG economies, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26, 2093–2113. 
Brandt, N., Burniaux J.-M. and Duval, R. (2005) Assessing the OECD Jobs Strategy: Past developments 
and reforms, Economics Department Working Paper, No. 429 (annexes). 
Buiter, W.H., and Kletzer, K.M. (1993) Permanent International Productivity Growth Differentials in 
an Integrated Global Economy, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95, 467-493. 
Buyse, T., Heylen, F. and Van de Kerckhove, R. (2011) Pension reform, employment by age, and long-run 
growth,  Journal of Population Economics, 26, 769-809. 
Caselli, F. and Coleman, W.J. (2006) The world technology frontier, American Economic Review, 96, 499-
522. 
de la Croix, D., Pierrard, O. and Sneessens, H.R. (2013) Aging and Pensions in General Equilibrium : 
Labor Market Imperfections Matter, Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control 37, 104-124,. 
Devereux, M.P., Griffith, R. and Klemm, A. (2002) Corporate income tax reforms and international tax 
competition, Economic Policy, 35, 451-495.  
Dhont, T. and Heylen, F. (2008) Why do Europeans work (much) less? It is taxes and government 
expenditures, Economic Inquiry, 46, 197-207. 
Dhont, T. and Heylen, F. (2009) Employment and growth in Europe and the US: the role of fiscal 
policy composition, Oxford Economic Papers, 61, 538-565. 
Diamond, P. (1965) National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model, American Economic Review, 55, 
1126-1150. 
Docquier, F. and Michel, P. (1999) Education subsidies, social security and growth: The implications of 
a demographic shock, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101, 425-440.  
Duval, R. (2003) The Retirement Effects of Old-Age Pension and Early Retirement Schemes in OECD 
Countries, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 370. 
Feldstein, M. (1974) Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 
Journal of Political Economy, 82, 905-926. 
Feldstein, M. (2005). Rethinking Social Insurance, American Economic Review, 95, 1-24. 
Fernandez Cordon, J.A. (2001) Youth as a transition to full autonomy, Family Observer, No. 3, 4-11. 
Fiorito R. and Zanella, G. (2012) The anatomy of aggregate labor supply elasticity, Review of Economic 
Dynamics, 15, 171-187. 
Fisher, W.H. and Keuschnigg, C. (2010) Pension reform and labor market incentives, Journal of 
Population Economics, 23, 769-803. 
Glomm, G. and Ravikumar, G. (1992) Public vs. private investment in human capital: Endogenous 
growth and income inequality, Journal of Political Economy, 100, 818-834. 
Gruber, J. and Wise, D. (2002) Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: 
Microestimation, NBER Working Paper, N° 9407. 
Hanushek, E.A. and Woessmann, L. (2009) Do better schools lead to more growth? Cognitive skills, 
economic outcomes, and causation, NBER Working Paper, N° 14633.  
137 
 
Heijdra, B. and Romp, W. (2009) Retirement, pensions and ageing, Journal of Public Economics, 93,  
586-604. 
Heylen, F. and Van de Kerckhove, R. (2010) Fiscal policy, employment by age, and growth in OECD 
economies, Paper presented at the 25th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, 
Glasgow, August 2010 (www.sherppa.be). 
Jaag, C., Keuschnigg, C. and Keuschnigg, M. (2010) Pension reform, retirement, and life-cycle 
unemployment, International Tax and Public Finance, 17, 556-585. 
Juillard, M. (1996) Dynare: A program for the resolution and simulation of dynamic models with 
forward variables through the use of a relaxation algorithm. Working Paper, N° 9602, CEPREMAP. 
Kaganovich, M. and Meier, V. (2008) Social security systems, human capital, and growth in a small 
open economy, CESifo Working Paper, N° 2488. 
Kaganovich, M. and Zilcha, I. (1999) Education, social security and growth, Journal of Public 
Economics, 71, 289-309.  
Kemnitz, A. and Wigger, B.U. (2000) Growth and social security: the role of human capital, European 
Journal of Political Economy, 16, 673-683. 
Kidd, S. and Whitehouse, E. (2009) Pensions and old-age poverty, in Holzmann, R., Robalino, D.A and 
Takayama, N., Closing the coverage gap: the role of social pensions and other retirement income 
transfers, World Bank, Chapter 3. 
King, R.G. and Rebelo, S. (1990) Public policy and economic growth: developing neoclassical 
implications, Journal of Political Economy, 98, S126-150. 
Le Garrec, G. (2012) Social security, income inequality and growth, Journal of Pension Economics and 
Finance, 11, 53-70.  
Lindbeck, A. and M. Persson (2003) The gains from pension reform, Journal of Economic Literature, 
41, 74-112. 
Ludwig A., Schelkle T. and Vogel E. (2012) Demographic change, human capital and welfare, Review of 
Economic Dynamics, 15, 94-107.  
Lucas, R.E. (1988) On the mechanics of economic development, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22, 3-
42. 
Nickell, S., Nunziata, L., and Ochel, W. (2005) Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s. What do 
we know?, Economic Journal, 115, 1-27. 
OECD (2005) Pensions at a Glance: Public policies across OECD countries, OECD, Paris. 
Ohanian, L., Raffo, A., and Rogerson, R. (2008) Long-term changes in labor supply and taxes: Evidence 
from OECD countries, 1956-2004, Journal of Monetary Economics, 55, 1353-1362.  
Reyneri, E. (1994) Italy: A long wait in the shelter of the family and of safeguards from the State in: O. 
Benoit-Guilbot and D. Gaillie (eds.), Long-term Unemployment, London, Pinter, 97-110. 
Rogerson, R. (2007) Taxation and market work: Is Scandinavia an outlier?, NBER Working Paper, N° 
12890. 
Rogerson, R. and Wallenius, J. (2009) Micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 2277-2292. 
138 
 
Samuelson, P.A. (1958) An exact consumption-loan model of interest, with or without the social 
contrivance of money, Journal of Political Economy, 66, 467-482. 
Sheshinski, E. (1978) A model of social security and retirement decisions, Journal of Public Economics, 
10, 337-360. 
Sommacal, A. (2006) Pension systems and intragenerational redistribution when labor supply is 
endogenous, Oxford Economic Papers, 58, 379-406. 
Stokey, N.L. and Rebelo, S. (1995) Growth effects of flat-rate taxes, Journal of Political Economy, 103, 
519-550. 
Turnovsky, S.J. (2000) Fiscal policy, elastic labor supply, and endogenous growth, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 45, 185-210. 
Whiteford, P. and Whitehouse, E. (2006) Pension Challenges and Pension Reforms in OECD Countries, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(1), 78-94. 
Whitehouse, E., D’Addio, A., Chomik, R. and Reilly, A. (2009) Two decades of pension reform: What 
has been achieved and what remains to be done, The Geneva Papers, 34, 515-535.  
Woessman, L. (2003) Schooling resources, educational institutions and student performance: the 
international evidence, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 65, 117-170. 
Zhang, J. (1995) Social security and endogenous growth, Journal of Public Economics, 58, 185-213. 
Zhang, J. and Zhang, J. (2003) Long-run effects of unfunded social security with earnings-dependent 
benefits, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28, 617-641.  
139 
 
Appendix 1: Construction of data and data sources 
 
In this appendix we provide more detail on the construction of some of our performance variables 
and policy variables.  
 
Employment rate in hours (in one of three age groups, 1995-2007) 
Definition: total actual hours worked by individuals in the age group / potential hours worked. 
Actual hours worked = total employment in persons x average hours worked per week x average 
number of weeks worked per year. 
Potential hours = total population in the age group x 2080 (where 2080 = 52 weeks per year x 40 
hours per week) 
Data sources:  
* Total employment and total population in the age group: OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics by Sex 
and Age. Data are available for many age groups, among which 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-
64. We constructed the data for our three age groups as weighted averages. 
* Average hours worked per week: OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics, Average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job. These data are available only for age groups 15-24, 25-54, 55-64. We use 
the OECD data for the age group 15-24 as a proxy for our age subgroup 20-24, the OECD data for the 
age group 25-54 as a proxy for our age (sub)groups 25-34, 35-49 and 50-54. 
* Average number of weeks worked per year: Due to lack of further detail, we use the same data for 
each age group. The average number of weeks worked per year has been approximated by dividing 
average annual hours actually worked per worker (total employment) by average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job by all workers (total employment). Data source: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics, Hours worked. 
 
Education rate of the young (age group 20-34, 1995-2006) 
Definition: total hours studied by individuals of age 20-34 / potential hours studied 
As a proxy we have computed the ratio:  20 34 20 24 25 34 20 340 5 0 25fts . pts . pts / pop      
with:  fts the number of full-time students in the age group 20-34 
           pts the number of part-time students in the age groups 20-24 and 25-34. 
           pop total population of age 20-34 
Full-time students are assumed to spend all their time studying. For part-time students of age 20-24 
we make the assumption (for all countries) that they spend 50% of their time studying, part-time 
students of age 25-34 are assumed to spend 25% of their time studying. Due to the limited number 
of part-time students, these specific weights matter very little.  
Data sources:  
* Full-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes, full-time)  
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* Part-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes). We subtracted the data for full-
time students from those for ‘full-time and part-time students’.  
Data are available in 1995-2006. However, for many countries (quite) some years are missing. Period 
averages are computed on the basis of all available annual data.  
 
Average effective retirement age (1995-2006) 
Definition: Average age of all persons (being 40 or older) withdrawing from the labor force in a given 
period.   
Data source: OECD, Ageing and Employment Policies – Statistics on average effective age of 
retirement. 
 
Annual real potential per capita GDP growth rate (aggregate, 1995-2007) 
Definition: Annual growth rate of real potential GDP per person of working age 
Data sources:  
* real potential GDP: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, supply block, series GDPVTR. 
* population at working age: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, labour markets, 
series POPT. 
 
Tax rate on labor income (w) 
Definition: Total tax wedge, marginal tax rate in % of gross wage earnings. The data cover personal 
income taxes, employee and employer social security contributions payable on wage earnings and 
payroll taxes.  
Data source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, Financial and Fiscal Affairs, Taxing Wages, Comparative 
tax rates and benefits (new definition). 
The OECD publishes marginal labor tax rates for several family and income situations: single persons 
at 67%, 100% and 167% of average earnings (no children), single persons at 67% of average earnings 
(two children), one-earner married couples at 100% of average earnings (two children), two-earner 
married couples, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 33 % (no children, 2 children), 
two-earner married couples, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 67 % (2 children). Our 
data in Table 3 are the averages of these eight cases. Data for 2000-04. 
 
Government debt (Dt) 
Definition: General government gross financial liabilities.  
Data source: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, N° 89, Government Accounts. 
 
Net benefit replacement rates when young and middle aged (b) 
Definition: The data concern net transfers received by long-term unemployed people and include 
social assistance, family benefits and housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also 
include unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still 
paid, i.e. if workers can be structurally unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit 
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eligibility. The data are expressed in % of after-tax wages. The OECD provides net replacement rates 
for six family situations and three earnings levels. Our data in Table 4 are the averages of these 18 
cases. Data for 2001-04. 
Data source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives 
Data adjustment: Original OECD data for Norway include the so-called “waiting benefit” 
(ventestønad), which a person could get after running out of unemployment benefits. Given the 
conditional nature of these “waiting benefits”, they do not match our definition of benefits paid to 
structurally non-employed individuals. We have therefore deducted them from the OECD data, which 
led to a reduction of net replacement rates by about 19 percentage points. For example, recipients 
should demonstrate high regional mobility and willingness to take a job anywhere in Norway. The 
“waiting benefit” was terminated in 2008. We thank Tatiana Gordine at the OECD for clarifying this 
issue with us.   
 
Early retirement replacement rates (ber) 
To calculate our proxy for ber we have focused on the possibility for older workers in some countries 
to leave the labor market along fairly generous early retirement routes. Duval (2003) and Brandt et 
al. (2005) provide data for the so-called implicit tax rate on continued work for five more years in the 
early retirement route at age 55 and age 60. The idea is as follows. If an individual stops working 
(instead of continuing for five more years), he receives a benefit (early retirement, disability…) and 
no longer pays contributions for his future pension. A potential disadvantage is that he may receive a 
lower pension later, since he contributed less during active life. Duval (2003) calculated the 
difference between the present value of the gains and the costs of early retirement, in percent of 
gross earnings before retirement. We use his data as a proxy for the gross benefit replacement rate 
for older workers in the early retirement route. To compute the net benefit replacement rate, we 
assume the same tax rate on early retirement benefits as on unemployment benefits. We call this net 
benefit replacement rate rer. However, these implicit tax rates are only very rough estimates of the 
real incentive to retire embedded in early retirement schemes and are subject to important caveats 
(Duval, 2003, p. 15). The available implicit tax rates take into account neither the strictness of 
eligibility criteria nor the presence of alternative social transfer programs that may de facto be used 
as early retirement devices. Our assumption will be that a realistic replacement rate for the early 
retirement route (ber) will be a weighted average of rer and b, where we take the latter as a proxy for 
the replacement rate in alternative social transfer programs. If rer > b, older workers will aim for the 
official early retirement route, but they may not all meet eligibility criteria and have to fall back on 
alternative programs. If rer < b, workers will aim for the alternative, but again they may not be 
eligible. We propose that ber = ξb + (1-ξ)rer. Underlying the data in Table 4 is the assumption that 
ξ=0.5. Correlation between ber and rer lies around 0.92. Cross-country differences roughly remain 
intact. Our results in the main text do not depend in any serious way on this assumption for ξ.  
Data Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Duval (2003), 
Brandt et al. (2005).  
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Net pension replacement rates (    and     for a=L,M,H) 
OECD (2005, p. 52) presents net pension replacement rates for individuals at various multiples of  
average individual earnings in the economy. We consider the data for individuals at 50% of average  
earnings as representative for the low ability group, individuals with average earnings as 
representative for the medium ability group, and individuals with twice average earnings as 
representative for the high ability group. Country studies in OECD (2005, part II) show the 
composition (sources) of this net replacement rate. This composition may be different for individuals 
with different income levels. Our proxy for     includes all earnings-related pensions and mandatory 
occupational pensions when they depend on wages or hours worked. Our proxy for     includes 
basic pensions, minimum pensions, targeted pensions, and old-age social assistance benefits, i.e. all 
categories that are not (or even inversely) related to individual earnings.  
Since in our model     is a percentage of the average net wage in the economy (Equation 9), 
whereas the above described OECD data are in percent of an individual’s net wage, we multiply the 
OECD data with the ratio of the replacement in percent of average earnings to the replacement rate 
in percent of individual earnings to obtain our    . This ratio can be derived from the ‘pension 
modelling’ tables in the individual country studies, at various multiples of average earnings. 
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Appendix 2: Detail on calibration procedure to determine    and   (with        ) 
 
Given the data for US relative wages in Table 2, we have for the low-ability group that:  
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We also know from Equation (26) that 
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Similarly, it is easy to obtain for the medium ability group: 
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If we finally take into account that           , and we introduce values for           and 
          which we simultaneously obtain elsewhere in the calibration (as functions of the 
employment rates and       and   , which themselves depend on       and  ), it is easy to see 
that we have three remaining equations in three unknowns (        ) that can be solved. 
 
Along the same line of reasoning, we obtain values for       and    such that our model matches 
the relative wages of middle aged low and medium ability workers for the US, as well as the target 
value for education (e) over all 13 countries. The direct link between       and education, and 
these relative wages, is obvious from the following two equations:   
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where we know that       and    are functions of       and    respectively and    and   . 
Furthermore, also       and       depend on these parameters via       and       as we 
have shown above.  
 
 
 
